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This thesis seeks to enhance our understanding of the Technology-
Organisation (T-O) relationship by developing a novel theorization, based on the
concept of the Agora of Techno-Organisational Change (ATOC). This concept is
developed and examined in relation to detailed studies around a Greek Bank (GB)
and a systems supplier (SIF). The thesis starts by exploring various approaches to
analyzing the T-O relationship articulated from different disciplines. It identifies a
number of shortcomings - linked to key theoretical distinctions/debates in social
sciences (action-structure, micro-macro, global-local, T-O) and around specific
issues relevant to analyzing the shaping of T-O - in relation to undertaking an
interdisciplinary study of the T-O relationship. These include inconsistencies, partial
perspectives and lack of conceptual integration.
Building on the Social Shaping of Technology perspective, an alternative
analytical focus is suggested to capture and theorize the shaping of the T-O
relationship in a more complete manner, integrating different analytical levels and
perspectives of actors in differing positions and roles. Specifically, a focus on
"instances of T-O change" is proposed capturing the social choices during their
initiation, design and implementation, within the space between local change
environments and wider socio-economic relations amongst actors (firms) within a
global knowledge economy. The ATOC is approached methodologically by
paralleling the analyst's view with the actors' views addressing the diverse ways that
different actors conceive, interpret and act on options for T-O change, through social
choices.
Two detailed longitudinal studies - one of a large restructuring program in
GB as a particular T-O change instance and one of the involvement of SIF in the
initiation, design and implementation of various T-O change instances - help explore
these concepts empirically. The cases examine how instances are initiated, designed
and implemented, their links to the wider ATOC environment and how they become
a terrain for the emergence of social choices and viewpoints.
Empirical findings elucidate the operation of the ATOC as a practice/action
space for T-O change, conceived as a networked, heterogeneous, complex multi-
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actor and multi-level environment governed by market dynamics and actors' politics
and actions. This highlights a set of challenges for T-0 change management
(complexity, distributed control, uncertainty, etc.), framed by and managed through
actors' viewpoints of the ATOC. The viewpoint approach to strategic T-0 change
management offers a basis for the generation, rationalization, legitimation and
promotion of choices, but also the foreclosing of choice (non-choices) as possibilities
for action. It is also shown that such choices and non-choices arise through and
contribute to processes of ATOC "particularization" and "abstraction" that link local,
particular change instances with the abstract, global knowledge economy. In addition
to exploring the empirical context, this thesis contributes to the analytical, theoretical
and epistemological advances in the study of T&O by theorizing the action-structure
and technology-organisation relationships as they are captured by the multilevel
analytical framework the ATOC concept offers. Finally, given the changing
epistemic as well as empirical realities, this study points towards the direction of a
new sociology of T&O that embraces interdisciplinary research and epistemologies,
provides the basis ofbuilding a solid academic identity for analysts and a more
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"All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from
particular points of view"




EXPLORING THE TECHNOLOGY - ORGANISATION
RELATIONSHIP
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an exploratory study on the relationship between technology
and organisation (T&O) within the interdisciplinary field of Science and Technology
Studies (STS). Based on two empirical case studies on techno-organisational (T-O)
change in the banking industry in Greece, the thesis develops a novel theorisation,
which explains the relationship between T&O as it is shaped in the space between
local instances of T-0 change and the global knowledge economy. This new theory
is based on the concept of Agora of Techno-Organisational Change (ATOC), which
represents and analytically captures a multi-actor, multi-level socio-economic
environment within which actions, interactions and social choices contribute to the
social shaping of T&O. With the development of this alternative theorisation of the
T-0 relationship the thesis aims at integrating existing analytical approaches and
issues into an interdisciplinary framework in a way that would capture the changing
socio-economic developments in the shaping of T&O. Therefore, this chapter sets
the grounds in order to form a basis and explain the rationale and motives behind this
study.
1.2 BEING A SOCIAL SCIENTIST
Based on the Weberian teachings (see Weber, 1949) that see scientists as
members of the society they live in and as products of a specific historical era unable
to free themselves from the values they carry, it could be argued that it is each
historical era and its socio-economic circumstances that pose the important questions
that analysts work to answer. The emergence of "hot" and "popular" empirical
2
questions and contexts and their problematisation by various theoretico-analytical
academic paradigms evolves in parallel with the history of society (-ies) they emerge
into. However, the way academic research and scientific paradigms shift, evolve and
interact with each other during this social process of knowledge production make the
relationship between the empirical context of study and the relevant theoretico-
analytical and conceptual development appear extremely complex as they co-evolve
throughout history. The recent focus on interdisciplinarity as a popular trend in
academic research has influenced the organisation of knowledge production. The
idea that each academic discipline should have their own separate research topics
(i.e. social scientists should study social phenomena while natural scientists should
study natural phenomena) seems to be shifting towards the idea that each topic,
important enough to be scientifically addressed, should be examined by the
employment of a variety of disciplines, or disciplinary paradigms. In this way many
different aspects relevant to the topic in question would be addressed and explored.
This also shows a direction towards the idea that a "phenomenon" that can be
scientifically addressed and investigated is not only social or natural, rather it has
many important aspects. Recent developments in the field of genetics constitute a
relevant example. For instance, research on stem-cells is done by biologists,
biochemists, genetic engineers, but also by social scientists that explore the social,
economic, cultural, historical, ethical and legal implications of these developments.
In general, the whole field of STS as it was developing was linked to the promotion
of the idea of interdisciplinarity by aiming to show that science and technology can
be interestingly studied by social scientists.
The relationship between T&O is such a research topic that has been studied
in many diverse ways by a variety of disciplines and has been conceptualised in
many different ways. More recently it has been placed under the interest of more
interdisciplinary research frameworks, given the recent trends in the re-organisation
of academic knowledge production. Analytically, throughout the years (since Marx, I
may arbitrarily suggest) the T-0 relationship has been empirically identified and
illustrated in diverse ways, also in relation to the material and socio-economic
changes in societies. Up to the 1980s, for instance, the T&O relationship was studied
in relation to the activity of manufacturing - see for example from Braverman (1974),
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Noble (1984) and the work of Fleck on robotics in the 1980s (1983; 1984) - while
more recently there is a shift towards studies on high-tech and service sectors
(Fincham et al, 1994), as they have come to gain increasing importance for the
economy due to the development and expansion of technology supply and its
application to service industries. Additionally, the theoretical and analytical value of
the T-0 relationship for the understanding of socio-economic developments in
contemporary societies was constructed by the involvement of diverse
epistemologies (sociology, management, economics, STS, organisation studies).
Given the above developments on knowledge production and on socio¬
economic relations, the relationship between T&O has been discussed and explored
within a variety of empirical contexts (industrial, organisational, national,
international, technological, regional) and has been understood and theorised in
many different ways based on various disciplinary and interdisciplinary insights,
concepts and epistemologies. Although different aspects on the topic have indeed
been addressed and explored by research based on different paradigms within
different empirical contexts, as the socio-economic context historically evolves the
study of T&O for an analyst of the present suffers from various problems. These are:
conceptual disintegration, inconsistency and the knowledge that is produced is
incomplete in the sense that different aspects on T&O which are addressed and
explored in interdisciplinary research are not effectively integrated in order to
constitute a resource of concrete scientific knowledge on a research topic. At the
present time, interdisciplinary and multi-aspect understanding of a topic is a
requirement that the present system of knowledge production is based upon.
Studying the T-0 relationship in an interdisciplinary manner, then, given the way
past studies and epistemologies have evolved while socio-economic relations are
historically transforming, require a reflexive examination and integration of relevant
existing studies within an interdisciplinary framework. This means that there should
be an attempt for theoretical, analytical and epistemological developments informed
by current pragmatic trends in socio-economic relations shaping T&O.
In stating this at a more personal terms, being an active member myself of the
society I live in and influenced by the socio-economic and historical circumstances
of the era while in the process of shaping my academic identity, I cannot stay
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unaffected by the recent developments in interdisciplinary research as well as
developments in the social and economic relations I am part of. My personal journey
of exploring the relationship between T&O, given my previous background as a
sociologist, was characterised by confusion stemming from the diverse
interdisciplinary research I encountered as part of my post-graduate training at
Edinburgh University while trying to familiarise myself with the contemporary
trends in the interdisciplinary field of Science and Technology Studies as they were
trying to explain social and economic changes around Science and Technology. The
present study, then, constitutes the documentation and elaboration of this confusion.
1.3 INTERDISCIPLINARY IN TECHNOLOGY AND
ORGANISATION
I started my PhD studies by reading the variety of available literature trying
to formulate a focus of analysis for my study and possible research questions and
issues of enquiry. Coming from a "pure" sociology background and a Master's thesis
on the sociology of work, technology and organisation, I first came in contact with
studies on technology and society, where organisation appears as a more specific,
meso-context of enquiry (macro being the societal level and micro the individual
level). Issues relating to historical changes in the systems of industrial organisation
and management systems (Fordism, post-Fordism, lean production, flexible
specialisation, Taylorism, human resources approach) and the effects of these
changes on issues interesting mostly to labour process research and organisational
sociologists studying the workplace (de-skilling, unions, control, negative effects of
Taylorism, workplace surveillance and control, management and politics in work
organisation, etc.). In addition to the above, more issues on wide or narrow
definitions of technology and on the question of technological determinism at both
societal and organisational levels, came to my attention, as I was slowly exploring
fundamental studies in the STS field.
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Thus, I became aware of more general shifts in the understanding of
technology and society and in particular a number specific contexts. From
deterministic views that see technology as autonomous systems that shape social
relations to more constructivist approaches that explore technologies as socially
constructed and shaped. From more structural, macro understandings of technology
and its relationship with society to more action-oriented, micro approaches that
illustrate the actions and choices of social groups, actors and players in the shaping
of technologies within certain contexts of design and implementation. From more
rationalistic and managerial understandings of technology and society (organisation)
to more political and processual models of inquiry. As the topic of T&O started to
become the centre of more interdisciplinary research (STS, economics of innovation,
theories of the firm, organisation studies and sociology, management, etc.) another
distinction was brought to my attention. This distinction was between studies that
focused on technological artefacts and studies that focused on organisation, whatever
that meant (firm, organisational processes, organisational structure, work
organisation, business models) in the context of each study. All the above
dichotomies reflect differences in analytical foci and approaches to the study of
technology and society in general and of T&O in particular.
Within a more interdisciplinary framework, different disciplinary
commitments were making their appearance in the study of T&O. For example, some
research focuses on the shifting boundaries of organisations and their external
environments (organisation studies), other research focuses on markets, technology
supply and the relationships between supply and use (economics, economic
sociology). Other research focuses on the relationship between design and use of
technologies in organisational contexts (STS). Others focus on the organisational
politics of innovation (STS, technology management). Others on the role of
knowledge and expertise in the shaping of technology (sociology of knowledge,
STS). Others on actors' strategies (strategic technology management), and so on.
This diverse attention to various issues in relation to the shaping of T&O seem to be
bound to previous commitments of disciplinary research brought into an
interdisciplinary framework. Their importance is undisputed for the shaping of T&O,
however, for a present student of T&O within an interdisciplinary framework such
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diverse studies create confusion in the sense that they are not integrated under a
new interdisciplinary knowledge map supporting a solid academic and epistemic
identity.
1.4 MOTIVATION AND AIMS OF THE THESIS
This analysis of relevant literature on the study of technology and society in
general and technology and organisation in particular has caused me great confusion
and uncertainty in relation to whether it was worth it to pursue a PhD degree in the
field and become part of this perceived "chaos", or not. I had started losing my
identity and I was confused about my place within this ambiguous interdisciplinary
field. Everything seemed relevant but yet vain and hopeless at the same time. In
search of a theoretical and analytical approach to become a basis for a PhD study on
the relationship between T&O things became increasingly confusing. The SST
approach itself, although it provided some sort of integration between sociological
and economic approaches, suffers from conceptual disintegration (Sorensen &
Williams, 2002), which makes it difficult to proceed to concrete and confident
research design decisions. This frustration pointed in the direction of trying to
provide such an integration which would lead to a more complete exploration of the
relationship between T&O. In doing so, original research and analysis tools would
have to be developed, based on shortcomings in existing approaches, that would
somehow integrate theoretical-analytical approaches into a consistent and complete
template for the study of T&O. Therefore, the motivation to proceed with this study
was the challenge to try to integrate previously inconsistent and disintegrated
literatures within an emerging inderdisciplinary field. Some initial original research
design and methodological choices were made (see chapter three) but as the research
was unfolding various other important issues emerged and were crystallised into
what is termed here as a new sociology of T&O, in which innovative research design
and methodological steps were integrated with research findings towards the building
of a new theory to approach the study of T&O, from an analyst's point of view. This
new theory also provides useful insights and resources for practitioners to understand
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this relationship and be able to manage the strategic challenges associated with this
relationship as they emerge and are revealed by this study. In other words, the
motivation and objectives of this study were to integrate previously inconsistent
research, on the basis of developing a new knowledge map that would provide the
basis for a new sociology of T&O that would reflect the changing socio-economic
environment and present developments in T&O.
In summary, the research topic shaping the relationship between T&O as
explored through a personal journey in relevant so-called multidisciplinary and
multi-approach literature appears quite heterogeneous, inconsistent, unfocused,
analytically distracting and with incompleteness. There is a great challenge in
integrating and resolving those inconsistencies requiring innovative methodological,
theoretical-analytical and conceptual advancements. This task, if achieved, will
enhance the academic, analytical, epistemological and methodological identity of
researchers studying T&O in an interdisciplinary manner. It will link the empirical
socio-economic relations and developments with analytical transformations in
knowledge production and it will also provide a more unified, complete, unbiased
and reliable source of influence of industrial practice, decision making, strategic and
policy planning in issues relevant to the shaping of T&O.
1.5 RESEARCH CONTEXT, METHODOLOGY AND
OBJECTIVES
Speaking of socio-economic transformations and the inability of existing
research to effectively and consistently link with them and address them within an
interdisciplinary framework, this section will start by referring to the socio-economic
and empirical context that this study will be based on. More particularly, recent
developments in the banking industry and the parallel development and
commoditisation of the banking technology supply industry and the way these
emerge in the Greek context offer a good opportunity to study the shaping of T&O in
the making. Access to a large restructuring program in a Greek Bank (GB) offered
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the ground in which one case study could be designed and conducted. Later on, and
while the first case was unfolding, access was gained to a systems supplier firm
(SIF), around which a second case study was designed and carried out. The particular
national and organisational context, its historical development and evolution and the
particularities or similarities with other contexts and international trends were
important and need to become visible in the course of this study. These empirical
cases which refer to large or smaller scale T-0 change instances reflect wider
transformations in the social and economic relations around which the T-0
relationship may be analytically captured and understood.
In terms of the methodological approach to the empirical field and based on
the literature that I have come across, I realised early on that I had to try new things
in order to move away from previous inconsistencies characterising STS as a
developing field. Literature on the notion of space and time in the context of
innovation (Clausen & Koch, 1999; Jorgensen & Sorensen, 1999; Heiskanen, 2003),
and insights from the Social Shaping of Technology perspective (Williams & Edge,
1996; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999), which point to the direction towards the
exploration of social and economic choices that, consciously or not, become inherent
in technologies, systems or directions of innovation programs (Williams & Edge,
1996), provided a source of inspiration. I realized that I had to shift the direction of
research focus away from artifacts, organizations, actions or structures and instead
try to identify a new socio-economic space that would incorporate all these and make
visible a more complete view of the social and economic relations that are involved
in the shaping of T&O from which choices emerge. I therefore suggested a focus on
"instances of T-0 change" as they rise from a wider environment of socio-economic
relations within the so-called global knowledge economy. Placing the social situation
of T-0 change instance at the centre of attention would first help develop an
unbiased sampling strategy as important actors would emerge from within the
instance and not chosen arbitrarily, and second, such a focus would make more
visible the social and economic choices (herein identified as "social") that shape the
relationship between T&O as it appears in the empirical context of a particular T-0
change instance. Methodologically and analytically, then, the shaping of the
relationship between T&O was looked for in social choices made during the
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initiation, design and implementation of local, particular T-0 change instances as
they emerge from social and economic relations of an increasingly globalised
knowledge economy. In capturing the space between T-0 change instances and the
global knowledge economy, the concept of "Agora of T-0 Change" (ATOC) was
introduced.
The concept of social choice as an action influencing the relationship
between T&O should not be confused here with managerial understandings of choice
and action that refer to decision making. It includes decision-making and managerial
choices of course but it is rather based on a more political view of social choice on
the social shaping of T&O (see for example Williams & Edge, 1996; McLoughlin et
al, 2000 on the role of 'change agents'). It is examined "in the making" rather than a
definite event as some constructionist (or rather de-constructionist) approaches
would suggest. This way the motivations, the negotiations, the final decisions taken
within a certain social situation and their legitimization and justification will be
revealed in relation to social choices as actions. In other words, although it is
assumed that the shaping of T&O is a product of choice and negotiation by actors,
they key point is to focus not just on the outcomes of T-O change and choice but also
on the processes by which these come about (see, for instance, McLoughlin &
Badham, 2005:836). Based on the SST teachings, therefore, the concept of action
(choice) and actor will be explored in this study in relation to the shaping of T&O.
After identifying the empirical context that was available and appropriate for
the study of T&O and after developing an alternative methodological and analytical
approach to it so as not to fall into the inconsistencies of previous research in the
field, more particular research objectives had to be formulated that would take into
consideration the particular research context. The main objective of this study is to
develop a conceptual understanding of the manner in which innovation occurs in
spaces between rather than within organizations. In doing so, the concept of ATOC
is explored towards two directions: Firstly, as a new kind of innovation space. The
two case studies empirically demonstrate the utility of the ATOC concept to
revealing key dynamics, challenges, actions and choices of actors within this space
ranging from local T-0 change instances to the global knowledge economy.
Secondly, the analytical and theoretical capabilities and potential of the ATOC
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concept are explored towards the achievement of a new multilevel, integrated,
interdisciplinary sociology of T&O where actors, actions and structures become
more visible in the shaping of T&O.
In summary, this study suggests and empirically explores a new approach to
the study of T&O with the purpose to move away from inconsistencies of previous
research approaches caused by diverse analytical foci and disciplinary commitments
and biases. In doing so, a more integrated and complete approach in the study of
T&O is pursued by identifying and exploring a new social space (ATOC) that
captures the social choices emerging from the social and economic relations between
actors. In response to its initial motivation, this study points in the direction towards
a new sociology of T&O. On one hand, this new sociology will provide a more solid
basis for the formulation of academic identities by developing a new analytical and
knowledge map for the study of T&O, while on the other hand it will provide a more
complete, consistent and reliable resource of scientific knowledge for reflexive
thinking, strategic and policy planning and action by industry practitioners.
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter two is devoted to reviewing the relevant literature in the study of
T&O. Due to the epistemological and analytical objectives of this thesis various
epistemologies will be examined with studies from a variety of disciplines. The
review of the literature will be driven by the concerns of my integrating point of
view and the changing epistemological frame in the study of T&O. This revolves
around various analytical distinctions that make possible the classification of the
literature in a certain manner. The criteria of reviewing the literature, then, will not
be based so much on comparing findings on different empirical contexts, although
this issue will be touched peripherally especially when talking about different aspects
on the shaping of T&O. The criteria of reviewing the relevant literature will be based
on revealing how a certain mapping of relevant literature might create
inconsistencies and incompleteness in the study of T&O.
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In chapter three, new analytical concepts and new methodological
approaches are introduced, based on the particular reading of existing literature on
T&O. It is explained how these new innovative conceptual and methodological
developments will fill the gaps identified in the literature. Additionally, the research
questions are presented and discussed, as well as the methods of data collection and
analysis.
In chapter four, the particular industrial, international and national context of
the study is discussed. Developments in international banking as well as
developments in the global development and supply ofbanking technologies are
briefly presented. Additionally, the extent to which these international developments
have influenced the national environment of Greece and the Greek banking and
technology supply industry is examined.
Chapters five and six are devoted to the presentation of the empirical data
from the two case studies conducted in this study. In chapter five, a large
restructuring effort in a Greek Bank (GB) is at the centre of analytical focus, as an
instance of T-0 change, while in chapter six the involvement of a systems integration
firm in the initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change instances is
explored. In these chapters, the voices of certain actors are becoming more visible
(or better, audible) in the way they develop and promote social choices.
Chapter seven revisits the empirical data and attempts an analysis of the cases
and an integration of the findings. New analytical concepts are put to use and bring
the empirical material in line with the purposes of the thesis. Certain issues that
emerge from the case studies on the initiation, design and implementation of T-0
change instances are discussed under the new suggested methodological and
analytical grounds, the challenges for actors and the way they face them are also
discussed and, finally, the new social and economic space linking T-0 change
instances with the wider environment of the global knowledge economy, captured by
the notion of ATOC, is identified and explained.
In chapter eight, the conclusions that this study has reached are presented.
Developments on the concepts of technology, organisation and the concept of
techno-organisational are discussed, the process of managing the challenges of T-0
change is theorised and finally the possibility of entering a new dimension in the
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study of T&O is examined by pointing to the direction of a new sociology of T&O
that integrates and embraces interdisciplinary research and epistemologies, provides
the basis ofbuilding a solid academic identity for analysts and also a more complete
and reliable source of knowledge for industry practitioners and policy makers.
CHAPTER 2
13
EMBRACING INTERDISCIPLINARY IN THE STUDY
OF TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANISATION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will be devoted to the review of relevant literature in relation to
the interdisciplinary study of T&O. The aim is to explore how empirical, but most
importantly, theoretical, analytical and epistemological developments in various
disciplines and research traditions in social sciences can be brought into the
interdisciplinary study of the relationship between T&O. I am questioning whether
existing research and analytical approaches from various disciplines that have been
(or could be) seen as part of the interdisciplinary field of STS is adequate in
addressing current issues and developments regarding social and economic relations
involved in the shaping of T&O. The literature reviewed here does not necessarily
address the T-0 relationship. The issues it raises, however, and the way technology
or organisation analytically appear in various approaches, as well as the way contexts
and actions are addressed, are very relevant in understanding the T-0 relationship
and its shaping. A student of the present that wants to study T&O in an
interdisciplinary manner within STS comes across these issues and approaches,
which should be integrated, into a new interdisciplinary knowledge map pointing
towards a new sociology of T&O.
The purpose of this literature review is not to criticize existing literature on
the grounds of identifying certain flaws and suggest an alternative way in which
certain studies could have been conducted. The purpose is rather to provide a certain
reading of the existing relevant literature available to a student within the STS
discipline in order to illustrate the need for a changing epistemological frame, a
theory that integrates the inconsistencies identified by such a reading. This, in turn,
will provide a basis for addressing and exploring recent developments on the social
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and economic relations that shape T&O in an interdisciplinary manner. Thus, the
value of the literature reviewed here is not questioned per se. Rather I aim to add
value to existing and future literature by emphasising the need to place the issues that
they raise within a new knowledge map that theorises, analytically captures and
empirically addresses current social and economic developments. In this way, the
concept of interdisciplinarity will be embraced and treated as an analytical tool in
itself, rather than treating it as a 'ghost concept' or as a 'black-box'.
The exploration of the relevant literature will be linked to key theoretical and
analytical distinctions/debates in social sciences. More particularly, issues on action-
structure, micro-macro, global-local as well as the 'technology-organisation'
distinction are discussed and the way they appear in STS literature. In addition,
attempts for transcendence of such dichotomies towards their more efficient use is
also examined. Finally, special attention will be given to the ways social choice,
action and actors appear in this literature.
2.2 ACTION-STRUCTURE, MICRO-MACRO or
GLOBAL-LOCAL?
Given my sociology background, in the beginning of this research and with a
wide understanding of literature in the area of sociology of work, organizations and
ICTs, I had a relatively weak engagement with the bulk of interdisciplinary research
on technology and organizations. Inevitably, my first reading of the relevant
literature was based on "pure" sociological analytical distinctions of action-structure
and micro-macro.
The action-structure dichotomy constitutes a criterion of differentiation between
grand theoretical traditions in social sciences as they developed based on opposing
principles and perceptions relating to action-structure and micro-macro distinctions.
Examples of such opposing traditions are structural-functionalism, which focuses on
structure and the macro level, symbolic interactionism focusing on action at the
micro level of interaction between individuals, while more recent paradigms, such as
postmodernism, tend to neglect any kind of analytical distinctions of that kind (see
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Craib, 1984). Apart from the theoretical perspectives focusing on agency, those
that emphasize structures and those that completely ignore the action-structure
dichotomy, there are also theoretical attempts to study action and structure together
as important elements to the constitution of "the social". Such a perspective is the so-
called "structuration theory", the brainchild of Anthony Giddens (1976; 1979; 1984).
Giddens' overall purpose and ambition has been to "put an end" to each of the
"empire-building endeavors" of functionalism/structuralism on one hand and
hermeneutics/interpretivism on the other (Giddens, 1984:2). In other words, Giddens
believes that functionalism/structuralism is too macro and
hermeneutics/interpretivism too micro (Taylor et al, 2001:31) and therefore, his
major purpose was to integrate and unite these two different grand paradigmatic
epistemologies into a more holistic analysis of social phenomena. In doing so,
Giddens develops a theoretical scheme that describes the constitution of the social as
a process in which both structure and human action are involved and produce and
reproduce each other. Thus, he rejects the dualism (separating the macro from the
micro world) as a basic principle of sociological theory development and he replaces
it with duality1. The term structuration signifies the process by which structures lead
to the constitution of social systems (Mouzelis, 1995:118). In this research the issue
of theorising action and structure in a specific context of research, will be explored.
Besides Giddens, other contemporary theorists have produced significant accounts
on the production and reproduction of social relations based on some interpretations
of the action-structure dichotomy (see for instance Bourdieu,1977 and
Habermas,1984; 1987).
In Giddens' work the action-structure dichotomy has been closely associated
with the micro-macro analytical distinction, thus, identifying structural accounts as
more macro while action-oriented accounts are more micro. However, Mouzelis
(1995) gives a more sophisticated explanation of the need to link micro and macro
sociologies. He argues that the attempts to bridge the micro-macro gap in sociology,
like that of Knorr-Cetina (1981), are "a truthful reflection of the overall failure of
1 The constitution of agents and structures are not two independent processes, as dualist accounts
would argue, rather the duality ofstructure implies that structures are not external to individuals
(Taylor et al, 2001:34), in other words, they are inseparable from the agent's conduct (Mouzelis,
1995:118).
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theoretically oriented micro-sociologists to deal satisfactorily with the major flaws
of Parsons' middle and late work, particularly with its under-emphasis on macro
actors" (Mouzelis, 1995:24). This failure, Mouzelis continues, is due to not taking
into serious account (a) macro actors, whose unequal access to the major economic,
political and cultural means of social construction enables them to take decisions
stretching widely in time and space; and (b) the complex social hierarchies that, via
formal organisations or otherwise, link micro, meso and macro actors and encounters
(ibid.). Mouzelis does not demonise the distinction itself, as long as micro is not
linked to agency nor macro to structure (ibid: 155). As he puts it, "whether we are
dealing with actors/interactions or institutional structures, macro refers to cases
where the impact of institutionalised rules (when instantiated) or actors' practices
stretch widely in time and space; micro applies where this impact is very limited"
(ibid.). Mouzelis, then, identifies correctly the differences between macro and micro
levels as differences in the scope and range of influence that a social whole might
project and not as differences between action and structure. The hierarchical nature
of social wholes is, according to Mouzelis, what links the micro, meso and macro
levels. They must be viewed both from a systemic/institutional and agency
perspective (ibid:26). The hierarchical nature of social wholes that Mouzelis suggests
as an alternative focus of research, might be seen as referring to the different
positions of different actors within a social whole and their access to rules and
resources and to mechanisms of power.
The tension between the micro and the macro, within the frame of SST and in
the sociology of technology in general has been associated with the distinction of
global-local (MacKenzie, 1988; Williams, 1997a; Law & Callon, 1992).
Academically, global-local has been conceived both as an analytical but also as a
practical issue and has taken the form of a paradox in STS, the so-called: global-
local paradox, which has been flagged as follows:
"In the recent past, attention has been focused on Information Technology (IT)
which offered powerful tools for rationalisation and automation of work activities,
based upon 'universal' mathematical principles, that were expected to have
widespread applicability across the widest array of firms and occupations. In
contrast to such expectations, recent empirical research points to the continued
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importance of contingent and local factors, arising for example from specific
features of the organisational setting, which impede the search for universal
solutions" (Williams, 1997a: 170).
There is an emphasis on the local construction of the world the same time that
gobalisation have made some kinds of technologies, management techniques and
economic forms and relations more or less universally available. In general, the
micro-macro analytical distinction in the age of globalisation and in the field of STS
appears in the form of global-local where micro is associated with local
circumstances and settings and global with elements and contexts of universal range
and scope. It is challenging both to try to conceptualise how the global and the local
might be usefully incorporated in an analytical framework and also to practically
manage it in relation to the management of technical change (MacKenzie, 1988).
In the field of STS, more particularly, influences by the action-structure and
micro-macro debates can be identified, meaning that some works have followed a
more macro, structural approach to the study of technology and its contexts, while
others have followed a more action-oriented, micro approach. Intellectual traditions
in the study of T&O, therefore, have also inherited the challenges posed by the
dichotomies discussed above. Studies influenced by the neo-institutionalism
tradition, for example, could be seen as structural, macro or meso approaches, while
studies following a more constructivist approach, such as Social Construction Of
Technology (SCOT) and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) could be seen as actor-
oriented approaches.
2.2.1 Neo-lnstitutionalism
An epistemology departing from a structure-oriented focus is the so-called
neo-institutionalism, which refers to the revitalisation of institutional theory in the
past few years and it has claimed attention from a large and growing circle of
organisational researchers (Scott, 1994:81). Neo-institutional theorists agree with
Weber's observation on the homogenisation of institutions and support the view that
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bureaucracy has spread continuously since he wrote. They argue, however, that the
engine of organisational rationalisation has shifted from: competition among
capitalist firms in the marketplace; competition among states, increasing rulers' need
to control their staff and citizenry; and bourgeois demands for equal protection under
the law, the most important of which was the competitive marketplace to: the
structuration oforganisationalfields2, a process that is affected largely by the state
and the professions, which have become the great rationalisers of the second half of
the twentieth century (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983:147). Homogenisation, then, comes
from powerful forces that lead organisations to become similar to one another once
they are structured into an actual field (ibid.). Neo-institutional theory, thus, was
developed out of the need to explain the identified process of homogenisation, and
not variety among organisations, which process is best captured by the concept of
isomorphism. The above ideas are conveyed on the assumption by neo-institutional
perspective that in modem societies, cultural beliefs are more likely to be
promulgated by specialised bodies such as professionals and by formalised agencies
of the state (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1994),
although the centrality of the role of the state as a source of institutional innovations
promoting economic growth has been questioned in search of other regional and
local factors that affect the institutional environment (Hopcroft, 1998).
Also, recent neo-institutionalists have come to acknowledge the importance
of both formal and informal rules and relationships in economic action. Mark
Granovetter (1985), argues that economic action is embedded in interpersonal
relations and subject to informal rules. However, increased recognition of the role of
formal mles is essential, neo-institutionalists argue, for the analysis of economic
action (Brinton & Nee, 1998). In an attempt to summarise the main observation
within the neo-institutional perspective, Meyer (1994) argues: "Overall, the
institutional image of modem organisational life suggests organisations that are (a)
somewhat ritualised; (b) internally decoupled; (c) isomorphic with environmental
patterns and rules in their identities, structures, and activities; and (d) showing
2
By organisational fields, Powell and DiMaggio mean those organisations that, in the aggregate,
constitute a recognised area of institutional life, such as, key suppliers, resource and product
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services or products
(1983:148).
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broadly isomorphic patterns of change over time following very general
environmental rules" (Meyer, 1994:34).
One problem with neo-institutionalism has to do with their methodological
approach. Since they focus on the institutional level, they do not give emphasis on
the role of actors, rather they emphasise rites and symbols as more powerful, that
they go beyond conscious choices of rational actors (Clausen & Koch, 2002). They
see concepts and stable "recipes" as important in their analysis and for the process
towards isomorphism (ibid.). Finally, the main bulk of the resources that they use in
their analysis comes from literature studies, as they argue that a literature review will
quickly reveal a bundle of elements which is recurring in most contributions and
which can be claimed to be the core of the concept that they study (ibid.). Neo-
institutionalism, then, is a theoretical perspective that places emphasis more on the
structures and institutions, or better on the process through which structures and
institutions are crystallised and become similar to one another. On the other hand,
they neglect actors as not being very important in the process towards isomorphism.
A more elaborate critique of neo-institutional perspectives in relation to the concept
of organisation, its environment and how actors can become more visible in
innovation processes will be attempted here.
2.2.2 Social Construction Of Technology
Actor-centred theories have a different focus. SCOT, for instance, evince a
general commitment to "opening the black box" of technology for sociological
analysis (Grint & Woolgar, 1997:19). This means that social analysis must take into
account the technology itself or take seriously the content of the technology (ibid.).
In terms of methodology, then, the SCOT approach proceeds with its analysis
"outwards", from a specific technology to the context shaping it (Williams & Edge,
1996:870). The SCOT approach, therefore, is an artefact-based approach, which
focuses on the developmental process of a technological artefact, described as an
alternation of variation and selection, where the crucial role is played by the
"relevant social groups" that are concerned with the artefact (Pinch & Bijker,
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1984:411-414). In other words, technological artefacts are described as social
constructs. The key requirement, Pinch and Bijker argue, is that all members of a
certain social group share the same set of meanings, attached to a specific artefact
(ibid:414). Typical social groups that are associated with the development of a
technological artefact may include engineers, advertisers, consumers etc. (Kline &
Pinch, 1999:113).
SCOT emphasizes the "interpretative flexibility" of an artefact, meaning that
different social groups may associate different meanings with artefacts leading to
interpretative flexibility appearing over them. The same artefact can mean different
things to different social groups or users (ibid.). Interpretative flexibility, however,
does not continue forever, rather "closure" and "stabilisation" occur such that some
artefacts appear to have fewer problems and become increasingly the dominant form
of the technology (ibid: 113-114).
The SCOT perspective is influential to studies of use and implementation of
technologies within organisations (Jackson et al, 2001). Scholars from various
disciplines employ constructionist approaches in order (a) to provide a framework
for understanding ICTs in the workplace and (b) to provide guidance for designing
and implementing ICTs in organisations (Jackson et al, 2001). Some major
assumptions of SCOT, common in all of these studies are: (a) Constructionism
denies technological determinism; (b) Constructionism recognises the interplay and
interdependence of social and technical elements; (c) Constructionism denies that
technologies are ever complete - this is valid also when talking about organisation;
and (d) Constructionism redirects attention from products to processes (Jackson et al,
2001).
SCOT approach also reveals weaknesses. As Kline and Pinch (1999) argue
"...SCOT, as originally conceived dealt mainly with the design stage of technologies.
The notion of closure was a little too rigid. What was missing was a sense of how
and in what circumstances the 'black box' of technology could be reopened as it was
taken up by different social groups"..."SCOT, as many commentators have remarked,
said little about the social structure and power relationships within which
technological development takes place. A related concern is the neglect of the
reciprocal relationship between artefacts and social groups. We agree that it is
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important to show not only how social groups shape technology, but also how the
identities of social groups are reconstituted in the process" (ibid: 114).
2.2.3 Actor-Network Theory
ANT refers mainly to the research program led by Michel Callon and Bruno
Latour at the Ecole des Mines in Paris (Williams & Edge, 1996:870). ANT like
SCOT is focused on the local actors and how they create social structures. This
approach, then, focuses upon the practical constructions (through negotiations) of the
alignments between social and technical aspects where analytic divisions between
the social and the technical are explicitly prohibited (Grint & Woolgar, 1997:28).
ANT proposes that power entails the construction and maintenance of a network of
actors, which networks involve both human and non-human actors, or
"heterogeneous entities that constitute a network" (ibid.). Thus, both humans and
non-humans are to be included in the analysis. The Actor-Network approach to
technology, as Grint and Woolgar argue, attempts to transcend the distinction
between the social and the technical, which re-emerges in the guise of technicism in
many of the attempts to fashion alternatives to technological determinism (ibid:30).
There is a great volume of studies based on the assumptions of the ANT.
While the early studies of ANTists3 involved micro-level studies focusing upon
R&D and scientific laboratories where the broader institutional context is fluid, more
recent work has shown interest in the relative stability of certain structures, fact that
reveals the need of the ANT approach to engage with other traditions in the field
(ibid.). On such example is given by Law & Callon's (1992) study on the Tactical
Strike and Reconnaisance 2 (TSR.2) project where the authors allow space for
structural factors that influence the shaping of the examined technology. Law &
Callon refer to the issue of micro-macro in the form of linking the global with the
local. Their actor-network template attempts to capture the tensions between the
3
Early studies are often based on "invented" cases (see for instance Latour, 1988) and they announce
a scepticism about the nature and influence of broader social and economic structures of power and
interests, insisting that actors create the world anew and that technologies are malleable to local actors
(Williams & Edge, 1996:870).
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global and the local and explain how these two levels can be linked in the
development of a technology by using a network vocabulary. They speak of "global
network" and "local network" and of "obligatory point passage" linking them.
Although this template tries to incorporate a more multilevel conception of the
world, it is rather limited as there are many things that remain unexplored, such as
actor's decision-making processes. Additionally, they do not capture the limits or the
boundaries of an actor-network leaving the impression of uncontrollable and
unlimited expansion. As Russell & Williams say: "When implementation and use are
taken into account, the range of social groups involved and affected by technological
change expands enormously, going far beyond anything recognisable as a
technological community" (Russell & Williams, 1988:6)4. This means that the actor-
network expands in a way that makes it difficult to handle analytically within an
ANT framework. There is also a danger in projecting the relationships found in a
R&D laboratory, that is to say into the micro level of analysis, more widely than
appropriate onto the broader structure of society, that is onto the macro level of
analysis (ibid:7). For ANT, macro-structures can only be explained by extrapolation
from micro-processes of interaction between individual social actors, thus, society
and the analysis of society is constructed from the bottom upwards (Russell &
Williams, 1988:1). This theoretical and methodological approach of the ANTists has
been highly criticised as carrying all the problems and dangers of an approach that
attempts to explain the macro through the micro. There is nothing wrong to study the
micro and try to explore how the macro can be found within the micro, but one needs
to realise that not the whole macro can fit into a particular micro. An account of the
whole macro and how some of it can be seen as enacted at a micro level is, therefore,
needed, something that ANTist studies do not do.
2.2.4 Attempts to Resolve Analytical Dichotomies
Epistemologically speaking, the tensions and inconsistencies between actor
centred and structurally oriented accounts or accounts focusing on the micro or
4 The same can be argued against SCOT in that it cannot delineate 'relevant social groups' in any but
artefact-centred way and basically becomes a 'stakeholder influence' analysis of artefacts.
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macro levels, or global-local, initiated work that attempts to transcend such
dichotomies or make a more efficient use of them. There are examples of different
engagements with the above distinctions which seek to achieve a more fruitful
accommodation of such distinctions. Such attempts were developed based on their
criticisms on more traditional work in the field, which appears as inconsistent and
incomplete due to a unilateral focus on certain levels or actions and structures. One
example from organisation studies is the adaptation of Giddens' structuration theory
to the analysis of technology development and use in the context of organisations.
Two significant works in this tradition are from Orlikowski (1992; 2000)5 and
DeSanctis & Poole (1990; 1994) and their Adaptive Structuration Theory6.
Additionally, Edinburgh based SST work has been developing by stepping on
analytical flaws ofprevious, early studies on technologies and their context of design
and use. Their treatment of such analytical issues along with the emergence of new
hot topics in social sciences, such as globalisation, knowledge economy and society
and so on, has given them a new context of conceptual development and empirical
use. Russell & Williams (1988), for example, in their attempt to establish the SST
approach and differentiate it from other approaches in the sociology of technology,
criticise heavily the ANT approach in terms of its methodological and analytical
focus, thus, revisiting the issue of micro-macro. They suggest an "interactive model"
of the relation between general context and action. As they say, this is the key to
overcoming the separation of micro and macro approaches to understanding
technology as a social product, with different but consistent forms of analysis
appropriate to each, rather than an application of the same action concepts regardless
of level (ibid:26). The micro-macro problem is a fundamental one. Explaining the
macro through the micro and the opposite involves risk when happening without
5 Wanda Orlikowski (1992; 2000) stresses that structures emerge from repeated and situated action
and that structures are enacted in recurrent use of the technologies. With the term "technology-in-
practice" (2000) she also suggests that the design of technologies is continuing when technologies are
used in various organizational settings since new structures are enacted in different use contexts.
6
"Adaptive structuration theory" (AST), introduced by DeSanctis & Poole (1990; 1994), outlines a
set of appropriation processes through which a technology comes to be constituted differently by
different groups of people. The terms faithful appropriation and ironic appropriation oftechnology
for instance refer to the difference between intended and unintended uses of technologies in different
environments.
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specific limits and conditions under which some structures and relations are
explainable through some others that can be identified into different contexts. Russell
and Williams are right in their critique but micro-level studies and attempts to
extrapolate from the micro in order to explain the macro should not be rejected all
together as long as this extrapolation takes place within certain conditions and limits
even if these conditions are constructed in order to serve analytical purposes. A more
sophisticated integration of these levels is sought in this study.
2.2.5 The Social Shaping of Technology
The above distinctions and their analytical interrelation creates problems with
the theorisation and identification of social action and social structure, in terms of the
difficulty and the inconsistent way of identifying and accounting for different actions
or structures. The Social Shaping of Technology (SST) approach attempts to
combine accounts like SCOT and ANT with structural accounts in highlighting the
social choices and options, as well as the structural and cultural constraints, in the
development, adoption and use of technology (Graham et al, 1999:2). SST emerged
from a convergence of various different analytical traditions e.g. technology policy
studies, Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, Labour Process theory and Industrial
Sociology, Evolutionary Economics all involving a common concern that the form of
technologies were amenable to and indeed required socio-economic analysis and
explanation (Williams, 1997a: 171). Hughes (1983), for instance, in his attempt to
explain his notion ofsocio-technical systems, stressed the socio-economic influences
upon technical choices and the material basis of social action (Williams, 2002:5).
This multiplicity of disciplinary traditions that SST derives from, however, has not
yet been integrated into a single, unified explanatory schema (ibid.) in a way that
efficiently incorporates concepts of action and structure, micro and macro. Reasons
for this lack of integration include the rate of change in our understanding of the
relationship between technology and society; the variety of concepts that are not
characterized by general applicability; the search for more comprehensive accounts
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of the settings of innovation; and the variety of authors from different backgrounds
that have been drawn to contribute to the field internationally (ibid:5-6).
The conceptual gap between actor-centred and structural accounts that the
SST approach attempts to bridge by the articulation of a variety of new concepts
appears disjointed since the field suffers from a lack of integration in its overall
conceptual development (ibid:8). In recent accounts within the SST approach, for
instance, authors attempt to address the interplay between local actors and broader
structural conditions in technological innovation, but in distinctive ways given their
intellectual traditions (ibid:7). Rip & Schot (2002), for example, deriving from
generalised evolutionary economic accounts of'selection environment' focus 'down'
from recognition of broad technology regimes to see how the circumstances for
regime shifts are created (Williams, 2002:7). Jorgensen & Sorensen (1999) drawing
on ANT seek to retain its focus on local negotiability while extending it to
understand technology development within globalised settings where a number of
actor-worlds and networks interact (Williams, 2002). The attempt of studies within
the SST approach to integrate structural with action-oriented accounts appears to be
difficult. This is because of the intellectual and conceptual confusion and different
foci of research on different spaces, occasions, social situations. These bring about
different issues but without providing a model that could capture social action and
social structure within a multilevel and multidimensional environment in a consistent
way away from further disintegration.
There is a gradual realisation and maturity of the idea that the development of
analytical templates and accompanying concepts and metaphors are needed in order
to capture social and economic relations in the development and use of technologies.
These new templates will prevent analyses from falling into the traps of dualistic
distinctions; rather, use them more effectively. In technology studies, in particular,
there is also the distinction between the "social" and the "technical" that new
concepts are trying to capture. Concepts and theories are developed, conceptual
boundaries, actors and contexts are re-defined, social, technical elements and
resources are identified and socio-economic relations re-examined. Such concepts
include: "regime" (see Nelson & Winter, 1982; Geels, 2002), "socio-technical
ensembles" (Bijker, 1995), "socio-technical constituencies" (Molina, 1990), "socio-
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technical systems" (Hughes, 1983), "technological frames"(Bijker, 1995),
"development arenas" (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 1999). These are just some of the
terms that capture and integrate different actions, structures, levels and resources.
They also pattern various diverse processes in the development of technologies.
The action-structure, micro-macro and global-local debates have been
associated, although not exclusively, with the study of T&O posing challenges to
analysts. It seems that in the STS field the current milestones for a successful
research are: to take into account both the significance of action and relevant actors
but also structural constraints and contexts, to produce a multilevel analysis by both
accommodating macro and micro approaches and also capturing the processes that
link global trends and developments with local settings and circumstances. Such
requirements accompany current interdisciplinary research in SST that point towards
multilevel, multidimensional and multi-aspect research.
2.3 TECHNOLOGY - ORGANISATION RELATIONSHIP:
DECISION-MAKING AND SOCIAL CHOICE
In this section, the discussion on social action and structure is deepened by
exploring social choice and how it has been accounted for by various theoretical
approaches in relation to the shaping of T&O. At this point, social choice is
conceived as a particular conception and expression of social action in the context of
shaping of T&O. The diverse ways various approaches treat social choice and action
in relation to T&O illustrates the need for conceptual and analytical integration. The
section will refer to managerial approaches, their shift towards more political and
processual approaches, the strategic management of technology literature and
theories of the firm.
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2.3.1 Managerialism
This tradition can be seen as a number of finite programs of work
transformation that have been produced and applied in industries and other
workplaces in order to achieve the best way of organising the labour process and
make the best out of the various resources available to firms, such as technology, the
human factor, etc. The major characteristic of this tradition is rational efficiency,
which implies that the logical basis of action is held to reside with management.
Effectiveness becomes synonymous with management effectiveness, while
employees who restrict or oppose such action are frequently held to be acting
irrationally, governed by a 'logic of sentiment' rather than one of efficiency
(Thompson & McHugh, 1995:12). In this context, social choice could be considered
as a top-down rational process of decision-making. The so-called "scientific
management" or "Taylorism", as well as more human-centred views regarding work
organisation such as the "Human Relations" and the "Human Resources" approaches
up to the post-Fordist and post-Taylorist models of lean production and flexible
specialisation, may be considered as finite programs within the managerialist
tradition (for all these see Kaniadakis, 2001).
More recently, new management programs such as Business Process
Reengineering (BPR), emerge (Hammer & Champy, 1993) following strategies
widely espoused within Business Schools and promoted by consultancy firms
(Clausen, 1996). It has been argued that BPR has been practiced as a formal
discipline since the early 1920's when it was known as "Methods and Procedures
Analysis" and that it has been recently re-invented under a new title becoming very
fashionable (Strassmann, 1995).
As is evident, a shift in management thinking has been identified. The
mainstream organizing principle, which used to be efficiency has now changed to
more processual models. The new principle is innovation-design with efficiency
considered as a significant subset (Clark & Staunton, 1989:19). Along with the
development of this new mainstream, organizational scientists have come to
acknowledge the balancing and interpretation of various levels of analysis as
methodological and analytical tools. Clark & Staunton (1989) argue:
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"...organizational scientists have to extend their analysis from the micro level of
the organization into the institutional and international levels, and to consider the
impacts of long-term techno-economic paradigms" (ibid:45). Despite this shift,
traditional managerialism is considered with structural changes in the dominant
models and programs of T&O that are reflected into management's actions, while
local action and particularities have come to gain importance only recently.
2.3.2 Linking Strategic Technology Management and
Corporate Strategy
The tension between micro-macro and action-structure in managerialism, and
more particularly, in the strategic technology management and policy literature, takes
the form of trying to align technology strategy and policy with the overall business
strategy of a firm. Strategic management of technology literature has been struggling
since the 1980s to incorporate technology strategy into the overall corporate strategy
of a business organization. In doing so, these literatures try to find ways to account
for the role of technology and technological innovation within the organizational
structure and processes of a business firm in their attempt to conceptualize strategic
technology management as part of the overall business management of the firm.
Robert Cooper (1984) was one of the first researchers in the early 1980s to provide a
link between corporate strategy and company innovation performance, while most
previous studies focused on the relationship between the actions firms took and
innovatory outcome (success or failure), and paid little attention to the strategies
underlying these actions (Rothwell, 1992:230). Cooper's integrated strategy account
concludes that there is not a single strategy but a packet of strategies, a marriage of
technological prowess, a strong marketing orientation, the search for differentiated
advantage and a willingness to accept risk, are strategic attitudes that appear to be the
key to a high performance program (Rothwell, 1992:231-232). Other writers started
following this approach. Steele (1991), for example, argues that technology strategy
is a central and pervasive ingredient in the concept of an enterprise, meaning that
technology must play a central role in strategic planning, addressing the fundamental
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questions of how to establish a sustainable competitive advantage and how to
ensure the survival of an enterprise (in Rothwell, 1992:233).
As the importance of an integrative approach to strategy was becoming
commonplace, various studies were conducted supporting it. Different authors,
however, have different views and focus on different aspects of technology and
corporate strategy. Ford (1988), defines the task of technology strategy as the
exploitation, development and maintenance of the sum total of the company's
knowledge and capabilities (in Husain & Sushil, 1997:541), Roberts (1989),
however, focuses on the importance of linking and leveraging internal technology
with an increasing number and variety of external technology sources (in Husain &
Sushil, 1997:544). Also, Prahalad & Hamel (1990) see technology as one new
dimension of the core competencies of a company (in Husain & Sushil, 1997:545),
while Langowitz (1992) focuses on the long term discontinuities from consecutive
changes stressing the inevitability of change and how firm leadership should adapt to
that inevitability (in Husain & Sushil, 1997:544). Finally, Green (1995) stresses the
role of management in supporting R&D projects as part of technology strategy while
Pavitt (1990) suggests that the successful management of technology requires the
capacity to orchestrate and integrate functional and specialist groups for the
implementation of innovations, continuous questioning of the appropriateness of
exploitation of existing technology and willingness to take a long view of
technological accumulation within the firm (in Husain & Sushil, 1997:541).
All authors above stress different aspects of strategic technology
management. All of them, however, try to see it as part of the overall business and
corporate strategy of the firm. Despite the fact that this integration is desirable, the
above accounts still view technology as analytically distinct from the organisation
although they define it in different ways and even though their definitions include
organisational elements. In the context of technology strategy, social choice and
action is diffused amongst various organisational contexts and activities of the firm.
There is an issue of legitimization of choice in this context, which could provide the
link between technology strategy and overall business strategy.
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2.3.3 Politics and Organisations (Political Process
Approach)
The shift in management thinking towards more processual understanding of
organizations has led to the development of work that focuses on the political nature
of these processes. This can be traced back to the sociological approach to
organizational studies articulated from the 1950s by Bums & Stalker (1961). Their
research on the management of innovation sets the grounds for a more contingent
and political understanding of organizations and innovation. Bums & Stalker
questioned traditional understandings of management, based on a hierarchical,
functional division of labour and knowledge, termed as "mechanistic organization"
and highlighted the importance in innovatory settings of "organic organization"
models where tasks are more fluidly defined and communication between individuals
and groups can be direct, across organizational boundaries rather than being
channeled through the organizational hierarchy (Bums and Stalker 1961). In this
model, they placed attention to the role of organizational politics. Bums & Stalker
understand organization as 'work organization' consisting of system management
and the activities carried out and a political system and a status structure (1961:97).
More generally this work signifies a more complex understanding - criticizing
dominant unitary conceptions of the firm with a single shared managerial goal, and
recognizing the existence of political interest groups with different agendas. Political
behaviour is here seen to have its roots in the management system (demands for
resources and control of other people) as well as in the status system (promotion,
rewards, etc.) (1961:144-145).
A further important contribution to analyzing social choices in the midst of
organizational politics is the work of Child (1972), who criticized attempts to find a
simple fit between organizational tasks and management structure and instead points
to the source for strategic choice. Child sees strategic choice as an interpretive
process by organizational leaders who possess the power to enact their
interpretations as plans and directives that structure the organization. He points that
organizational leaders are as likely to be affected by broadly normative, ideological
and political considerations as are that of any other organizational group or member.
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This suggests a notion of politics that goes well beyond simple self-interest to
include distinctive perspectives or beliefs about how people and organizations
'should' work. Child, then, includes the external social and political environment as
influencing strategic choice through its interpretation and its political enactment
through organizational leaders. In this sense, the external factors influence strategic
choice not in a determining way; rather, they act as contextual referents for decision
makers (McLoughlin & Harris, 1997:9), bringing the external environment into
organizational politics. Later research tends to emphasize the importance of choice in
the social shaping of technological change with attention to questions concerning the
nature and role of management strategy, the influence of trade unions and collective
bargaining, and the capacity of workgroups to influence changes in the organization
(see Boddy & Buchanan, 1983; Wilkinson, 1983; Child, 1984; Clark et al, 1988).
Based on such studies, there has been a recent revival in interest in the
subject of organizational power and politics opposing to more technocratic views and
approaches which neglect conflicts, hierarchical power, managerial control, effects
of networking (Hislop et al, 2000). This has been crystallized into a new approach
emphasizing the role of politics and political processes in innovation, which in turn
draws on a variety of disciplines. This has been termed as "political process
approach" under the common research theme of social and political shaping of
technology, which has produced studies on choice, design, development,
implementation and operation of new technologies and working arrangements
(Dawson et al, 2000:5). The political process approach is attempting to reveal the
"political" processes of innovation management, the unseen power-plays in arenas of
conflict and resistance, by employing a broad definition of politics. Such a definition
includes elements of culture, historical legacy of past events, and the social
construction of a dominant discourse around technology and change, as opposed to
traditional notions of politics as class division and control, or representations of
manipulation, vested interests and consents (Dawson et al, 2000:5).
This approach draws on various traditions of research. The Scandinavian
tradition for working life research represents an action-oriented approach to political
processes oriented towards strategy and on the facilitation of a 'democratic dialogue'
on the design and use of technology at work (Dawson et al, 2000:6). The industrial
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sociology tradition, which was caught in the struggle created between the works of
people such as Blauner (1964) and Woodward (1958) on one hand and Braverman
(1974) on the other in regard to the up-skilling and de-skilling theses (see
Kaniadakis, 2001:39-46). Wilkinson (1983) and his followers, industrial sociologists
and labour process adherents, began, however, to consider technological
developments as a political process in their own right (Dawson et al, 2000:7).
Another tradition the political process approach draws on is organizational theory
and management studies, which characterize workplace change as a rational staged
series of events or posit contingency views on technology and change (Dawson et al,
2000:7). Finally, it has been influenced by the developments in the area of sociology
of technology and the emergence of constructivist and actor-network approaches and
their constant and persistent critique of technological determinism (Dawson et al,
2000:7-8). These approaches see politics as negotiations between diverse actors
across established organizational borders and also as transformation and
development of actants/actors (Dawson et al, 2000:8).
The work of Pettigrew (1985) falls into this category. Apart from its general
magnitude in the field of organization science, this is also a work illustrating the
importance of organizational politics and political processes in organizational change
and development. Pettigrew discusses decision-making in the context of
organizational change by distinguishing between a strategic level of change and an
operative level of change, where the former sets the constraints of the latter. He sees
change events as part of 'ongoing processes ofcontinuity and change'' (Pettigrew,
1985:26). He argues that strategic change flows in waves whose peaks are short
periods of major reorientation followed by long stretches of institutionalization and
relative stability (Barley, 1987:177). This periodicity of organizational
transformation, on one hand, along with the ad hoc nature of changes, on the other,
questions the role of managers as foresighted planners of strategic direction (ibid.).
What makes the political character of organizational development more visible is
that Pettigrew views it as a "social movement", where consultants, for instance,
appear as opportunists who know how to work the political system and exploit the
openings that change provides (ibid: 178).
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Similarly, Knights & Murray (1994) produced a study on organizational
politics in information technology management. They review and classify various
theoretical and analytical traditions according to their focus of research (global-local)
and according to their understanding of politics either as dismptive of the 'smooth'
and 'rational' management of an organization or as an inescapable 'fact' of
organizational life (Knights & Murray, 1994:3). Their own suggested approach tends
towards the latter where they seek to study the use and development of IT in a
political context through detailed and localized studies of management practice that
are understood to be influenced by, and have consequences for, broader socio¬
political and economic, organizational, technological and what they call security
conditions (Knights & Murray, 1994:xii). Their notion of politics refers to the
concerns of individuals in contemporary society to secure a symbolic and material
sense of themselves in historically particular conditions of uncertainty and
competition (Knights & Murray, 1994:xiv). In the context of IT management,
therefore, by politics they mean the "managerial and staff concerns to secure careers,
to avoid blame, to create success and to establish stable identities within competitive
labour markets and organizational hierarchies where the resources that donate
relative success are necessarily limited" (Knights, & Murray, 1994:xiv). This critical
processual perspective (Dawson et al, 2000:7), by conceiving politics as "the very
stuff, the marrow of organizational process" (Knights & Murray, 1994:xiv), they
state that organizational politics are embedded and inescapable in organizational
processes and actor's strategies. Nevertheless, it could be argued that by doing this, it
is difficult to separate the "political" from the "non-political" and thus it is more
difficult to be engaged with analytical games of this kind, and operationalise
concepts as such.
In relation to the shaping of T&O, recent work by McLoughlin & Dawson
(2003) distinguishes between material and social in relation to technology. They seek
to reveal an analytical space that integrates the materiality of technology as a 'hard
place' and the 'interpretive flexibility' of technology as a social construct
(McLoughlin & Dawson, 2003:21). McLoughlin & Dawson suggest a "mutual
shaping of T&O approach". It views technologies as socially constructed material
artefacts, while organisation is the social context within which these artefacts are
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interpreted and acquire meaning. In the mutual shaping process, technology shapes
organisation in the sense that the characteristics and capabilities of a technology may
enable and constrain organisational transformation in particular circumstances, while
the organisation shapes the technology in the sense that within certain organisational
contexts, the interpretive flexibility of the "technical" as it is configured, re¬
configured in cycles of adoption, adaptation in use, redevelopment and application in
other organisational settings, acquires different meanings (McLoughlin & Dawson,
2003:32). This approach recognises that while technology is designed and developed
by a range of individuals and groups, these and others also engage in constructing
meanings of technology within a changing social context (ibid.). McLoughlin and
Dawson link the 'materiality' and 'sociality' of the technology with 'obduracy and
stability', on one hand, and 'openness and re-interpretation', on the other. In doing
so, they stress the importance of temporal contextual influences and how, over time,
there may arise a common understanding among different groups and individuals on
what constitutes a particular technology (ibid.). They see a "duality of technology" in
which the social shaping of technology may at certain periods add to the obduracy of
technology and there may be certain reconfigurations of technology in use which
present a challenge to previous agreements on what constitutes technology (ibid.).
In this scheme, choice emerges when in periods of technology obduracy the
materiality of technology may serve to enable and constrain the social process of
choice and negotiation in the uptake and use of technology (McLoughlin & Dawson,
2003:32-33). Choice appears as emerging from local, contextual contingencies of
particular, temporal circumstances. Its direction depends on how the relationship
between T&O appears within a temporal, contingent organisational context. Choice
is seen as a political action within the adopting organisational context where 'change
agents' negotiate the meanings and the legitimacy of technological change in
organisations (see McLoughlin et al, 2000).
In the mutual shaping of T&0 approach the term "technological frames"
(Bijker, 1995) is used to explain T-0 change as a process of shaping socio-technical
configurations. The possibilities and constraints that obdurate or more open frames
might offer in this shaping are illustrated (160). Following Bijker (1995),
McLoughlin distinguishes between 'semiotic power' which refers to the power of
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fixed meanings and 'micro-political power' which refers to the variety of practices
that transform and structure the actions of actors (McLoughlin, 1999:161). These two
forms of power are different sides of the same entity, as the dominant technological
frame constraints the actions of its members and thus exerts power through the fixity
of meaning (semiotic power) and also enables its members by providing problem-
solving strategies, theories and testing practices (micro-political power) (ibid: 161-
162). It is argued that by both enabling and constraining micro-political activity,
frames can be seen to exert a 'disciplining power' since they govern the way in
which thinking and action take place (ibid: 162). This analysis successfully highlights
action as part of micro-political activities alongside the construction of meanings at
an organisational level, while possibilities and constraints for action refer to the
openness or fixity of a technological frame, which represents a metaphor for T-0
change. This is a restricted view of action and the motivation for action as it is
reduced to conflicts of political interests within organisations.
There are studies on politics, organizations and technology that have
expanded, or cross-fertilized their approaches with other interesting issues and
concerns. Hislop et al. (2000), Swan et al. (1999) and Swan & Scarbrough (2005),
for example, examine innovation and organizational politics by introducing issues
about networks and networking, knowledge management and decision-making.
Additionally, Suchman & Bishop (2000) focus on the discourses and associated
practices of innovation in studying the relations between technology and labour.
They see innovation not simply as a process, but as a highly politicized construct
taken up by specific actors and made to work in particular ways by the use of cultural
frames within certain cultural imaginaries (Suchman & Bishop, 2000:331). They
conclude that innovation can be understood as a construct activated in the service of
what is a fundamentally conservative project, in the sense of the reproduction of
existing orders (ibid.). This view questions what really constitutes innovation. For
example, "resistance to change, in the sense of resistance to the premises and
consequences of agendas initiated under that banner, may in fact be a requirement for
long-term, substantive innovation" (ibid:332).
The political process perspective stresses the need for theorization of choice,
of constraints and opportunities, possibilities to act and freedom to choose alternative
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paths for technological development, decision-making. It theorizes choice by
taking into consideration the duality of possibilities-constraints. Authors, however,
are restrained in presenting them as "unseen power-plays in arenas of conflicts and
resistance" (Dawson et al, 2000:5). This is due to the broad definition of politics as
including many things such as culture, historical legacy of past events, dominant
discourses around technology and change (ibid.). Decision-making and choice are,
therefore, seen as overly political processes. Through choice either some political
game will be affected and find its winner and loser or some options will be
eliminated, thus, closing the contested terrain of change options. The political nature
of the socio-economic relations involved in the shaping of T&0 in various contexts
is undoubtedly important. A broad definition of'polities', on one hand, and the
variety of contexts of research and perspectives, on the other, creates confusion. It is
necessary, therefore, to be clear about how the notion of politics is used.
A more recent special issue in Human Relations also discusses the political
process approach. McLoughlin and Badham (2005), after illustrating the evolution of
the political process approach since its emergence in the 1970s through two
generations of studies, they point towards the development of a "3rd generation".
They seek an integrative, multidimensional approach to study technological change
integrating distinctions such as the "technical" and the "social" into a more
sophisticated understanding of the socio-technical. This suggestion shifts the focus
from the question of whether technology causes social change or the opposite. Both
things surely happen. Attention should be given to the circumstances of such changes
(McLoughlin & Badham, 2005:839). It is suggested that the social-technical
integration could happen through a "three-dimensional approach", as opposed to
one-dimensional focus on either the technical or the social, or two-dimensional
models, which are softer versions of the impact and agency approaches seeking to
identify the mutual shaping effects of the technical and the social on each other
(ibid:838-839). The three-dimensional approach should problematize the social-
technical distinction itself by viewing it as 'made up of complex interwoven
combinations of human and non-human elements' a better integration of which
should be sought after by future political process approach studies (ibid:839).
37
2.3.4 Theories of the Firm and Organisational Boundaries
The context of the firm is and has been important in relation to the discussion
on T&O and social choice. Developments in theories of the firm that illustrate the
firm as a basic unit of capitalist production, as important economic agents and
portray the relationship between the firm and its environment and how this could be
useful analytically are discussed here. The concept of action and choice appears in
the context of firm behaviour within a certain environment. In theories of the firm
the historical shift identified is from neo-classical microeconomic theories of
production which have been criticized as lacking realism and reducing firms to
epiphenomena of markets, to the so-called "realist theories" (Coombs et al, 1987:29).
In relation to producing a theory of the firm, a central issue was that of
'divorce of ownership and control' in industrial firms, which elevated the scope of
managerial action and its motivations as a central theoretical concern in explaining
the behaviour of firms, during 1950s and 1960s (ibid.). It established that managerial
action is an important influence on firm behaviour and that such action is logically
and practically distinct from that implied by the owner-entrepreneur model in
traditional theory (ibid:31). This debate is concerned with the locus of control where
some authors (i.e. Crosland, 1952) believe that managerialism marks a
fundamentally different type of capitalism, while others (i.e. Berrett-Brown, 1958)
argued that various practical and ideological considerations meant that the
supposedly autonomous managers still represented the interests of the capitalists
(Coombs et al, 1987:31). Finally, Tomlinson (1982) suggests that we should
conceive managers as owners and not shareholders, thus, not seeing ownership in its
strict legal sense (Coombs et al, 1987:32). More recent work has also emphasized the
importance of corporate decision-making in the shaping of the markets, which is
seen as important as the regulatory forces (see Gordon, 1996).
Upon the realization of the importance of managerial action, there are two
types of theories of the firm that have been produced. One is based on managerial
motivation (i.e. Penrose, 1980; Marris, 1964) and examines how firms are motivated
to pursue growth and size as intrinsic objectives, while profit, sales, market share and
other goals are seen as instruments to achieve those ends: all subject to a constraint
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framed in terms of the continued existence either of the firm itself or of the
managerial team which controls the firm (Coombs et al, 1987:33). The other type is
based on the firm structure. There are numerous traditions in this area of study, the
most significant are: a) The transaction-cost (TC) approach (Williamson, 1975), b)
the behavioural approach (Cyert & March, 1963) and c) the historical approach
(Williamson, 1962, 1967; Chandler, 1962)7. Coombs et al (1987) stress the need to
combine managerial motivation models with firm structure models in order to be
able to explain the behaviour of different firms in different circumstances (1987:36).
Also, technical change should be seen as an active component of firm behaviour, as
allowed by managerial theories of the firm (Coombs et al, 1987:40).
Sociological approaches focusing on the form of industrial organization have
produced accounts on the nature of the firm as an agent within a market structure and
how changes in the market environment and the models of industrial organization
affect the role and the organizational structure of the firm. Such theories usually
come from organizational sociologists who respond to Weberian studies on
bureaucracy and the structure of industrial capitalism and the nature of the actors
within it. After the 1970s the idea that firms are changing as organizations and
becoming more open, more flexible, more networked with a temporary character,
contrary to more rigid, hierarchical organizational models of modernity. Alvin
Toffler for example in his 1971 book, Future Shock, suggests that the model of
bureaucracy is to be replaced with that of adhocracy (Toffler, 1971). Also, Henry
Mintzberg (1991) discusses organizational configurations referred to as "the
innovative organization". It represents an organic structure, while its opposite would
be a process of standardization, which would prevent innovation. This discussion
about increasing flexibility in organizational models as a move away from more rigid
and permanent structures of the past, was systematically "confirmed" by the seminal
work by Piore & Sabel The Second Industrial Divide (1984), where they argue on the
emergence of a new form of industrial organisation, the "flexible specialisation",
through a historical rapture of the past mass production model. Additionally, the
discussion on the transition from Fordist and Taylorist models of industrial
7 For an overview see Coombs et al, 1987:34-39.
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organisation and management models to post-Fordist, lean production models of
more humane management (i.e. from direct control to responsible autonomy -
Friedman, 1977) has produced work on the nature of organisations and firms. This
relates both to their structure and their role in a system of industrial organisation,
where traditional conceptions of the firm as a central production unit are seriously
questioned8.
Such accounts have produced terms in order to capture the changing nature of
the firm. One example is the firm-in-sector perspective (see Whipp & Clark, 1986;
Child & Smith, 1987), which attempts to move outside firm boundaries and
conceptualise organisations as part of the sector they are active in. Fincham et al,
more recently (1994), use the firm-in-sector idea to show how the firms as actors
negotiate the sector rather than being involved in a transmission of 'recipes' and
assimilation in organisations (see also Fincham et al, 2005). The conception of a
firm's environment as a 'sector', however, is rather restricted nowadays, with the
convergence and consolidation of diverse organisational fields that were traditionally
classified in different sectors. Although the firm-in-sector perspective is a dynamic
and multilevel analytical approach, it offers a limited conception of the firm's
external environment as a sector. Also, some sectors have more defined boundaries
than others. For instance, sectors like the automotive sector, or the financial services
sector have clearer boundaries since they are heavily regulated.
Other concepts that have been produced to explain the changes in our
understanding of firms and their environment include: the flexible firm (Pollert,
1987; 1988), the network firm (Castells, 1996), the virtual organisation (DeSanctis &
Monge, 1998), the firm as a distributed knowledge system (Tsoukas, 1996), and so
on. There are differences and different starting points or objectives among the
conceptions of firms discussed herein as changing organisations and organisation as
an action. Reference is made to them as a trend stemming from the realisation that
organisations and firms are changing roles and forms within an also changing
environment of industrial organisation and economic markets. The underlying idea
behind these theorisations of the firm is that firms as organisations have been
8 For a review of the discussion on the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, as well as, a critique
to post-Fordism claims for more efficient and humane management see Kaniadakis (2001).
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historically differentiating from what an ideal-type Weberian model of
bureaucracy would describe. Authors describe firms as opening their boundaries,
becoming more active within their environment and hierarchical structures. Also,
management methods are re-evaluated and the value of various resources and
organisational practices is re-considered. For instance, the customer base has now
become an integral part of a firm's organisational structure.
The developments in the nature and role of firm within its environment can
be associated with the discussion of changes in the model of industrial organisation.
There is a debate about what kinds of different models can and have been developed
in various countries and industries. Sturgeon (2002), for example, presents the
"modular production networks"9, as a new American model of industrial
organisation emerging in the case of contract manufacturing in the US electronics
industry. Innovation management literature of the early 1990s also acknowledged the
importance of networks in innovation and saw them as a new emerging model of
industrial innovation (Rothwell, 1992). With the "5th generation model", innovation
is becoming faster and it increasingly involves inter-company networking; that is,
innovation is increasingly becoming a multi-firm networking process, and it employs
a new electronic tool-kit (Rothwell, 1992:221).
Furthermore, Langlois (2003), tried to incorporate Alfred Chandler's The
Visible Hand (1977) - who argued that the visible hand of managerial coordination
has replaced Adam Smith's invisible hand on the market - argues on the vertical
disintegration beginning to replace the classical multi-unit managerial enterprise, at
the end of 20th century as the dynamics of industrial capitalism change through
changing historical circumstances (Langlois, 2003:351). Under such developments in
the industrial organisation models and the role of firms as economic agents,
questions are raised regarding the role of innovation or T-0 change. How does it
happen in such a changing model of industrial organisation? What does it involve?
How is it managed? Various authors have started talking about "networked
9
Sturgeon explains it as follows: "Lead firms in the modular production network concentrate on the
creation, penetration and defence of markets for end products - and increasingly the provision of
services to go with them - while manufacturing capacity is shifted out-of-house to globally operating
turn-key suppliers. The modular production network relies on codified inter-firm links and the generic
manufacturing capacity residing in turn-key suppliers to reduce transaction costs, build large external
economies of scale and reduce risk for network actors" (Sturgeon, 2002:451).
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innovation" (Swan & Scarbrough, 2005), "distributed organising" (Orlikowski,
2002) and "distributed innovation" (Rammert, 2003). These terms refer to the
structure of innovation process and the various activities associated with it as
dispersed in space, connected in diverse and asynchronous ways and involving
heterogeneous actors. Innovation processes are seen as occurring within networks of
diverse and heterogeneous actors, as opposed to happening internally to
organisational boundaries of a firm. Additionally, the networked and dispersed
character of innovation poses challenges for the management of firms (Orlikowski,
2002).
All these approaches that have some sort of conception of action as decision¬
making and social choice need to be integrated as they add to the analytical
confusion in relation to the interdisciplinary study of T&O. A close look at the
empirical field will shed some light on how such diverse approaches could be
integrated towards a shift in the epistemological frame that embraces
interdisciplinary research without losses in the academic identity. The space where
social and economic relations, actions and interactions contributing to the shaping of
T&O is also something controversial. Questions also rise in relation to what the
focus of analysis should be. Where should action and choice looked for? Within
organisational hierarchies? Within firm structures? Within markets? This is also
something that needs to be theoretically addressed.
2.4 DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND USE: FOCUS
ON ARTEFACTS OR ON ORGANISATION?
The way the field of social studies on technology has been developed, based on
the purpose of identifying and illustrating the "sociality" of technologies, as opposed
to more technical and deterministic accounts that treat technologies as "black boxes",
analysts started studying various processes associated with the design and
development of new technologies (see SCOT tradition for example - bicycles,
refrigerators, etc.). Further work has pointed to the direction of the phases of
implementation and use of technologies as also important for the shaping of
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technologies and artifacts. Fleck (1988), for example, with the concept of
"innofusion" identifies innovative processes during phases of implementation and
use of technologies. More recent research has focused mainly in linking design,
implementation and use with studies emphasizing the importance of users in
technology development (Oudshoom & Pinch, 2003) and the relationships between
designers and users (Hyysalo, 2004). Such studies on the design, implementation and
use of technological artifacts, along with the attempts for their integration have come
with studies that try to capture the broader structure of the socio-economic context
where technologies are designed, implemented and used. By reviewing this literature
where different phases in the development, diffusion, implementation and use of
technologies in different socio-economic contexts is studied, further inconsistencies
and gaps based on the diverse foci and diverse contexts of these studies can be
identified for the student of the T-0 relationship. This particular reading of the
literature reveals them.
Some STS literature focuses on particular technologies or particular artifacts and
how these are shaped during processes of design, implementation and use in
particular organizational, sectoral or national environments. Such analysis takes into
consideration various constructs and socio-economic relations in relation to one case
of a technology or an artefact. The technology is kept constant, that is, at the centre
of analysis while organizational elements and socio-economic relations are seen as
factors that might contribute to the development of that technology. The focus on
particular artifacts was initiated by early STS studies on the Social Construction of
Technology (SCOT) (Pinch & Bijker, 1984), which emerged as a programmatic
response to technological determinism. SCOT'S legacy was taken up by more recent
research in a wide interdisciplinary field of Science Technology and Innovation
literature. For instance, we have the development of concepts like "biography" of an
artefact (Pollock et al, 2003), "innovation journey" (Rip & Schot, 2002; Van de Ven
et al, 1999), "trajectory" (Dosi, 1982), which refer to the development and shaping of
technologies, over one or more product cycles and try to conceptualize and theorize
the transformations that certain technologies go through in a non-linear course of
development where different processes and contexts of design, implementation and
use might change the direction of the shaping of the artefact. Also, concepts such as
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"script/inscription" and "vision" (see Akrich, 1992) refer to how technological
artifacts may embody certain rules and preconceptions, which have been put there
through social processes during phases of design, implementation and use.
An Edinburgh based research project, for example, examines the "biography of
standard software packages" (Pollock et al, 2003). This project shifts the focus away
from snapshot studies that provide limited information on particular phases of the
development of a technology (i.e. implementation studies). They research team
conceives and theorizes a more complete process of development and evolution of
software packages and they overcome dichotomies such as universal-local and
rational-political. The notion of biography is an analytical novelty fitting socio¬
economic relations shaping a technology into an evolutionary and unified conception
of the process of software package development.
The same research team uses the concept of "generification" (Pollock et al, in
press) to describe how standard software packages are be able to "travel" from one
context to another. The authors stress the importance of the interaction between
supplier strategies and users' influence in how they are combining their particular
user requirements with collective requirements while negotiating with the suppliers.
The generification concept is useful because it theorizes the organizational and
market environments within which artifacts travel. More work is needed, however, to
theorize the "routes" and "journeys" certain technologies follow within socio¬
economic environments. In this way, the limits and possibilities of generification (or
of customization) could be accounted for. Pollock et al, correctly link the
generification process with its understanding by strategic management of suppliers
and users but they do not say how actors can also strategically construct the scope of
their actions and give meaning to distinctions such as global-local or generic-
particular.
The opening of the black box of technologies meant that people started
finding all sorts of things in it. The notions of "inscription" and "visions" mentioned
above refer mostly to immaterial elements that are associated with particular artifacts
and have been put there during processes of design, implementation and use. Recent
work on elderly care technologies, for example, examines how social practices are
combined with professional practices in the development and use of a technology
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(Hyysalo, 2004; 2006). The concept of "Practice Bound Imaginary" (PBI) is used
to describe the way that different social and professional practices are blended and
cross-fertilized with others as sources of representation of use in the development
and use of a technology. Hyysalo believes that in the process of technology design,
the development of user representations is a process that occurs with the involvement
of a PBI. This PBI accounts for a continuous change in the various pre-existing
professional and social practices the merging of which informs technological design.
In this sense, user representations are not only imagined by the designers but also
rooted in the practices that are mobilized for a particular technological configuration.
Although he discusses instantiation of PBIs, in the sense that different combinations
of practices might take place as well as different interpretations and ways of
participation in these practices (Hyysalo, 2006), he attributes the choices that
emerged only to local contingencies. This makes the actors and factors visible
retrospectively and only after they have acquired an important role for the future of a
technology. Hyysalo acknowledges the significance of particular historical moments
as important decision-making instances for the development of a technology where
designers meet the users and negotiate the PBIs, but he does not pay much attention
to the choices themselves and how they emerge from such instances. It might be
argued, therefore, that "social choice" in Hyysalo's work is viewed as open in terms
of the resources and the practices that will be configured, but it is examined as such
only after configuration took place. This highlights choice as an empirical issue but
without allowing a possibility of a theory of social choice.
Apart from the literature focusing on technologies and artefacts, there is
another strand of interdisciplinary research in STS focusing on the context of
design, implementation and use and how this context is historically shaped by its
interaction with technologies and processes of incremental or radical innovation. In
search of a concrete context that could be conceived and analyzed in relation with
technologies, one is offered by the concept of organization. At the start of the debate
about new technology, studies stressed more the influence of design and how it could
incorporate conscious social objectives and choices (see Noble, 1984). Later
implementation studies (Webster, 1990; Fleck et al, 1990) revealed organizational
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aspects as important in the shaping of a technology which has initiated work
focusing on the exploration of organization and its transformation during
implementation, as opposed to a focus on technological artifacts and design
processes exclusively.
The concept of organization has been used as having many different
meanings. Nonetheless, studies focusing on organization in relation to the design,
implementation10 and use of technologies and in parallel with the focus on specific
technologies or artifacts have shown that organization, however conceived
methodologically, is held analytically central in such studies. Other factors, such as
technologies, are seen as having influence on the shaping of the structure or
formation that the concept of organization represents. Besides, organization is the
context within which technologies are designed, implemented and used11. Current
research on T&O has been stressing the concept of organization in relation to the
introduction, adoption, implementation and use of new technologies. This particular
focus on organization has shown that organizations have biographies and histories
too, which are shaped by their interaction with technologies.
Relevant concepts have been produced in this strand of research emphasizing
the importance of the organization in the shaping of technology. The notion of
organization is directed towards "the firm" and its constituting elements, in contrast
to artefact-centered research that has not considered firms. The concept of "Company
Social Constitution" (CSC) (Hildebrandt & Seltz, 1989; Koch, 1997; Clausen, 1997)
captures the "frozen politics" of the firm and how they historically constitute,
through conflict and conflict-solving activities, a particular set of rules, norms and
principles that governs the attitudes to work and the working conditions of the
employees (Koch, 1997:131; Clausen, 1997:174). These elements are important for
10 It is more common for studies focusing on organization to be also part of implementation studies as
this is when technologies and organizational environments interact in a more dynamic way and
changes happen on either side. See for example Williams (1994) and the notion of "implementation
arena" or Fleck (1988) and his notion of "innofusion".
11 In such studies, one is able to make distinction between action and structure-oriented explanations.
German research, for instance, tends to primarily stress structural oriented explanations of the shaping
of technology, for example, focusing on distribution of qualifications, management/labour relations,
product market characteristics, company size, etc. (Clausen & Williams, 1997:4), while Scandinavian
research has been engaged in action research with experiments and demonstrations to improve
technology and working conditions but there is a neglect in structural limitations (see Clausen &
Langaa Jensen, 1993).
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the shaping of technology and organization, especially during the phase of
implementation (ibid.). Important elements of a CSC are described through the
norms of a) policies for work performance and principles regulating performance, b)
industrial relations at company level and the regulation of these and c) attitudes
towards work among the different actors of the company such as workers,
management, technical departments (Clausen, 1997:174). Such norms are seen as
specific for a firm depending upon the original founding idea, the regional
integration of the plant and the culture and education of the workforce and
management (ibid.). The fact that CSC are historically constituted point to the idea
that organizations, in this case organizational rules and norms within a firm, also
have a history or a biography throughout time. Although it is not clear whether the
CSC and the firm is the same thing, the CSC concept shows how certain
organizational aspects and arrangements within the firm might be products of long-
term historical processes or that certain attitudes towards work might be a result of
the historical evolution of a specific CSC. Not only technologies but also
organizations have histories and biographies. The concept of CSC captures the
internal to the organization environment as a dynamic one where politics and
conflicts define its form. It helps understand technological innovation as an ongoing
social and political process occurring, not only during design, but also during
implementation and use. It has been empirically used to study the implementation of
CAPM, CIM and production management systems (PMS) in Denmark (Clausen,
1997; Koch, 1997). It is also a concept that maps the user environment as
challenging and significant during innovation processes and it also makes visible the
relations between suppliers and users as social and political relations. Finally, it
directs research away from snap-shot studies of particular moments by stressing the
importance of organizational history in how firms adopt innovations, either
successfully or not. What has not been examined is whether the CSC of the supplier
could influence innovation. One could also explore whether CSC constitutes a
conscious conception of the firm's history by the firm's management and how is it
treated strategically during innovation.
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Further STS literature, captures the dual but inseparable character of
technologies and the processes shaping them. Various authors incorporate the
context of design, implementation and use of technologies in newly formulated
hybrid concepts and theories12. Technological artifacts, then, appear in a more active
mutual relationship with contexts of design, implementation and use, all of which are
considered as important in the shaping of technology. Such concepts, therefore, aim
to capture the interaction of technologies with the social environment within which
they are designed, implemented, and used. Methodologically, the constructionist, or
rather de-constructionist, approaches discussed earlier, aimed to explore how the
"social" or the "non-technical" was embedded within the artefact through processes
of design, implementation and use all of which had an influence on the shaping of
the biography of the artefact studied. The studies focusing on organization as the
context of design, implementation and use aimed at showing that technologies are
not shaped only in the design phase but also in the implementation and use phases, as
the social (organizational) interacts with the technical. Furthermore, the latter
literature aims to explore how an artefact or a technology may be seen as one entity
with the social environment it interacts with during processes of design,
implementation and use. Instead of looking at processes through which social
contexts and elements are embodied into artifacts, or processes through which such
contexts and elements historically evolve through incremental innovation, they look
at the "interaction" between analytical categories that represent technical and non¬
technical elements. They focus, then, on the interaction between two analytical
categories rather than on a linear conceptualization of shaping processes of these
categories, (i.e. linear models of innovation). Such analytical categories can be
captured by the concepts of technology and organization.
Studies that explore the development of technology and work organization
for instance have emphasized the need that these entities should be analyzed as a
unity (Fleck et al, 1990). The work of Robin Williams (1997a; 1997b) points towards
this direction in his study on the social shaping of industrial technologies where he
12 A few of such concepts which have become quite popular in the field are: "socio-technical systems"
(Hughes, 1983), "actor-network" (Law & Callon, 1992), "configurational technologies" (Fleck, 1988),
"artefact-activity" (Fleck, 2000), "technology-in-practice" (Orlikowski, 2000), "co-evolution", "co-
production", "mutual shaping" (Williams, 1997) etc.
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addresses the concept of "mutual shaping of technology and organization"
(Williams, 1997a; 1997b; Webster, 1990; Fleck et al, 1990).
Figure 2.1: Schematic Model ofthe Development ofTechnology and Organisation
(Source: Williams, 1997b)
Williams explores the relationship between design/supply of a technology and its
implementation and use over the life history of an innovation by employing Fleck's
(1988) "innofusion" model (Williams, 1997:110). He identifies the concepts of
technology and organization as representing two socio-technical systems: One of
which is "organization", a configuration that often proves remarkably stable in terms
of established divisions of labour and knowledge, technologies and product markets,
many of which features are captured by the concept of CSC (Williams, 1997:111)
stressing their historical development and evolution. The other socio-technical
system is "technology" which also has a history through the subsequent updates by
the suppliers, due to incorporation of features and presumptions from the context in
which they had previously been developed and used (ibid.). Williams argues that
previous research has taken the first or the second as the starting point in ways that
have shaped their understanding of their respective importance and he suggests an
alternative focus on the interaction between them. More particularly, he claims that
"the implementation of a technology that is new to the firm represents a collision
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between these two sets of institutions - with their own historical roots and
presumptions which may be more or less in conflict" (ibid.). The figure above
illustrates how this interaction takes place and how technological and organizational
change is produced. Empirically used to explore the social shaping of CAPM, the
above model supports the idea of a mutual shaping of T&O where the biography of
the artefact as it unfolds through successive organizational implementations and
generations of technological supply is addressed. Furthermore, the way these
implementations were patterned by the broader context of changing practices and
beliefs about business organization is also illustrated (ibid: 123).
The problem with Williams' model and the rest of the similar implementation
studies, is the lack of realization that the concepts of "technology" or "technological
artefact" and "technological solution" have less similarities among them than they
seem to have. Do organizations adopt technologies or technological solutions?
Technologies have been described as configurations of various elements, more or
less unique assemblies of, material, organizational, procedural components, some
standardly available, others specially developed, built up to meet the particular
requirements of user organizations (Fleck 1988). This makes it more difficult to
distinguish when such a configuration could be conceived as a technological artefact
or as a technological solution. It is very rare that an organization adopts a single
technological artefact; rather, they adopt configurational technologies in the form of
technological solutions, developed to solve particular, local organizational problems.
The above model of the mutual shaping of technology and organization
criticizes approaches that view technologies as an external factor that "causes"
organizational change, or approaches that view technology as a purely local
construct. Nonetheless, it also tends to identify technology with technology supply
and the strategies of suppliers, with off-the-shelf, black-boxed packages, while
organization is identified with the 'implementation arena' (see Williams, 1994), in
the context of a clearly defined CSC. This model, then, uses relatively closed
concepts instead of allowing for some "space for meaning" that would make such
concepts meaningful in different contexts. Finally, this model cannot account for
actors' decisions and choice very effectively because any information on choices are
obtained "on the side", while identifying mismatches and conflicts between
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technologies and institutions. A focus on choice and decision-making could be
more useful in helping to reveal arenas and fields of conflict between different
actors.
A more recent paper by Clausen & Koch (1999) could be seen as an attempt
to integrate technology and organization as an analytical focus by searching for
spaces and occasions open for negotiating technologies. Clausen and Koch take the
Social Shaping of Technology (SST) as their theoretical starting point and focus on
the decisions and choices that shape a technology. They argue, however, that a
comprehension of technological choice as being social is not enough. One needs to
understand how, where and when and under what circumstances the choice is taking
place (Clausen & Koch, 1999:463-464). They also emphasize the political
characteristic of these negotiations since the heterogeneous players involved in them
express diverse interests. As they state: "A space for shaping implies a social
context, where socio-technical ensembles can be addressed and politicized" (Clausen
& Koch, 1999:465). By studying the development and transformation of ERP
systems in Denmark, they identify and explore three spaces and occasions, which
also reflect different moments in the transformation of IT systems: segments of IT-
suppliers and their customers; company internal dynamics; and design for mass
production of software and customization (Clausen & Koch, 1999:464). Through
their analysis, the authors are led to very useful conclusions regarding the actors'
strategies, the instability or stability of their relations as well as the dynamics of the
market in relation to the process of shaping of ERP systems in Denmark (Clausen &
Koch, 1999:479-480). Although this study brings out different contexts and
occasions for social choice generation, the complexity of the actor that produces and
promotes legitimate social choices is lost within the analytically disintegrated spaces
and occasions they suggest and within arenas of political negotiations. The authors
illustrate the context of generation of choice as important but, in turn, they lose the
rationale and legitimacy mechanisms driving the actions of complex actors.
In terms of the relationship between T&O, the artefact-based research seems
to involve any social or organizational arrangements as the context within which
technologies are shaped, the organization based approaches tend to emphasize the
fact that this context is shaped historically along with the shaping of technologies
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and the last strand of literature seems to perceive this context as an entity with the
technology and see them as analytically inseparable. This segmentation of analytical
foci, however, creates confusion and inconsistencies to the study of T&O in an
interdisciplinary, multi-level and multi-dimensional manner and therefore needs
integration.
2.5 THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE
There is a preoccupation with a focus on knowledge and expertise and their
networks in some STS research that draws upon the intellectual background of the
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) (see Bloor, 1976) as well as from the
Bravermanian tradition on skills (Braverman, 1974). Influential studies have shown
that knowledge can be codified and embodied in machines. Codified knowledge is
the knowledge that has been (or can be) converted into symbols for easy
transmission, replication and storage (Noble, 1984; Boisot, 1995; Saviotti, 1998;
Langlois, 2001). Not all knowledge can be codified, however. As Polanyi (1966;
1967) first showed, not all knowledge can be put into words, as we know more than
we can tell. This phase of knowledge was termed as 'tacit knowledge'. Since
Polanyi, there are numerous studies in different disciplines illustrating the
importance of the tacit elements of knowledge for a wide range of activities (see
MacKenzie, 1996). The acquisition and employment of tacit knowledge in designing
technologies is quite crucial. This has also been shown in relation to the role of tacit
knowledge in organizations. Baumard (1999) for example, highlights that strategic
success seems to exist more in top managers' ability to use tacit knowledge than in
gaining or upgrading explicit knowledge.
The identification of the mobile character of knowledge, both tacit and
especially explicit, made scholars realize how knowledge may be dispersed across
various boundaries and that its mobilization and use require the development of
networks and contacts. Many authors have commented on the distributed character of
knowledge and that technological and organizational change and innovation needs to
emerge through collaborations of groups and organizations (Alter & Hage, 1993;
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Powell et al, 1996, Tsoukas (1996); Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). Since
knowledge is increasingly dispersed across organizational boundaries (e.g. across
professions, organizations and specialized practices) it is at these interstices that
distributed knowledge can be brought together and integrated into new products,
processes and services (in Swan & Scarborough, 2005). Opportunities for networked
innovation are, therefore, seen as increasingly important to organizational
performance facilitating the creation of new knowledge rather than just the transfer
of existing knowledge (Gulati, 1999). This realization shows that knowledge can not
only be transferred from one context to another; rather, the activity of re-
contextualization itself constitutes a knowledge producing activity with the
involvement of different contingent elements, which give innovative value to these
attempts. Of course, "networked innovation" might pose constraints and cannot only
give positive outcomes (Barley, 1990).
Apart from the distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge there is
another concept attributed to knowledge that is embodied in local working and
organizational environments. This has been termed as 'contingent knowledge'. As
Fleck (2002) argues "important elements of knowledge can be recognized as
embodied in the very working environment itself, even in the structure of the
organization, with its elaborated and emergent division of labour (or knowledge)".
Knowledge can also be embodied in people and organizational structures (Blacker,
1995; Sorensen & Levold, 1992). This form of concealed and embedded knowledge
has seen as making a huge difference in the effectiveness with which different
organizations can achieve innovation (Fleck, 1997). Contingent knowledge, then, is
local knowledge with doubtable transferability (Williams & Edge, 1996: 887) and its
proven significance for innovation processes creates questions on how this type of
knowledge of local character and scope can be combined with other types of more
mobile knowledge of universal availability and generality.
There is another distinction between abstract and particular or concrete
knowledge. Arora & Gambardella (1994) stressed the role of abstract and general
knowledge for innovation. Abstract knowledge is understood as the ability to
represent phenomena in terms of a limited number of 'essential' elements, rather
than in terms of their 'concrete' features. General knowledge is one able to relate the
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outcome of a particular experiment to the outcomes of other, more 'distant'
experiments (Arora & Gambardella, 1994:524). They argue, then, that there is an
increasing trend for the emergence of generality and abstractness of knowledge
during innovation, where technological change is not so much tied down to trial-and-
error processes at a local, tacit level. Scientists and technologists are able to distill
abstract ideas and general principles from their experiments, which they can apply
successfully in other concrete circumstances (Arora & Gambardella 1994; Langlois,
2001:82). The use of both local concrete knowledge and abstract, universal
knowledge in innovation opens up the possibility, Arora & Gambardella argue, for a
division of innovative labour.
The importance of knowledge and expertise of various kinds in innovative
processes has been further explored in studies of technology and organization.
Fincham et al (1994) have produced a relevant and seminal study exploring the role
of expertise in the IT-based innovation process in the Scottish retail financial
services sector. This interdisciplinary study contributes to the strategic co-ordination
of expertise, and more particularly, co-ordination of technical specialists in the arena
of information systems. The study demonstrates the complexity of the relationships
involved in such innovation processes and the extent to which expertise within
organizations is itself a product of a number of organizational, strategic,
technological and sector-specific factors (Crede, 1996:837). Despite its intellectual
contribution, this study has been criticized as lacking a clear theoretical focus
because authors have tried to combine too many theoretical lines of discussion
without combining them into a unified whole, and also that they fail to use
theoretical insights in their full effect (Crede, 1996:837).
The interest in knowledge and expertise in studies of T&O has been steady
for many years and was supported by the discussion about knowledge economy and
society (Drucker, 1993a; Drucker, 1993b; Neef, 1998) stressing the increasing
importance of knowledge both scientific and specialist in contemporary societies13.
In respect to the notion of the knowledge economy there is much debate and
13
Despite the theoretical and conceptual debates over the concept of knowledge economy and society,
hard evidence on the economic importance of knowledge has also been produced (for example see
OECD, 1996).
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ambiguity in relation to what it includes, how it is challenging for firms or whether
we should be talking about knowledge economy at all. The Department of Trade and
Industry (1998) defines a knowledge driven economy as one in which "the
generation and exploitation of knowledge has come to play the predominant part in
the creation of wealth" (in Gelauff, 2003:7-8). Some underlying trends of the
knowledge economy have been identified: internationalisation, liberalisation of
international trade, technological change, ageing and increasing heterogeneity in
worker types and preferences (Gelauff, 2003). The challenges for firms in terms of
managing innovation within a knowledge-based economy have been associated with
the management of their own interdependencies between their own and external tacit
and codified knowledge bases; assessing knowledge competencies by reviewing
knowledge related sources, incentive structures and communication channels
(Gelauff, 2003). Finally, firms would have to realise that modes of knowledge
production no longer only consist of entrepreneurship, links with universities and
vertical integration, rather two new modes of knowledge production are emerging,
namely technological cooperation and market for knowledge around knowledge
intensive business services, which would require firms to increase their knowledge
potential by connecting to external knowledge bases (Gelauff, 2003).
The notion of knowledge economy, or global knowledge economy given that
it is associated with globalisation trends, whether an undisputed fact (Dankbaar,
2003) or an early scenario (Vissers, 2003) or a questionable and empirically
ungrounded claim (Smith, 2000) is, nevertheless, present and used in research as a
point of reference for many studies, even though there is not consensus on what it is
and how it is important for social and economic actors. Given this ambiguity of the
term, I am making analytical use of it in reference to the abstract socio-economic
environment of technology supply and use on a global scale.
2.5.1 Markets and Networks
Relevant to the knowledge and expertise literature is the one that explores in
more structural terms the markets and the institutions within which innovation, as a
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knowledge-intensive activity, takes place. Such studies do not focus on particular
technologies or organizations; rather they examine the structural characteristics of
supply and demand and the institutional arrangements, such as market structure and
firm size. Interesting questions are: how new industries are created from innovation?
What is the ideal market structure to stimulate innovation? What is the best firm size
to stimulate innovation? What is the relationship between invention and demand?
(Coombs et al, 1987:95-96).
Various debates emerged from this interest on markets in relation to
innovation. The "technology-push/demand-pull" debate is one of them. It is rooted in
the economic theories of Schumpeter (1934; 1943) and Schmookler (1966)14, but
also in later works of various authors that contributed to the debate (see Pavitt, 1980;
Freeman et al, 1982). Nonetheless, as Mowery & Rosenberg (1979) argue, both
supply and demand, as well as the coupling of technology and market, are important
in determining the success of innovation (Coombs, et al, 1987:102). Moreover,
innovation is a very complex process and it is hard to pinpoint to one factor as the
most essential (Coombs et al, 1987:102).
Another economic approach constituting a revolutionary reformulation of the
neo-classical paradigm (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995:99) is the so-called "path
dependence" approach (Arthur, 1983; 1987; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995). The path-
dependence literature is accompanied and motivated by mathematical literature of
non-linear dynamic models. It claims that a minor or fleeting advantage or a
seemingly inconsequential lead for some technology, product or standard can have
important and irreversible influences on the ultimate market allocation of resources,
even in a world characterized by voluntary decisions and individually maximizing
behaviour (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995:205). Much of that literature has been pre¬
occupied with explaining "historical accidents" or "market failure". The work of
14 What makes Schumpeter an advocate of the technology-push thesis is his belief that whether the
central character is the entrepreneur or the large firm, it is only by introducing radically new ideas into
the economic life that whole new industrial sectors can be generated. Therefore, technology whether
generated outside the economic system or in the large R&D laboratories of a monopolistic competitor,
is for Schumpeter the leading engine of growth (Coombs et al, 1987:95). On the other hand
Schmookler (1966) did not argue that the demand forces and the structure of demand were the only
determinants of inventive activity, but he placed some additional focus on demand factors because he
was trying to correct the opposite imbalance according to which it was only the exogenous flow of
inventions that could generate new investments and new economic activities (Coombs et al, 1987:96).
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W.B. Arthur (1983; 1987; 1989; 1999), is a good example of how path-
dependence theory might work.
The path dependence studies, along with providing a critique ofneo-classical
theories of equilibrium have also elevated the importance of history, although in a
limited manner. The importance of history is related to what have been called "non-
ergodic" properties of the economy (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995:222). In Arthur's
analysis for example, history is important only because the sequence of events
determines current values, while if the sequence does not determine the end result,
then there is little place for history (ibid:223). History then is the "mere carrier -
deliverer of the inevitable" (ibid.). Apart from efficiency explanations of history
where economic history is trying to find purpose to past actions there is also history
where agents, for one reason or another, do not successfully optimize, making
history the tool to understand what rationality and efficiency cannot explain; that is,
the random sequence of insignificant events that are not addressed by economic
theory (ibid.).
As a random or patterned sequence of significant or insignificant events,
history is a context-bound concept conceived only a posteriori. In other words,
history is bound to the context of its conception and is re-enacted at certain moments
and places. A question would be: Can we study history in the making while it is
unfolding? A more active role and conception of history is needed as opposed to
something examined a posteriori as a completed sequence of historical events. In
order to do so, "social choice" needs to become more visible and theorized in a way
that reveals how history, organizational or technological is re-enacted during
particular situations.
Although the path dependence approach offers an explanation that captures
the important, general characteristics of competition between technologies with
increasing returns (Arthur, 1987:595), it has a number of flaws. It gives the
impression that technologies are adopted "by chance" without theorizing processes
of strategic planning and policy initiatives. Furthermore, choice seems to have been
left entirely up to "mimesis" (imitation) while the negotiation terrain or sphere is not
at all visible. Although technologies improve with adoption improvement processes
or even mimetic behaviour of users remain a mystery. The path dependence thesis
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offers the lenses for an alternative, more critical interpretation of economic history
but choice in this model is simplified while the complexities of negotiations and
social interaction are only implied in the background.
Apart from the evolutionary economics and economics of innovation
tradition, there is also a more sociological approach to the markets within the so-
called "new economic sociology" (Granovetter, 1985; Smelser & Swedberg, 1994).
Its contribution to the understanding of the markets is mostly because of the shift
away from a conception of purely rational action and away from the methodological
individualism of mainstream economics. Economic sociologists view markets as
networks of social relations rather than as just a transaction terrain (see Granovetter,
1973). The work of Mark Granovetter, for example, constitutes an attempt to theorise
economic action in between under-socialised economics accounts and over-
socialised sociological accounts of economic action (Granovetter, 1985). His notion
of "embeddedness" refers to the idea of economic action and economic rationality as
embedded into networks of social relations, as opposed to stand-alone rationality and
methodological individualism. Also his notion of'strong and weak ties'
(Granovetter, 1973) is an attempt to capture the informal characteristics of these
relationships and networks between economic agents. Finally, Callon (1997) has
stressed the complexity and heterogeneity of market networks by highlighting the
diverse interests of agents within markets, how they pursue them and how conflicts
between them are arranged. Markets then, have been seen as phenomena socially
constructed and politically maintained (Clark, 2000:103).
2.5.2 Commoditization & Commercialization
The various taxonomies of knowledge and expertise and their important role
in innovation, but also in science, technology and society more widely, have raised
questions on how this knowledge can be transferred and used, in what form and
through what processes. The realization of the increasing importance of knowledge
in society and the parallel development of ICTs has allowed the increasing
codification of different kinds of knowledge. This makes possible the
58
commoditization and commercialization of knowledge (OECD, 1996:13).
Knowledge, expertise and experience can be recorded and expressed into an explicit
form which means that it can be easily transformed, sold and bought. Business
organizations, with variations amongst different industries, tend to move away from
the traditional way of acquiring and maintaining knowledge through the
'professional model' that involves specialist functions within hierarchies
(Scarbrough, 1999). The in-house generation and maintenance of specialist
knowledge is too expensive for most organizations which instead choose to
outsource knowledge in different forms, either by adopting new IT, relevant services
and some more or less critical organizational processes. Business firms, instead of
developing and maintaining in-house knowledge, they choose to turn to networking
and alternative market-style arrangements (Whittington, 1991:43-53; Scarborough,
1999) while "knowledge workers" on the other hand have been subjected to forces of
marketization and outsourcing (Whalley, 1986). Commoditization has transformed
user firms into consumers and purchasers of knowledge and firms that produce and
develop knowledge and technologies into suppliers that offer such commodities. For
user organizations, choosing whether to develop in house or buy and use such
commodities becomes a highly strategic issue with political and economic
implications. Political implications might relate to the situation where management
aims to reduce their dependence on certain groups of labour. Economic implications
are related to the achievement of economies of scale, both for users who reduce cost
and suppliers who expand their markets (Tierney & Williams, 1990:4).
The idea of commoditization of knowledge and information into artefacts and
organizational processes and hierarchies has produced research resembling the
unfocused emphasis on artefacts or organizations discussed earlier. Studies exploring
the commoditization of IT (Swann, 1990; Swann & Lamaison, 1989) and accounts
that argue on the commoditization of organizational processes (Davenport, 2005)
have been conducted. Alongside there is literature that explores processes and
strategies of commoditization and commercialization of technologies stressing the
challenges of such processes for the actors involved and also the limits of
commoditization. Tierney & Williams (1990), for instance, explore the process of
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black-boxing15 of technologies as a commoditization process which is amenable to
strategic planning by both developers of such technologies and user organizations.
They suggest that the occupational and industrial division of labour in advanced
industrial societies makes possible the specialization and intensification of expertise
needed to develop complex technologies. Nonetheless, this division creates problems
of exchange of information between specialist firms and difficulties for maintaining
control (Tierney & Williams, 1990:3). Although black-boxing is a strategy for the
management of uncertainty and complexity, although it has obvious economic
benefits for both suppliers and users, is a challenging and difficult process because it
occurs within the framework of this particular division of labour. For example,
industry standard solutions emerging from black-boxing might offer users a greater
choice of suppliers and confidence that the product will not become obsolete
(Swann, 1990), however, the socio-economic relations between suppliers and users
make that process a little problematic, in terms of its strategic significance. The so-
called "package paradox"16 gives an idea of why black-boxing of technologies is a
rather difficult and contradictory process.
Brady et al (1992) explore the extent to which commoditization will expand
to include those industry-specific applications which have characterized the bulk of
in-house or customized software development, during the 1980s, especially in the
financial services industry (Brady et al, 1992:489). They identify an uneven and
limited commoditization process in software packages despite the enormous
economic incentives for commoditization and large scale supply of standard software
packages (ibid:490). They suggest that wholesale commoditization of industry
applications software is unlikely to emerge in the same way as it has for operating
systems and utilities; rather it will occur by means of the emergence of 'compromise'
software commodities in two main forms: semi-generic applications and niche-
specific applications (ibid:491). Finally, work by Eric von Hippel (1994) illustrates
the difficulties of acquiring and transferring certain pieces of information, termed as
15
Black-boxing is defined by Tierney & Williams as a process producing a preassembled technical
tool or product which can be used reliably without the user needing to understand and intervene in
their internal technical intricacies (Tierney & Williams, 1990:1).
16 The package paradox refers to the difficulties to balancing the independent development of a
software package as a commodity on one hand, and the opposite trend towards extensive
customization that user organizations are aiming for.
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'sticky' and the way this causes problems in innovation related problem-solving
activities. This also has implications in the process of commoditization of
technologies and organizations because of the difficulties to capture certain pieces of
information and knowledge, extract them from a certain locus or site and use it to
develop a commercial product.
Other ongoing research relevant to the commoditization and commercialization
ofknowledge focuses on social choice during the phase of procurement. More
particularly, it explores social choice between suppliers and users in the procurement
of software packages drawing on the notion of performativity17 placing social choice
in the midst of economic and cultural sociology theorisations (Pollock & Williams,
forthcoming). It is argued that actors attempt to drag the choice from the informal
domain which cultural sociologists would focus on, onto a more formal, accountable
plane through the mobilization and performance of a number of 'comparative
measures' and criteria (ibid.). They conclude that it is not the properties of the
technology that determine choice, but the way these properties were given form
through the various comparative measures put in place. This means that decision
making and social choice on technology design and procurement appear to be
significant social actions that contribute to its shaping.
2.6 SUMMARY
Societal and historical changes on one hand and theoretical and analytical
developments in social studies of technology and organization on the other are in a
mutual influence relationship. The way historical moments and societal changes
affect the way analysts pose questions and analytically conceive their subject matter
is captured by the Weberian discussion on values and value neutrality in social
research, while the way science influences society was captured, more recently, with
17
The term suggests that certain phenomena are, to a substantial degree, brought into existence and
sustained through the actual doing of them (MacKenzie, 2005: 9). In this sense, Callon suggests that if
people are to trade and purchase goods in a 'market' (as opposed to any of the other ways the
exchange of goods might occur) then the market has to be continually performed (in Pollock &
Williams, forthcoming).
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the notion of performativity (MacKenzie, 2005). Recent developments in the
social and economic relations bringing together, integrating and shaping the T-0
relationship - such as the commoditization of knowledge supply, the emergence of
diverse knowledge skills that create a diverse division of labour, the emergence of
new technology markets and contexts of use, the proliferation of and increasing
contention over the knowledge economy and the changing importance of certain
economic activities over others - provide the "material" and empirical basis on which
interdisciplinary STS research could be based on and explore the T-0 relationship.
Further theoretical, analytical and epistemological developments that capture and
address current socio-economic developments will provide a basis for a conceptual
integration under which a certain history of existing research and literature could
become useful to present and future students of STS and more particularly to the T-0
relationship. There is a need, therefore, for a new integrated and updated sociology
of T&O as a resource of solid academic identity and of reflexive planning by
practitioners and policy makers. In other words, academic research in the field of
T&O should catch up with empirical socio-economic developments in order to
become useful. Academic researchers and analysts who struggle to construct an
identity that makes sense given the social and economic reality they study and they
are part of will profit from it. Furthermore, practitioners and policy makers seeking
for applicable and relevant scientific knowledge in order to be able to insightfully




RESEARCH DESIGN, ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS AND
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
3.1 INTRODUCTION
A need for integration of the concepts and issues raised by the diverse
literature reviewed in chapter two has been identified. This can happen through
further theoretical and analytical developments able to capture and address the
shaping of T&O in a consistent manner that reflects the multidimensionality and
complexity of the socio-economic relations shaping T&O on a global and local scale.
Designing and organising a research project on such grounds was a difficult
task, given the diversity of alternative analytical and theoretical approaches. For this
reason, the encounter with the empirical research field proved to be helpful in
formulating a research design. If the research field and its particular social and
historical circumstances are the factors that direct research investigations, according
to the Weberian teachings on values in social research, then maybe I should look at
the particular research field more closely in search for a way to design a research that
explores the shaping of T&O. The design and conduct of this particular research
reflects a quite interesting personal journey of the analyst before the analytical and
methodological developments that I suggest were crystallised into a more concrete
proposition for an alternative research approach. Nonetheless, the suggested
approach should be able to incorporate analytical dichotomies, such as, action-
structure, micro-macro and global-local in explaining the shaping of T&O.
The chapter is structured according to the research design steps described by
Miles & Huberman (1994:16-39). Firstly, I present the analytical concepts and tools
developed and used in this study. Secondly, I formulate and present my research
questions according to the conceptual framework. The third step is to define the case.
That is to say, to define what I will be studying, in other words, the unit or units of
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analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994:25). Since the conceptual and analytical work
is related with the redirection of analytical units, this issue will be discussed in the
conceptual framework section. Here, however, more specific information on the case
studies will be provided. The fourth step involves sampling, while the fifth and final
step has to do with instrumentation, that is, to decide how to get the information
needed. For instance, if one seeks to find out how suspects are arrested and booked,
one may decide to interview people associated with this activity, collect arrest-
relevant documents, etc. (ibid:35). The sections on case-studies, sampling and
instrumentation are discussed together and then a discussion on the techniques of
data collection and analysis follows. It is my hope that the alternative theoretical-
analytical and methodological approach suggested and developed here will resolve
the problems identified with existing literature on the relationship between T&O. In
other words, this research is about developing an analytical grid that will help
develop a methodology, a way of approaching the topic of the relationship between
T&O.
3.2 REDIRECTING ANALYTICAL FOCUS: TOOLS AND
CONCEPTS
3.2.1 On Action, Structure, Actors and Social Choice
Traditionally, sociology and social sciences in general are considered with
the notion of action and the circumstances surrounding it. Along this, the SST
perspective is considering with capturing the social choices (intended or not) that
contribute to the shaping of technologies. However, social action and social structure
are situated into various contexts and analytical purposes that may have various
complicated meanings in different cases. The same is true for accounts on social
choices and actions within STS and SST approaches. There is not a consistent
meaning of the concepts of actions, structures and choices and there should not be
one given the diverse, contingent circumstances and empirical contexts within which
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such concepts are explored. The linkage of the concepts of action, structure and
social choice with their particular context, is the key to providing a complete and
consistent theorisation of social action and social structure, where consistency does
not refer to homogeneity of meaning, rather to the illustration of such concepts as
open to various interpretations and analytical uses. Analysts, then, "consistently"
need to be aware that the particular context and analytical purposes of a study attach
meaning to concepts such as action, structure or choice.
In this particular research, although there was an initial interest in action-
structure debates, the concept of social choice occurred later on when exploring the
field and gradually becoming familiar with studies on the SST. Social action,
therefore, came to mean social choice while social structure refers to the conditions
that generate, motivate, promote and finalise such a choice. In the context of this
study, then, action can be spotted in decision-making processes where actors are
planning and making certain choices instead of others in the context of managing T-
O change and innovation. Such choices might include selection of technologies, that
is, what to buy, what to invest on, what kind of expertise and other resources are
needed, where to get them from and how to organise them. On the supply side, such
choices might include how to design, what products to promote, what kinds of
technological solutions to develop, who to collaborate with, how to maintain and
expand their networks, towards which direction. Regulators need to decide how to
regulate the environment of design, procurement and adoption of technologies, and
so on. Social action is, therefore, seen as the possibilities open to a certain actor for
making social choices in the context of strategic decision making and management,
while social structure is seen as the factors that might constraint, limit or direct and
condition these possibilities.
In the literature review it is shown that there is no agreement on the notion of
action and social choice as well as on who the actor is and where and how action and
choice emerges (for example differences between managerial, political process
approaches, theories of the firm). Such controversies are challenging when designing
research. It is argued here that particular attention should be placed on the choice of
the focus of analysis. An analytical focus that will make more visible who the actor
is and where and how action as social choice emerges is needed. It will also
66
contribute to the conceptual integration of the approaches reviewed in the previous
chapter. For this purpose, a focus on "instances of T-0 change" within the wider
socio-economic environment they emerge from is suggested, while at the moment
the concept of actor, the nature of choices and the way they emerge will be explored
and defined by the field.
3.2.2 Instances of Techno-Organisational Change
The redirection of the analytical focus towards "instances of T-0 change"
and the way they are linked with their wider socio-economic environment within a
global knowledge economy will provide a framework for analysis able to capture and
make more visible the relations involved in the shaping of T&O by addressing social
action, structure and choice. Instances of T-0 change can be defined as the social
situations where the biographies of technological artefacts meet with the histories of
organisations and firms. The significance of these situations as important moments
able to affect the future of the technologies or organisations is something to be
decided and evaluated by the actors involved, according to their separate strategic
plans. The importance of such instances for both technologies and organizations has
been emphasized through various terms and research. Hyysalo (2004) for instance
examines what he calls "visible handshakes" in the shaping of healthcare
technologies and Vergragt (1988) calls them "critical events" which are crucial
moments in innovation process where directions are decided, negotiated or
consolidated and might affect future possibilities. Additionally, such instances have
been studied as boundary objects (see for example Jensen, 2005), political spaces of
inclusion-exclusion (Clausen & Koch, 1999, Clausen & Yoshinaka, 2004).
Such social situations have been conceptualized and studied in different ways
and in different contexts where various aspects have been examined and attention has
been given to alternative foci, according to the commitments of different intellectual
backgrounds employed. In the context of this study a focus on T-0 change instances
is suggested because it is during the instantiation, design and implementation of such
instances that a space and a social situation is created for the actors involved in it to
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make sense of that situation which will lead to decision making and social choices
in regard to the direction of the shaping of T&O. In this way, social choices, that is,
the interplay between social action and structure linked with a particular context of
T-0 change become visible. Additionally, T-0 change instances do not emerge out
of nowhere; rather, from the formulation of socio-economic relations amongst
various actors. It is important, for this reason, to identify and explain how such
instances are linked with the wider environment of a global knowledge economy and
how it might be configured differently in different local contexts and circumstances.
The notion of a global knowledge economy is an ambiguous term. It has many
facets, it has been conceived in many ways, many consider it as an undisputed fact
while others question its existence and whether it constitutes a recent phenomenon or
not. I will not get into the debate of defining the global knowledge economy. Given
its ambiguity and lack of consensus in its use, however, I will use it for its analytical
merit (see Vissers, 2003). This is to refer to the global, abstract social and economic
environment of the relations of supply and use of technologies, knowledge and
expertise, and other elements that comprise technological solutions looking their way
out to instances of T-0 change.
The phases of initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change instances
can provide a basis for a systematic exploration of different sets of social choices that
actors involved in such an instance need to make (what to buy, how to design and so
on). The centre of analysis of this study, then, is not a particular technology or a
particular organization, rather the social situation which is created when certain
dynamics bring together certain technologies with certain organizational settings
within the global knowledge economy and how this situation can be perceived and
managed by different actors involved in it. An exploration of how such instances
emerge and how they are linked with the wider environment of the knowledge
economy will be attempted. In other words, the shaping of the relationship between
T&O will be accounted for more completely by a focus on the techno-organizational
rather than on just the technological or just the organizational. That is to say, in this
thesis there will be an attempt to pursue and develop the "techno-organizational"
concept as a theoretical-analytical category that could provide a wider focus for
studies on T&O. The techno-organizational change concept has been used elsewhere
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to stress the mutuality of technological and organizational change processes
(McLaughlin et al, 1999:7). It is argued here that technological and organizational
change is not about two separate but mutually shaped processes, rather it should be
seen as one process with different aspects. Additionally, the redirection of the
analytical focus on instances of T-0 change will help define the case studies and the
unit of analysis. By producing case studies on a set of instances of T-0 change rather
than on firms will help locate social choice and social action as it emerges within
these instances. Finally, instances of T-0 change will give rise to the actors involved
in them, their nature and the way they act and produce social choices.
Figure 3.1: Particular instances ofT-0 change within abstract knowledge economy
The figure above represents instances of T-0 change as social situations that emerge
within a wider yet indeterminate socio-economic environment that could be captured
by the concept of global knowledge economy. As this figure is not very sophisticated
in illustrating how instances of T-0 change are linked with the global knowledge
economy, later on in the analysis chapter a more elaborate figure which is informed
by the findings of this research is presented.
3.2.3 Actor's or Analyst's View?
The redirection of the analytical focus towards the instantiation, design and
implementation of T-0 change instances as it happens within the socio-economic
relations of the knowledge economy requires methodological adjustments that will
bring about the processes through which social choices are happening regarding the
shaping of T&O. This is due to the heterogeneity and diversity amongst the actors
that could be involved in a T-0 change instance. The concepts of network
innovation, distributed organizing and distributed innovation mentioned in the
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previous chapter suggest that T-0 change is taking place with the involvement of
heterogeneous elements (resources, expertise, artifacts, etc.) carried into the T-0
change instance by various actors (firms) through the development of networks.
Since the necessary elements and resources for a T-0 change instance to take place
require the involvement of various heterogeneous and diverse actors with different
roles, different strategic orientations and a different set of choices to make during the
instantiation, design and implementation of a T-0 change instance, the perspective of
the analyst needs to be paralleled with the perspective of the actor. Although a focus
on instances is suggested, methodologically a "follow-the-actor within a multi-actor
socio-economic environment" approach should be adopted. The concept of "actor",
as mentioned earlier, at this stage of research is not entirely shaped. Therefore, an
initial exploration of the empirical field will be necessary in order for actors as
entities to emerge and take form. It is suggested, however, that the place to look for
actors is the T-0 change instance where social choices as actions emerge. Therefore,
the process of paralleling the analytical view with the actors' views is one unfolding
in parallel with the emergence of actors as significant entities that produce social
choices and shape the T-0 relationship within social situations of T-0 change
instances. The exploration, then, of how different actors understand and become
conscious of themselves and their environment, while they are emerging within T-0
change instances, will reveal how social choice is differently framed in different
contexts by attaching meaning to the particular social situation and in turn the
challenges and factors that generate social choice. This will help theorize social
action and structure as they are linked with the special context within which they
emerge. In this way more voice will be given to the actors, that is to the empirical
and pragmatic entities, to define the challenges and the significant aspects of T-0
change regarding the choices that each actor needs to pursue in order to manage T-0
change. In turn this will help the analyst produce theories and analytical frameworks
to explore and explain these processes.
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3.2.4 The Agora Metaphor
The concept of "Agora of Techno-Organisational Change" (ATOC) is
introduced in the context of T-0 change in order to capture the analytical space
between instances of T-0 change and wider socio-economic relations within the
global knowledge economy, as conceived by different, diverse and heterogeneous
actors. Let us see in more detail what is an Agora, why and how it is used, and which
are its analytical powers.
Although in the modem Greek language the term Agora translates as
"market" or "marketplace", the ancient Athenian Agora was not just a marketplace
equivalent to a modem shopping centre, it was also a place/space of gathering for
1 8
Athenian citizens to discuss, exchange political views, socialize etc . For centuries
the Athenian Agora served as a busy marketplace where merchants and artisans had
congregated to offer their goods to all who gathered and it also provided a platform
for the Athenian political and intellectual life. It was the physical place where every
Athenian citizen gathered to conduct their business, participate in their city's
governance, decide judicial matters, express their opinion for all who cared to listen,
and elect their city officials (Thompson, 1985). The concept of Agora then, in the
context of ancient Athens, refers to a physical space which served as a platform for
the formulation of social, economic, political, commercial relationships and the
exchange of material products, ideas, values and knowledge amongst Athenian
citizens.
The Agora metaphor has been used in STS by Nowotny et al, (2001) in order
to capture and explain the complex social and political processes involved in the
production and use of scientific knowledge. This thesis, although it is not related to
the work of Nowotny et al in terms of the research topic, could profit from the use of
the Agora metaphor which can embrace and capture the formulation, maintenance or
transformation of complex relationships between actors and the material and non-
material, basis of these relationships, i.e. the type and nature of the resources
circulated. Also, the discussion about commoditisation and marketization of
expertise and innovation (see previous chapter) points to the direction of the
18
The word Agora comes from the Greek word ageiro (ays ipa), meaning "gather" or "assemble".
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emergence of a market, not just in the strict economistic view, but rather as a
format where social relations are developed and unfolded, technological products are
bought and sold but also non material aspects influence the way this market operates.
This makes the Agora metaphor appropriate to be used as an analytical concept to
capture socio-economic relations surrounding instances of T-0 change where various
diverse and heterogeneous actors are involved.
In the context of study of T&O in an era of globalisation, the Agora concept
would not be restricted in a reference to a physical finite space; rather its more
cognitive and non-physical boundaries should be explored and analytically exploited.
For example, how come different actors from different parts of the world, involved
in different kinds of activities, belonging in different industries, can be seen as being
part of the same ATOC even though they might have not any relationship
whatsoever with each other? Relevant to this is Giddens' (1989) discussion on space,
time and place (in Heiskanen, 2003:10). Giddens argues on the distanciation of
space, time and place as an increasing phenomenon in modernity as opposed to pre-
modem societies. Therefore, "when" does not coincide with "where" and "space"
does not necessarily mean "place" (in Heiskanen, 2003:10-11). The notion of time
still exists and plays an important role in social relations but it does not refer to a
particular geographical place. Within a set of organised relations time could count
differently for different parts within the space or have different significance. The
meaning, therefore, of such notions like space, time, place is transformed as societies
change. The combination of these concepts with each other is relevant to how one
perceives them and it is very much dependent on the different situations that they are
used. ATOC, then, refers to a space in a wider sense of the term within which local
instances of T-0 change are shown as emerging from and linked with socio¬
economic relations amongst actors within a globalized knowledge economy19.
For the purposes of this study the analytical capabilities of the ATOC concept
will provide a template within which actors' social choices will be followed and
explained, according to the methodological propositions suggested above. The space
between local instances of T-0 change and socio-economic relations within a global
19
For more on the notion of space, i.e. production of space, real vs. imagined space, material vs. non-
material space, etc. see Heiskanen (2003) and Kaniadakis (2004).
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knowledge economy will be identified as a significant terrain for the shaping of
T&O within which the interplay between social action and structure will be theorised
by looking at social choices made during those T-0 change instances. In other
words, the ATOC concept helps make visible an alternative analytical space but also
an unexplored space for action within which social choices could become more
prevalent. This will lead to a more comprehensive theorisation of social action and
structure in the context of T-0 change, thus, responding to the problems of existing
literature identified in the previous chapter. Additionally, a contribution will be made
to the establishment of a new terrain for practitioners' action and intervention, a new
focus for the task of managing the challenges of T-0 change, by enabling actors to
conceive themselves as part of their external environment of a global knowledge
economy.
It is important to state that the conceptual tools and analytical and
methodological suggestions presented here emerged and developed during the
processes of data collection and analysis along with the exploration of relevant
existing literature, in other words, throughout the research journey of this study.
While I was struggling to cope with the challenges of the above processes I gradually
formulated my methodological strategy, my alternative analytical focus as well as the
concepts that would capture the processes I wanted to explore. The ATOC concept
for instance emerged during my attempt to integrate findings from my two case
studies under a single explanatory scheme. Or the suggestion to parallel the analyst's
view with the actor's view emerged from my realisation during fieldwork that the
different people I interviewed were describing the same situation from a distinctively
different point of view, depending on the firm they represented, their expertise and
their position within organisational hierarchies. The choice to present them here in
this chapter was made due to the need to construct a narrative and a thesis structure.
Nevertheless, the choices for the formulation of this particular research
design were developed from a combination between the inconsistencies and
shortcomings stemming from the diversity of analytical foci in the existing literature
and the gradual appreciation of the empirical context while the research process was
unfolding. Given the gradual appreciation of the empirical context where the
concepts of "distributed organising" and "networked innovation" were illustrated as
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indicators of innovation taking place between rather than within certain actors, a
redirection of the analytical focus towards instances of T-0 change and their links
with their wider socio-economic environment would analytically open up such a
space. Within this newly identified "terrain" the production and promotion of social
choices as they emerge together with certain actors could be captured and explained
better as generated within such multi-actor, multi-level and distributed social
situations. This would avoid inconsistencies stemming from an a priori focus on
certain technological or organisational outcomes that single design and
implementation studies could produce and capture social choices "in-the-making".
Additionally, the selection of the particular case studies, which include actors that are
not directly involved with each other in a commercial or contractual relationship,
although it happened based on the contingencies of organising and gaining access to
the field, it proved to be particularly beneficial. This situation offered insights for the
conceptualisation and development of the ATOC as a space for innovation. For
example, the fact that actors from the two case studies did not have any present
relationship with each other does not mean that they do not have any relation at all.
They are part of the same socio-economic environment captured by the ATOC
concept and they exist as possibilities for each of the actors in terms of the options
and choices that link development, supply and use of T&O. This also made possible
the identification of the non-choice, as it will be shown in chapter seven, as a
possibility for action, which refers to the possibilities for choice that were not
selected.
After the fulfilment of the goals of this thesis, I hope that the concepts
developed here will be established and accepted as both useful analytical tools which
mark and represent new areas/fields for scientific enquiry but also as useful concepts
within which practitioners will be able to use in understanding their environment and
themselves as part of it while developing strategy and managing T-0 change. Along
such lines, I will now discuss the ATOC as an alternative spatial concept contrasting
it with various similar ones.
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3.2.5 ATOC: An Alternative Spatial Concept
With the gradual appreciation of the distributed and networked character of
innovation, spatial concepts that capture and embrace spaces within which social and
economic relations and processes of innovation are formulated in multiple levels of
understanding, are extremely important. Such concepts open up alterative empirical
research fields, or rather, alternative ways of approaching and accessing the
empirical reality, and help analysts to clarify and make sense of complex situations.
The ATOC, as an analytical concept could be contrasted with any such spatial
concept. Reference is made here to a few of such concepts.
"Innovation space" (Tidd et al, 2005:10-13), is a concept which attempts to
map various different types of innovation (product, process, position, paradigm) and
the variety in the degree of novelty they might project (radical - incremental).
Although the "innovation space" concept implies the existence and importance of
multiple levels of innovation, through the different degrees ofnovelty and scale of
changes, and although it allows for the presence of innovation strategy and
management, it fails to illustrate how multiple actors might co-exist in such a space,
how they produce social choices and how these are shaped and negotiated through
political and power relations. In other words, this is a managerial model providing a
generic map of different types of innovation, however, it does not necessarily refer to
a system or a nexus of social and economic relations amongst various diverse actors,
in the way the ATOC concept does.
Another similar spatial concept is that of "development arenas" (Jorgensen &
Sorensen, 1999). Building on ANT, the "development arenas" concept illustrates the
interaction of "actor-worlds" around the development of certain technologies.
Although "development arenas" is a useful spatial concept that captures important
socio-economic dynamics in the development of technologies, it could be argued that
it provides a rather restricted view of T-0 change. The reasons for that are associated
with an artefact-centrism this concept is based on where actor-worlds interact around
the development of particular technologies. The ATOC concept provides a wider
frame as it includes global abstract relations and integrates them with local particular
social situations. In that sense, there might be various development arenas within the
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ATOC and contribute more or less significantly in various techno-organisational
configurations. For instance, as we will see in chapters five and six, the development
arena of banking integrated software packages could be identified as part of ATOC
as it appears in the two case studies.
Finally, concepts such as "technological frames" (Bijker, 1995) and
"practice-bound imaginaries" (PBI) (Hyysalo, 2006) could be contrasted with
ATOC. These concepts could be seen as spatial concepts in the sense that they
constitute sources that provide references and metaphors for design and/or
implementation of technologies in various contexts. They, therefore, refer to design
and implementation spaces. More particularly, "technological frames" is a concept
that provides shared assumptions, knowledge and expectations through which
relevant groups give meaning to an existing or emerging socio-technical
configuration (McLoughlin, 1999:160). The concept of ATOC as an analytical space,
however, includes wider processes and social relations beyond such configurations
and moves away from strictly organisational understandings of the T-0 relationship.
Additionally, the exploration of ATOC both as an analytical space but also as a space
for action/practice allows for a more material presence of socio-economic relations,
rather than just the metaphorical presence suggested by the notion of frames. The
material reality is more present in the concept of PBIs, as metaphors and
representations are rooted in social practices, however, social choices in-the-making
cannot be accounted for with this concept, only a posteriori.
The ATOC concept is an alternative spatial concept seeking to integrate
multiple levels of analysis in exploring and understanding innovation as it takes
place in the space between local T-0 change instances and the global knowledge
economy. In doing so, the production, promotion and negotiation of social choices in
the socio-economic space amongst multiple and diverse actors is highlighted as
essential in the exploration of such a concept. The following research questions aim




According to Punch (1998), research questions, in general, do five main
things:
• They organise the project, and give direction and coherence.
• They delimit the project, showing its boundaries.
• They keep the researcher focused during the project.
• They provide a framework for writing up the project.
• They point to the data that will be needed (Punch, 1998:38).
The formulation of the research questions for this study, however, reflect an
unfolding research process, a journey that reveals a gradual change, or rather the
gradual formulation of my research agenda. The illustration of this evolution in the
formulation of research questions will add more value to this research as it supports
the argument of linking or aligning theoretical and analytical developments with
empirical socio-economic changes that shape T&O, in other words, that analytical
and theoretical development has or should have a basis in reality.
My initial attempt towards pursuing a conceptual integration of STS studies
for the exploration of T&O was to produce a more theoretical approach based on
action-structure and micro-macro debates. By involving such analytical
distinctions/debates I wanted to improve the theoretical treatment of T&O. Drawing
on Mouzelis' suggestion that action should not be associated only with micro and
structure only with macro levels (Mouzelis, 1995:155), I had conceived an analytical
basis in order to explore how the action-structure and micro-macro concepts could be
combined in the study of T&O towards a multi-level understanding. The empirical
basis for this theoretical endeavour would be cross-sector, cross-national, two-by-
two case studies of firms in Greece and the UK. However, this was at a stage that I
had no fieldwork experience and my reading of STS literature was very limited.
Nonetheless, an initial set of general and theoretical research questions developed
and they were focusing more on exploring action-structure and micro-macro in the
context of T&O.
More particularly I was directed towards exploring what constitutes action
and what constitutes structure within a multi-level reality, that is, to see how action
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and structure expressed at various analytical levels (micro, meso, macro).
Subsequently, I wanted to explore how the links between such levels could be
captured through conceptualising and putting in motion the action-structure interplay
as it could appear in various levels and how this interplay was revealing a dynamism
between different levels of analysis (i.e. tensions between global-local) and
contributing to the shaping of T&O. Initially, then, I had identified a need for further
theoretical and analytical developments in the study of T&O by embracing the
analytical distinctions of action-structure and micro-macro (with global-local being a
certain version of it) but having no clear idea of what could be counted as action or
structure; the initial research questions were directed towards defining these
concepts.
Entering the fieldwork and further engaging with relevant literature, however,
helped me formulate more particular research questions along with developing
original analytical concepts and tools that could capture the reality that I was
experiencing. During my interviews the commoditisation of knowledge and
technology supply became apparent where supplier-user relationships were playing
an important role in how technologies were coming in contact with various
organisational contexts. In such commoditisation processes I could see that
technologies were integrated with organisational elements and constituted
configurations that could be developed, sold and bought within networks of supply
and use of technological solutions for organisational/business problems (see analysis
and concluding chapters).
In such a context the concept of action was associated with social choice
during decision-making and management of T-0 change, while the concept of
structure was associated with the factors conditioning the emergence of such choices.
Additionally, the concept of the actor was starting gradually to become clearer in the
context of the research. As research was unfolding business firms started
crystallizing as important actors. User and supplier firms that go through decision¬
making processes for the production/deliverance of social choices were emerging
and in turn directing my focus of analysis towards social choices produced by such
actors. If action and social choice, however, become completely identified with the
actor-firm, the importance of inter-organisational networks will be downplayed and
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inter-firm relationships will analytically disappear, since social choice will be seen
as emerging from individual actors without any influence. Fincham et al (1994), for
example, have shown the importance of networks of expertise in innovation where it
is prevalent that when a firm makes a choice to buy or invest on a technology this is
actually an investment on networks of expertise. A firm-based theory of technical
and organisational change, then, has to be carefully conducted because although
firms might appear as the legal entities that produce social choices, the emergence of
these choices does not lie within the firm's organisational structures, but rather on
networks of inter-organisational relations. On the other hand, social choices as
conceived by political process approaches - as emerging through conflicts and
negotiations at the organisational level — cannot be neglected as well. This thesis will
attempt to integrate such approaches systematically and show how action can be
theorised and conceptualised in such a context.
In summary, the evolution of the formulation of research questions for this
thesis started with a realisation for further theoretical development that would offer
the grounds to provide an integrated theorisation of T&O based on analytical
distinctions of action-structure and micro macro. This led to a set of general and
theoretical research questions. As the fieldwork research was unfolding social
choices emerged as actions and business firms were crystallizing as significant actors
within a wider socio-economic environment within which instances of T-0 change
were initiated, designed and implemented. This led to the development of the
concept of ATOC to capture the socioeconomic relationships and map out an
environment of supply and use of technologies and knowledge, which generates
social choice during T-0 change. The ATOC concept, it might be argued, is an
analytical response to the pragmatic and empirical integration between technologies
and organisations into configurations that constitute solutions to business problems.
In other words, my exposure to the field and my encounter with the emergence of the
commoditisation of technology and knowledge supply and use led me to the
development of the ATOC concept but then further questions emerged on how the
social and economic relations captured by ATOC work. A second set of more
particular research questions on what ATOC is, how it operates and what is the role
of actors within it, was developed. This second set of research questions was also
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directed to the improvement of the theoretical and analytical treatment of T&O but
through showing how ATOC works and how actors-firms appear as the producers of
social choices as actions within it.
Given the above evolution in the development of the research questions of
this study the final questions will be presented here. The first set of questions refers
to T&O in more general terms while the second is more particular and refers to the
ATOC.
General Research Questions:
1. How can the relationship between T&O be understood in the context of this
study?
2. How can the concepts of action-structure and micro-macro (global-local
being a certain version of it) help improve the theoretical and analytical
treatment of the T-0 relationship?
Particular Research Questions:
1. Within the space between local T-O change instances and the global
knowledge economy, which are the social and economic relations the ATOC
concept is referring to and which are the dynamics shaping them and the way
ATOC operates?
2. How is the ATOC environment challenging during instances of T-O change
and how do actors strategically manage them?
3. How can the ATOC be understood in terms of actors' strategies and social
choices on the management of T-O change?
While the first set of research questions refers to a more general theorisation of T&O
by using fundamental theoretical/analytical distinctions/debates in social sciences,
the more particular research questions refer to ATOC and how it operates. The first
question, for instance, aims at defining what ATOC as a phenomenon that is
empirically studied is, what is its nature and what are its driving forces. The second
question aims to show how such an environment may be challenging for the actors
involved in it, in other words how and under what grounds this environment can
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generate action during T-0 change. Finally, the third question aims to show how
social choices during the management of T-0 change constitute actions that shape
the relationship between T&O within ATOC. The last two questions will also give
insights on the relationship between actors as they emerge from fieldwork and the
environment within which they operate.
As it is shown here, research questions, especially in qualitative research,
may be unfolding rather than pre-specifled (Punch, 1998:23). The evolution in the
development of the research questions illustrates important aspects of the co-
development between theory and empirical practice and the importance of the field
itself and the subjects studied in the contribution to the analysis and to theory
building. Exploring the above research questions will be a first step in finding out
how this study can fulfil its purpose, that is, to provide a basis for an integration of
STS literature that could be used for the study of the T-0 relationship in an
interdisciplinary manner that bridges the gap between theoretical-analytical,
pragmatic and empirical developments.
3.4 CASE STUDIES, SAMPLING AND
INSTRUMENTATION
A case study takes as its subject one or more selected examples of a social
entity - such as communities, social groups, organisations, events, etc. - which are
studied using a variety of data collection methods (Hakim, 2000:59). Punch (1998)
argues that a case could also be a process (Punch, 1998:152). In this study, as stated
previously, the object of study consists of instances of T-0 change within the wider
social and economic environment within which they emerge. As mentioned earlier,
actors appear in this unit as firms that are called to be engaged in the production of
social choices within such instances. Actors are represented in a T-0 change instance
by physical persons involved in it or by means of structures such as legal framework,
directives, standards. These physical persons as well as relevant documents would be
the sources of information. This is not to say that the firms themselves are
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unimportant as entities to be at the centre of analysis. On the contrary, the firms
involved in this study are very important sources of social action. This action,
however, emerges and becomes visible within instances of T-0 change, which are
the multi-actor social situations within which social choice is produced.
The process of selecting units of analysis is called sampling (Miles &
Huberman, 1994:27). Sampling here is purposive rather than random which means
that there are certain criteria under which I chose the social situations that serve as
instances of T-0 change comprising the unit of analysis. This could be done in many
ways. For instance, one could first select a team of firms and from then go on to
identify moments in their history or relevant activities they are involved in that could
count as instances of T-0 change. Another way would be to directly identify
significant T-0 change instances (i.e. restructuring programs) and from there on to
map out the various different firms/actors involved in it. In this study both of the
above happened because of the specific route of my research journey. Let me
explain:
The scope of the study and the development of the sampling strategy evolved
in the same manner that my research questions did. As stated earlier, initially the aim
was to conduct two cross-national and cross-sector two-by-two case studies around
banking firms and IT firms. The exploratory nature of the study led to the gradual
formulation of the scope of the study and the types of case studies that it will include.
A redirection of the analytical focus from case-firms to instances of T-0 change as
more appropriate in an attempt to reveal social choices helped expanding the scope
of the study towards a more extended theoretical exploration of the cases. This
expansion became possible due to a deeper appreciation of the empirical field and
the nature of socio-economic relations of supply and use of T-O solutions. This
expansion of the scope, therefore, was not theoretical but pragmatic since it was
allowed by the nature of the social and economic relations amongst actors in the
empirical field. This made possible the involvement of a wider range of players
(suppliers, consultants, users, etc.) and the exploration of the relationships among
them, rather than focusing only on case-firms, which would offer a restricted account
of the shaping of T&O. To put it simply, I expanded the scope of the study because I
realised I could do so.
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A focus on instances of T-0 change served as a methodological device to
guide my snowballing technique and the scope of my first case study. More
particularly, I identified a T-0 change instance in a Greek Bank (GB) as a starting
point, and I snowballed my way out. I, therefore, interviewed people from various
expert firms and organisational structures of the bank that were directly involved in
it. Firstly, I met an external consultant that was involved in the change program. He
then introduced me to people from the bank and other consultants and suppliers. The
scope of this case study, then, was determined by the scope of the particular T-0
change instance. While collecting data for this case, it started becoming apparent that
suppliers and experts involved in the instance were quite important for its direction
and control. This directed me to look for actors in the supply side for another case
study. It also became apparent that different people interviewed were expressing
different views and were interpreting in different ways the same social situation they
were involved in. This led me to the development of the idea to use the differing
views of the different actors as analytical lenses, thus, paralleling my analytical view
with the actor's view. This methodological decision led to the sampling of the second
case study, where I did not start from an instance and work my way out; rather, I
started from a particular actor, a System Integration Firm (SIF) from the supply side
and looked at their involvement in the initiation, design and implementation of series
of T-O change instances. The actors selected do not constitute the case studies. They
rather provided two different angles, two different nexi through which a set of
multiple T-0 change instances was examined. One was the instance in the GB and
the others were instances that the SIF is involved in. This way, both the supply and
use sides involved in the shaping of T&O were examined also allowing for fruitful
comparisons between the GB change program and SIF's projects, in terms ofhow
they were managed. It is important to state that GB and SIF are not currently
involved with each other in any kind of relationship. This is because of the form of
my access to the field but also it will be challenging to show why and how two firms
that are not in any form of relationship might be seen as part of the same socio¬
economic environment.
Although the particular national and industrial context of this study will be
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, a few words are necessary at this stage
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as a justification of the choices to study the specific cases. Relevant literature in
Greece on the relationship between T&O is minimal. Most of the studies that have
been conducted regarding technological and organisational issues in Greece have not
been produced within the prism of a specific discipline or an area of studies. This is
not to say that T&O in Greece is studied according to interdisciplinary principles.
This would presuppose some sort of cohesion in the methods used or in the kind of
bibliography that various authors draw upon. Rather the study of T&O in Greece is a
collection of dispersed accounts not linked with each other, written mostly by
engineers, architects and regional scientists (see Sefertzi, 1998). Due to the condition
above, it is quite difficult to locate and identity relevant literature with some form of
consistency in order to review it and reach valid conclusions. This shows that the
national environment of Greece is an understudied field with many inconsistencies
and incoherencies. It, therefore, provides an excellent virgin area for studies on T&O
to be empirically, but also theoretically and analytically, studied. The banking
industry in Greece is an appropriate sector to look at for the purposes of this study.
Banks, due to strong competition and due to newly introduced programs of techno-
organisational restructuring, are almost constantly in the process of reshaping their
technologies and accordingly their work content. Additionally, the banking industry
in Greece is ideal for studies of new technology applications because it constitutes a
pioneering industry, in that aspect, in the service sector as a whole (Stratigaki,
1996:43). The IT sector, respectively, is the fastest growing sector in Greece and
exhibits a substantial degree of indigenous technological development. It, therefore,
provides cases of advanced players in the field.
Regarding the issue of generalisability that case studies suffer from (Punch,
1998:153-156), it is argued that generalisability, in the sense of identifying
commonalities in a wide population the way a survey does, is not one of the goals of
this study. As Yin (1994) argues, empirical studies do not only provide
generalisations to a population but also to theory. Since this study is aiming at
advancing theoretical-analytically the shaping of the relationship between T&O,
rather than just to produce empirical findings per se, generalisations will be
attempted in relation to how the relationship between T&O can be theorised.
Additionally, while attempting to link individual local instances of T-0 change with
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the wider socio-economic environment within which they appear, it will be shown
how local individual cases can be seen as a part of a wider general socio-economic
environment. It is suggested, therefore, that linking individual cases with wider
relationships and environments extending outside these cases, provides a new,
alternative meaning to the principle of generalisability in social research.
The fifth basic step of a research design, as described by Miles & Huberman
(1994) is instrumentation, which provides a plan on how to get the necessary
information from the field (ibid:35). First of all, access to the field is needed.
Contacts with people from firms, other academics in Greece that might have relevant
access was a strategy that was followed. In both cases (a consultant for the GB case
and an academic for the SIF case), I established contact with one person and then I
worked my way through getting in touch with the rest of my informants. In terms of
the types of informants and the questions that needed to be asked in order for the
necessary information to be extracted I asked people from various hierarchical levels
within the firms involved in the examined T-0 change instances. Access was, thus,
gained to various kinds of decisions and choices that needed to be made during the
initiation, design and implementation of those instances. In order to formulate an
idea of what the instances examined are about as well as the nature and the role of
the actors involved, relevant questions regarding general processes, activities, firm
histories, profiles, were asked. This is discussed in more detail in the following
section on data collection and analysis.
3.5 TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION AND
ANALYSIS
The main techniques of data collection used for this research are semi-
structured interviews and documentary analysis. It is often appropriate and necessary
to combine different methods of data collection and analysis, as limitations in one
method can be compensated for by the strengths of a complementary one (Marshall
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& Rossman, 1995:99). The information collected by interviews was, therefore,
supplemented by documentary analysis.
3.5.1 Interviews
Interviews are defined as "encounters between a researcher and a respondent
in which the latter is asked a series of questions relevant to the subject of the
research. The respondent's answers constitute the raw data analysed at a later point in
time by the researcher" (Ackroyd & Hughes, 1983:66). Since the goal is mainly to
explore the respondents' experiences, views, opinions and ideas in relation to the
shaping of T&O, semi-structured interviews were used. As Arksey and Knight
(1999) argue, semi-structured interviews are qualitative data gathering techniques
that are designed to obtain information about people's views, opinions, ideas and
experiences (Arksey & Knight, 1999:96). In semi-structured interviews, there is a
thematic guide that serves as a framework for the main body of an interview, and it is
based on the key questions that the study is addressing (Arksey & Knight, 1999:97).
This includes probes and invitations to respondents to expand on issues raised by
seeking further elaboration, clarification, the use of specific examples and so on
(Fielding, 1988:212; Arksey & Knight, 1999:97). While designing interviews, I start
by devising a wide range of questions, eliminating any that are unlikely to contribute
towards answering the research questions, piloting to see how well the remaining
questions work and revising accordingly (ibid.). Since the access to the field is quite
limited, a proper pilot study seemed unrealistic. Alternatively, I incorporated piloting
with the actual interviews by attempting to improve my questions and my interview
approach interview after interview. It is difficult to interpret the data from the first
interview with a discourse used for the last one. The experience I gained while
interviewing, however, helped me do so. In cases where uncertainty of meaning was
very prevalent I had to contact the informant again via email or telephone and ask for
complementary specifications. This happened on two occasions.
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3.5.2 Informants
Various groups of informants were identified beforehand during the research
design process. I had a rough idea that I would speak to bank managers, bank
workers, technology suppliers and consultants for the GB case and also managers
and technical staff from the SIF case. Going into the field and gradually becoming
aware of the social organisation of the activities and the situations I was exploring
(i.e. organisational structure of the bank and various levels ofhierarchy and different
kinds of expertise), the groups of informants became clearer. In the GB case my
informants consisted of: top managers of the bank, branch managers and branch
employees. I also spoke to people from the various specialist firms and technology
suppliers involved in the GB project. The structure of the project and the various
tasks that had to be done required different kinds of expertise and resources and that
made necessary the involvement of different kinds of actors. Apart from the bank
people, therefore, I spoke to managers and technical specialists from the various
external firms involved in the project. Regarding the SIF case, the identification of
possible informants took place with the involvement of my academic contact. He
pointed out people that I could speak to from various departments, organisational
units, hierarchical levels and types of specialty within SIF. Then, he phoned them
one by one and we arranged appointments for meetings. For the SIF case, then, my
informants consisted of top managers and general directors of SIF, middle managers
of different divisions and organisational units, technical specialists and
programmers. I also had weekly meetings with my academic contact discussing my
progress with interviewing. These discussions helped me to put in perspective the
information I was collecting from interviews. Additionally, although I accessed
information on various customers and suppliers of SIF, I did not think it was
necessary to contact them for interviews since they are different actors and given the
suggested methodological approach, things would become confusing when following
different actors simultaneously.
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GB CASE SIF CASE BOTH
CASES
2 top bank managers 3 top managers of SIF
4 branch managers 2 pre-sales managers
6 branch employees 1 R&D manager
2 organisational processes
firm(OPF)
3 Information Services Division
managers





2 IT programmers and technical
specialists
1 risk management firm
manager
1 top manager of a financial
technologies firm
1 sub-contractor firm to
OPF, manager
1 academic consultant to SIF
1 general project manager
TOTAL: 20 TOTAL: 15 TOTAL: 35
Figure 3.2: Number of interviewsfor the two case studies
A pre-specified number of necessary interviews is not important at the
research design phase. It is important to conduct the right amount of interviews that
could provide the range of perspectives needed for a study, including the
confirmation of this information. I had planed an estimated amount of interviews,
approximately fifteen to twenty for each case study. I eventually conducted twenty
interviews for the GB case and fifteen for the SIF case. More particularly, as figure
3.2 shows, for the GB case I spoke to seven external experts representing various
specialist firms (suppliers and consultants) within the GB restructuring project. All of
them had various positions within the project's organisational structure (i.e. project
managers for the various subprojects and one of them was the project manager of the
whole restructuring project). Two people from the top management of the bank were
also interviewed as well as four branch managers in branches around Athens and
Crete. Finally, I interviewed seven branch employees from various branches. For the
SIF case, I interviewed people from all hierarchical levels and organisational units of
the firm. They had either engineering or business backgrounds, or both. I also
interviewed the director of a financial technologies firm closely associated with SIF
and I had several meetings with my academic contact. During planning and
conducting interviews I tried to have a wide representation of various types of
informants in order to get a more complete picture of what I was looking for. The
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themes discussed with my interviewees were not only related with their particular
role or tasks that they were involved in, in relation to specific instances of T-0
change, but also with their views, perceptions and ideas of the wider environment
within which they operate. I was asking, for instance, top managers to describe and
offer their opinion on the general business environment both in Greece and
internationally. Since most of them were highly educated people, with post-graduate
training and PhDs, and with many years of experience in the area, they were quite
opinionated and reflexive regarding their activities and the conditions of their
environment. This served as a mechanism to sketch the multiple levels that could be
conceived as important in the shaping of T&O, as they are conceived by the views of
different actors.
Most of the interviews were tape-recorded, then transcribed and qualitatively
analysed. In the SIF case some of my informants refused the recording of our
conversation but they were very happy to go into details about anything I wanted to
know. In these cases I kept notes and whenever something important was mentioned
I asked them to give me time to write it down. Quotes used in the case studies
chapters from such interviews were documented in this way. This issue was not a
barrier for my research. My informants were more comfortable to express their views
and talk about topics that they would normally not talk about to an outsider like
myself, given a general suspicion about people in the world of business. It would
also be unethical to insist in using the tape recorder as I could lose any trust that they
might have invested in me. Finally, all informants were before hand ensured of the
confidentiality under which the data was collected and they were assured that there
would be no disclosure of any relevant information to anyone else besides myself.
For this reason, interviewees and names of firms were anonymised, although the
positions of my interviewees within organisational hierarchies and the types of firms
they represent are factual.
3.5.3 Analysing Interviews
In relation to the analysis of the data, at an early stage of the collection I was
looking for significant themes, issues, parameters and patterns that might seem
important based on the interview themes that I had prepared. These themes and
patterns would help me later on in structuring my thesis while writing it up (Arksey
& Knight, 1999:161 provide good guidelines on how to analyse qualitative
interviews). More specifically, during and after the collection of the interview
material I proceeded to the indexing ofdata, that is to say, chunks of speech were
coded and cut out of the transcript and pasted with similar items under a category or
topic heading (Arksey & Knight, 1999:163). The next step was to retrieve the data,
which means to search for all the information about a particular topic or theme that
has been indexed under the same code (ibid: 167). The last step was to interpret the
data to generate meaning from them according to the goals of my project (ibid: 169).
Miles and Huberman (1994) list a few tactics for generating meaning among which
are: note patterns and themes; look for concepts that describe related observations;
try counting to see whether something is as common (or as rare) as it seems;
compare and contrast to see whether categories are distinctive, and whether they
need to be split, etc. (Miles & Huberman, 1994:245-261). In this way while data
collection was still in process, the process of data analysis had already started. Of
course, the themes and issues identified were changing during the life-cycle of the
research process, new themes were emerging and old ones were transformed or
merging with others. Eventually, a way that the interview data could be utilised for
the purposes of this thesis was finalised based on their incorporation into the
analytical concepts suggested previously (i.e. techno-organisational change and
ATOC).
3.5.4 Access to Informants and Practical Considerations
Previous studies on firms in Greece stated that firms, especially large ones,
are usually very open to researchers because they have very well developed public
relations departments, due to the open marketing that they follow. In the beginning
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of my fieldwork, however, I encountered rejection and unwillingness from various
firms that I approached. This happened in a number of cases when I was contacting
the PR departments of these firms. As I was routinely denied access to the field, I
decided to contact individual persons working in these firms, or that had some sort of
relations with these firms, based on my social and informal networking while staying
in Athens. In this way, I managed to get an interview with a person from a
consultancy that was involved in the GB project and from then on, through
snowballing, I managed to get access to the field despite the initial rejection from the
central PR departments of the firms that I contacted. Learning my lesson from the
GB case, I did the same for the SIF case and through my academic contacts in
Athens, I gained access to the field20.
Another problem that I had to overcome when conducting fieldwork was the
difficulties in communication due to the difference in discourses used by my
informants and myself. This was the basic issue that I was dealing with when
updating my interview questions and my interview themes. I was trying to phrase my
questions as openly as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings and to make sure
that both my interviewees and I could understand each other. Eventually, I
familiarised myself with technical and professional jargon and interview after
interview was getting easier in that sense. Patience and constant updating of the
questions and the interview themes used in my discussions with my informants,
therefore, solved this problem.
Finally, a problem that emerged with interviewing was that in some cases my
potential interviewees were suspicious of the role I was playing, especially when I
was asking to interview people in the low echelons of organisational hierarchy. This
problem appeared mainly in the GB case. Since the restructuring project was still in
progress, questions raised suspicion on behalf of the branch employees and branch
managers. Some of them thought that I was sent there by the central management to
control them and evaluate their performance. In most cases where I was interviewing
branch staff I spent the first minutes of the interview explaining who I was and why I
want to interview them. This put their minds at ease, though not completely. I was
20 „ . . .
bee previous section, on instrumentation.
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also conscious of the way I look and the way I was dressed. I did not want to look
too informal when speaking with managers, but not too formal either in an
intimidating and authoritative way.
3.5.5 Documentary Analysis
Documents can tell us a great deal about the way in which events were
constructed at the time, the reasons employed, as well as providing materials upon
which to base further research investigations (May, 1993:133). Also, documents do
not simply reflect, but also construct social reality and versions of events. That
means that they may be located within a wider social and political context (ibid: 138).
In this case, there are different types of documents that may be used. The allocation
and use of relevant documents will depend on the aims of the research, the
researcher's perspectives, but also at the time and resources available and the
problems encountered in the collection of data (ibid: 140). At this point, I refer to the
types of documents that might be interesting for this research, the sources that I
might get them from and also availability issues.
First of all, the necessity of using document analysis for this research will be
illustrated. I chose to use documents primarily for the following reasons: Firstly,
through document analysis I aim to achieve a credible characterisation of the
contextual elements at the various levels of analysis (T-0 change instance, firm
profile, wider environment, regulatory frame). The second reason is to supplement
and verify data collected through interviews. Thirdly, through the use of documents a
more accurate historical account of the examined cases becomes possible. Finally,
various other actors are involved in the shaping of T&O but do not physically
participate in instances, thus becoming visible (i.e. regulatory bodies, the state,
standardisation committees, etc.). I will, therefore, use documents that refer to the
firm, such as company accounts and annual reports; relevant EU and Greek
legislation that might apply to the examined cases and have a significant effect on the
characterisation of the socio-economic environment; during fieldwork, power point
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presentations and proposals from suppliers and consultants became available
which provided an understanding of T-O change instance as a process with different
phases.
In terms of analysing document data, according to May (1993), qualitative
content analysis starts with the idea of process, or social context, and views the
author as a self-conscious actor addressing an audience under particular
circumstances where the task of the analyst becomes a "reading" of the text in terms
of its symbols (May, 1993:146-147). This case also is about conscious writers
addressing to particular audiences. Examples of the opposite would be, for instance,
diaries, novels, personal letters, etc. Additionally, this relates to the aim of the study
and the research questions. In the qualitative content analysis, therefore, I will pick
out what is relevant for analysis and piece it together to create tendencies, sequences,
patterns and orders (ibid: 147). During this process, then, theory is generated,
modified and tested from the particulars of the document to a general understanding
of its context and ways of representing the social world (ibid.). In other words, the
documents that I collect and analyse are seen as representations of a reflection of
reality, but I will also consider them as representative of the practical requirements
for which they were constructed (ibid: 137).
GB CASE SIF CASE
GB annual report 2000 Annual reports 2003, 2004
Software package leaflet Data on SIF from previous research by
my academic contact
Bank of Greece regulatory acts Examples of proposals
1 existing research paper Drawings by my interviewees




Figure 3.3: Documents available in relation to the two case studies
Regarding data availability, most of the types of documents mentioned above
were easily accessible, even through the Internet. Firms, for instance, very often put
their annual reports in their web sites. Also, regulatory acts are not hard to access
through Internet websites and the university's libraries. The most difficult documents
to get hold of were the power point presentations and other solution proposals, which
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were accessed through contacts with individuals in addition to the interview I had
with them. These were difficult to access because a certain level of trust was needed
in order for people to be convinced to make available such documents to me without
fearing that I would betray the rules of confidentiality implied by the levels of trust
built between my interviewees and myself.
3.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter I explain how the research design for this study was
developed. I discuss how the motivation to conduct this study, but also the
practicalities of conducting fieldwork, have influenced the formulation of this study.
More particularly, I discuss the development of alternative analytical concepts. I say
how my research questions were formulated while research was unfolding, followed
by the case studies and their scope, and the processes of sampling and
instrumentation. Finally, I present issues on the processes of data collection and
analysis.
In the following chapters, before proceeding to the presentation of the case
studies and the analysis of the empirical data, there is a chapter providing
information on the context within which the case studies are happening. This context
refers to the particular industries (banking, IT), globally, nationally and
organisationally and how various dynamics and societal and economic




GLOBAL AND GREEK BANKING AND THE SUPPLY
OF TECHNO - ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter serves as a link between the research design chapter and the
presentation of the two case studies. Specifically, it sets my research questions within
a more particular context, thus providing an empirical basis for the development of
theoretical and analytical work. Furthermore, it also provides a social, economic and
historical framework within which the particular empirical case studies will be
explored in the following chapters. In short, it is the last phase of the research design
and at the same time the first step into the presentation of the empirical material.
While exhaustive details concerning the particular developments and specific
characteristics of the banking or the IT industries lie beyond the scope of this study (I
do not intend to tell the deregulation story one more time), it is necessary to discuss
some historical and general characteristics: The importance, for instance, of T-0
changes in banking as well as the development of a global supply of T-0 solutions
for banking (and not only). And also, particular characteristics of the Greek banking
and how the global development of T-0 supply have touched upon the Greek
banking industry.
This chapter, finally, illustrates the integration and the commoditisation of
technology and organisation as it historically evolves and takes on a global scale in
relation to various industrial fields of the economy and to banking in particular and
explores both the development of a global supply of T-0 solutions and their
association with banking at an international and national level.
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4.2 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GLOBAL AND
GREEK BANKING
Recent changes in the regulatory environment of the financial services along
with rapid technological advancements (Harrison, 2000; Claessens, 2002) - both of
which are part of a globalisation process, within or towards a more knowledge and
IT intensive international economy (Fincham et al, 1994) - have changed the nature
of the industry and also the competition within it (Harrison, 2000). The
harmonisation and balancing of the link between trade liberalisation and domestic
deregulation hold great importance in ensuring effective international competition in
the financial services industry (Claessens, 2000). Successive deregulation has broken
down the traditional lines of demarcation that once served to limit competition and as
a result, non-financial institutions are also able to enter the competitive arena
(Harrison, 2000). Banks, consequently no longer provide unique services within the
financial services industry, but resemble all the other firms and organisations which
are part of a competitive environment (Claessens, 2000). It seems, then, that although
banking still plays an essential role in the modem economy, banks are not (Furash,
1993:20) as a distinctive type of institutions defining a whole industry. Such changes
are altering the nature of banking fundamentally in many industrialised parts of the
world (Nelson, 1999:265) bringing banks into a difficult position, which has been
characterised as "the most serious bank crisis since the Great Depression" (Furash,
1993). Due to this difficult situation banks, both corporate and retail, lose most
profitable customers to their competitors while retaining their most costly clientele
(Nelson, 1999:265).
The segmentation of the market for financial services, which was introduced
through deregulation and trade liberalisation, has increased competition, which banks
must now face. Banks, as a result, lost the traditional role within both the market and
economy. There were variations in different national banking systems in the way this
crisis emerged and also in the way it was perceived and treated, due to differences
social, economic, political and historical differentiations. Nonetheless, the increasing
globalisation of financial markets and of the economy in general highlights the
similarities of different national banking systems rather than their differences,
especially regarding issues on T&O, a highly globalised domain. In the following I
will track how these developments in global banking affected the Greek banking
system. Though it might have distinctive particularities and unique characteristics,
the Greek banking industry is nonetheless part of a global economy.
Until the mid eighties, the Greek banking system operated in an environment
characterised by selective controls and regulations, which gradually led to
inefficiency and to serious distortions in the functioning of the country's financial
system (Christopoulos et al, 2002; Hondroyiannis et al, 1999). The need for a
modern, flexible and market-oriented financial system, which would participate in
the Single European Market and the EMU initiated efforts towards deregulation.
Thus, in 1992 Greece was decisively affected by the harmonisation of national
regulations within the EU with the enactment of the Second Banking Directive
(SBD), which concerned the establishment, operation and supervising of credit
institutions. The Greek Parliament passed the SBD in August of the same year (ibid;
ibid;). The SBD also states that the Bank of Greece is the competent supervisory
authority and specifies the context of the Bank of Greece's co-operation with the
respective supervisory authorities in the EU (ECB: Blue Book, 2001). Among other
things, the SBD affected one of the major structural features of the Greek banking
system, that is, its institutional specialisation, which was required by law rather than
dictated by market forces (Christopoulos et al, 2002:815-817; Hondroyiannis et al,
1999:378-379). In Greece there are seven such specialised credit institutions (two
investment banks, three housing banks, a saving bank, a specific purpose bank and
four credit co-operatives) which were, now under SBD allowed to offer new
services, such as leasing, factoring, forfeiting, and venture capital, while firms were
permitted to borrow in foreign exchange; additionally, banks were allowed to use
financial derivatives, such as futures, options, and swaps for hedging against
potential risks from both foreign borrowing and foreign exchange liberalisation
(Hondroyiannis et al, 1999:380). All foreign exchange controls concerning current
transactions were lifted in 1992, while capital movements were completely
liberalised in May 1994 along with other various measures that were taken towards
the modernisation of the capital market (Hondroyiannis et al, 1999:380).
98
At present, a decade past, Greece has moved from one of the most
restrictive financial environments in the Western world to a largely deregulated
market (Eichengreen & Gibson, 2001). More specifically, features of the Greek
financial-credit system, which includes the smallest number of credit institutions in
the EU, has been the decisive presence of the state, the dominant role of a few large
banks (see Hondroyiannis et al, 1999:381) and the limited share of foreign banks
along with the relative high weight of banking in the Greek financial system
(Christopoulos et al, 2002:817). Within the rapid changing banking environment,
domestic and EU, the Greek government decided to reduce the state's intervention
by moving to a gradual, controlled privatisation of previously state-owned banks.
Thus, banks such as Attica, Cretabank, Macedonia-Thrace, of Central Greece along
with the third largest bank, Ionian Bank, were privatised, even though state
intervention still remains relatively high (Christopoulos et al, 2002:817). Also,
various mergers and acquisitions took place which further changed the structure of
the Greek banking system (Chtistopoulos et al, 2002:817). Taken together, these
changes lead to the conclusion that the liberalisation measures introduced in recent
years have both improved the degree of competitiveness of the Greek banking
system and decreased its oligopolistic character (Hondroyiannis et al, 1999:380).
In addition to the government bodies and the Bank of Greece that promote
legislation and are responsible for the supervision of the banking institutions in
Greece, there are also other private and public sector bodies that partly shape the
Greek banking sector. One such organisation is the Hellenic Bank Association
(HBA), which is a non-profit organization representing Greek and foreign banks
operating in Greece. It was founded in 1928 and today has 29 members, of which 24
are regular and 5 associated (HBA website). HBA recognises as its mission the
promotion of the collective modernization of its member banks and develop the
banking sector in general, thereby contributing to the advancement of the Greek
economy. As a representative body, the HBA contributes in a consultative capacity
to regulatory issues by participating in the formulation of legislative proposals or in
technical committees on the international, European and national levels (HBA
website). They therefore help creating regulations and legislations by using their
organs and consultative committees; co-operate with the Bank of Greece and other
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government and non-government bodies; and they finally provide training for
bank employees with the Hellenic Banking Institute which was established in
198621. Additionally, the HBA has been monitoring related developments and
offering significant feedback to its members (ECB: Blue Book, 2001). These
activities also include: conducting research with regard to the development of new
payment systems and the improvement of existing inter-bank payment systems in
order to identify the related operational requirements and finally supporting its
members in matters related to technology by the standardisation of services and
procedures (ECB: Blue Book, 2001).
Although they claim to be engaged in some social activities, HBA is not a
union representing the bank employees. In fact it is the Greek Federation of Bank
Employees Unions (OTOE), a bank employees union, which is responsible for the
employees' rights. OTOE was established in the 1950s and it is mobilised towards
work, trade-union, and insurance issues and they constitute an important voice in the
Greek banking sector (see OTOE website). In 1991 there was established the
Institute of Work of the OTOE (INE/OTOE), which is constitutes a branch
expression of the institute of work of the General Confederation of Greek Workers
(GSEE), which is itself, in turn, responsible for issues of trade union information,
educational training, carrying out of studies on the banking industry (OTOE
website).
The international trends in banking have penetrated the Greek banking sector
and had their effects on its transformation. New legislations coming either from the
EU directives or from domestic government measures have set the basis for the
transformation of the Greek banking. The role of other private and public sector
bodies that operate within the sector environment is also significant in the shaping of
the recent developments. As a result of these measures we have increased
21 The Hellenic Banking Institute is not an independent legal entity; it operates as part of the Hellenic
Bank Association. Its predominant academic organ is the Board of Education. Board members are
university professors, bank representatives, an OTOE (bank employees' trade union) representative
and HBI executives - its Director being among them. The Chairman of the Board of Education is the
Secretary General of the Hellenic Bank Association. A five-member Executive Committee
coordinates the various activities of the Institute (HBA web site).
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competition within the sector, which come not only from foreign banks of other
member states that do business in Greece (such as Barclays, ABN-AMRO Bank,
Credit Commercial de France, Midland Bank pic, etc.), but also from within the
markets where with the growth of securities exchanges and derivative financial
instruments, corporate and other clients will be able to choose among various sources
of finance (Eichengreen & Gibson, 2001). Individuals once forced to place their
savings in deposit accounts will be able to choose among money market mutual
funds and other financial instruments (Eichengreen & Gibson, 2001).
In summary, global trends in international banking has affected the Greek
banking industry despite this industry's unique environment with distinctive
characteristics. Greek banks, then, are facing similar challenges as international
banks, where increasing competition has brought them face to face with a serious
crisis to which they had to respond. In the following section the techno-
organisational developments in the global and Greek banking industries will be
discussed where the emergence of a global supply of T-0 solutions promises to help
banks survive the crisis.
4.3 MARKETING STRATEGIES AND TECHNO-
ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The response of the banking industry to this crisis was directed towards
reorganisation efforts and enhancement of marketing strategies supported by
advanced information systems (IS) in an effort for banks to attract and retain
profitable customers. Banking organisational processes and information systems
started, therefore, being problematised and framed as the area of intervention where
banks should focus in order to respond to the upcoming crisis. Recent research has
shown that from 1970 onwards there is little evidence that banks employed IS
capable of supporting the needs of their marketing strategies (Nelson, 1999:265).
Also, banking IS of the pre-deregulation era, practically always home-grown, are
seen as remaining huge and cumbersome, requiring extensive maintenance and
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limiting the flexibility ofbanks to create strong links with existing customers and
also to attract new ones with increased marketing efforts (Mentzas, 1997:179). These
kinds of issues and concerns have called for a practical need for a reengineering of
both the banking business and organisational processes along with the associated
information systems (Watkins, 1994; Maull & Childe, 1994).
The development or redirection of strategic and marketing philosophies in
banking was an aspect of these transformations providing new visions that guide and
direct transformations (see Fincham et al, 1994:54-56 on the importance of business
strategy and marketing culture for technological change). The directions at which
these T-0 transformations aimed vary according to the national and organisational
environment, capabilities and strategic visions. There are identifiable trends,
however, that pave the way. For example, there is a trend for a shift in banking
business models from product or account-oriented systems to more customer-
oriented ones (Mentzas, 1997:179), which has led to the systematisation and
rationalisation of the marketing ofbanking products and services while providing a
source of visions which might guide T-0 change in banking worldwide.
4.3.1 Global Techno-Organisational Trends and International
Banking
The realisation of such strategic and marketing visions at an organisational
level of the user could traditionally be seen as generated within individual
organisational settings (i.e. developed and implemented in-house). The processes of
globalisation and the expansion of a knowledge economy, however, have led to the
emergence of a global supply of technological and organisational knowledge as a
commercialised response to the crisis in banking at an industrial and economy level.
Certainly, the emergence of global technological supply is not only particular to the
banking industry. Global technological supply has penetrated, or has been accessed
by, various industrial fields of the economy. In banking, however, it was associated
with the certain developments in this particular industry, as discussed earlier. The
commercialisation and commoditisation of the response to the crisis in banking and
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its move outside organisational boundaries and within ATOC global networks
has led to the professionalisation and commoditisation of T-0 change efforts and the
further legitimization of technological and organisational transformations as an
appropriate strategic response to any emerging crises in various industries and in
banking in particular. The promises of the emerging global techno-organisational
possibilities for business success on the one hand, and the opening and exposure of
user organisations to those promises on the other has created a global supply-use
chain, a cycle of development, distribution and use of such T-0 solutions supported
by visions for a better future.
Within this cycle various elements that constitute ways through which
strategic and marketing visions can be achieved are circulated and have created
trends in T-0 transformation worldwide. One such trend in T&O in general, not
particular to banking only, is Business Process Reengineering (BPR). It is described
as a means of facilitating significant, even fundamental, change in the way an
organisation operates (see Hammer & Champy, 1993; Davenport, 1993 a; also in
Currie & Willcocks, 1996). The holistic approach to strategy, structure, process,
people and technology is a central element to BPR practice (Currie & Willcocks,
1996:214), despite the variations in the interpretation and implementation of BPR
both within and across national borders and the mismatch between its rhetoric and
what is actually implemented (ibid.; PRECEPT report, 2003).
A large study involving many European countries and carried out by a
consortium of many academic institutions reveals the ambiguity behind the BPR
concept. This study stresses, what it terms, the "interpretative flexibility" involved in
the BPR concept, which means that BPR is, what it terms, a "contestable concept"
that allows for various competing interpretations and conceptions (PRECEPT report,
2003). Consultancies and others were able, as a result of this flexible interpretation
of the BPR notion to create a variety of methods, as products for company renewals,
while still meeting the obligatory point of passage constituted in the need to "do
BPR" (ibid.). This reveals a strong rhetoric around BPR and a weakness in
crystallising a unique methodology (ibid.). In other words, there is not one way of
doing BPR, or alternatively, the BPR concept has come to express any attempts for
company reorganisation worldwide the past decade or so, whether these attempts
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refer to incremental or to more radical and holistic changes (see Currie &
Willcocks, 1996; Davenport, 1993b on incremental vs. radical transformation).
It is important to see the role of IT in relation to BPR and how these might be
viewed as complementary to one. One might well ask whether IT should be entwined
with BPR or not. If it should, then, what should be the role of IT towards
organisational change? Should firms aim at radical or incremental change? Should
firms invest on tailored or bespoke IT systems or rather adopt packaged software?
(see Graham & Williams, PRECEPT report, 2003). IT, by becoming a factor
included in strategy placed IT specialists in the centre of attention, that is, they
became quite important players in the whole change process.
There is mixed evidence whether T-0 change or innovation in banks is IT-
driven. On one hand, there is research that supports the importance of IT adoption in
innovation. Davis (1989) for instance argues that perceived benefits on an innovation
promote the adoption of that particular technology. Also, Fuglseth & Gronhaug
(1997) argue on the possibilities of IT to enhance consistency between strategy and
operation, improve the quality of empowered employees' decisions, and, finally,
facilitate organisational learning. Lastly, Gupta et al. (2001) conclude both that
operations must be recognised as a strategic function in banking institutions and that
investment in new technologies should be strategically directed to strengthen various
operations such as quality, process, capacity and facility. On the other hand, evidence
from twenty banking institutions in Britain on the benefits of Expert Systems (ES) in
banking, suggests both that ES benefits are perceived in process-related
organisational aspects of IT management and that perceived ES impact is not found
associated with ES adoption in banking organisations (Shao, 1998). In this case
therefore, innovation is not seen as IT-driven but as driven by the business needs of
the organisation (ibid.).
In any case, banking organisations become exposed to a variety of different
possibilities for T-0 change in terms of the variety of technologies that could adopt,
packaged or tailored solutions, the variety of organisational principles and visions of
business models that could pursue and finally, the way they perceive the benefits
from such actions and realise their goals, i.e. either radically, or incrementally, in-
house or outsourcing. All the above possibilities constitute a source that generates
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decisions to be made for the techno-organisational present and future of a
business firm. As shown in the previous chapter such decisions will become more
visible as challenges and how they are managed. This will be achieved by placing the
focus on instances of T-0 change within a global knowledge economy, a space
including the cycle of development, distribution and use of T-0 change solutions.
4.3.2 Systems Integration: Integrating T&O and Linking
Supply and Use
These decisions on T-0 change are associated with the increasing importance
of the activity of Systems Integration (SI). As Hobday et al. (2005) argue, SI
capabilities are inextricably linked to decisions on whether to make in-house,
outsource, or collaborate in production and competition (Hobday et al, 2005:1111).
SI has gradually entered the domain ofbusiness and T-0 change, evolving from an
engineering practice to a strategic business activity, moving beyond its original
technical and operational tasks to encompass a strategic business dimension,
becoming, therefore, a core capability of many high-tech corporations (ibid: 1110).
Hobday et al (2005) provide both a broad and narrow definition of SI:
"In its broader sense, systems integration can be defined as the capabilities which
enable firms, government agencies, regulators, and a range of other actors to define
and combine together all the necessary inputs for a system and agree on a path of
future systems development. In the narrower sense of firm capability, systems
integration is concerned with the way in which firms and other agents bring together
high technology components, subsystems, software, skills, knowledge, engineers,
managers, and technicians to produce a product in competition with other suppliers.
The more complex, high technology and high cost the product, the more significant
systems integration becomes to the productive activity of the firm" (Hobday et al,
2005:1110).
SI as a business activity could be seen as emerging from the need to combine a
variety of heterogeneous elements which might be found in different places within
the global knowledge economy due to the market segmentation of T-0 change
solutions. The tensions between the global supply of technologies and business
models, on one hand, and the local circumstances emerging from a T-0 change
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instance on the other, makes SI a significant activity for the production of
complete and effective T-0 solutions for any possible emerging user organisation.
We have seen in this section that there is a significant commercialised and
professionalized response to the crisis that business organisations have gone through
during the 1980s and 1990s with the establishment of a global emergence of T-0
solutions for this crisis. The focus has centred mainly on interventions associated
with the technological and organisational capabilities and models of the user firms.
The activity of SI has increased in importance, in bridging the global supply of
solutions with local circumstances and needs of the users. Also, it is an activity that
integrates technological and organisational elements and configures them into a
commoditized solution. Let us now see how the Greek banking industry is part of
these developments.
4.3.3 Techno-Organisational Trends and the Greek Banking
Kyrtsis (2005) examines the different phases of computerisation of Greek
banking in the period 1975-2000. He argues that the international trends affected
Greek banking in similar ways to the rest of the world although specific national,
industrial and organisational characteristics of Greek banking also played an
important role in the history of computerisation of Greek banks. Although in the
1980s and early 1990s several Greek banks kept pace with international
developments, in the late 1990s they lost ground due to difficulties in adopting a
quality management culture which affected the rates of success in adopting relevant
Management Information and Customer Relationship Management systems (CRMs)
(Kyrtis, 2005). Rationalisation and consolidation and not technological expansion
appear to be the main strategic and managerial tasks. The introduction of new
technologies, therefore, does not seem to be the main issue, but the integration of
existing technologies with incremental needs to add new elements (ibid.). Handling
organisational aspects, and, consequently, also the human resources aspects,
becomes increasingly equally or even more important than decisions on the
acquisition and use of new hardware and software components (ibid.). As the
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movement of fundamental computerisation seems to end at the end of the 1990s,
the main problem now is organisational restructuring and the taming of operating
cost and operational risks (ibid.). This would suggest that IT-driven T-0 change in
Greek banking has given way to organisational restructuring as defining the
relationship between T&O.
The global supply of T-0 solutions has, nonetheless, entered the Greek
industrial environment. This is reflected both by the entrance of a network of various
expert firms that specialise in organisational restructuring in Greek industry and in
banking in particular. The need for restructuring of the Greek banking system at an
industrial and organisational level brings more actors into the process of shaping of
the banking industry. Technology suppliers and consultants and systems integrators
are professional expert firms that have been expanding and dominating the T-0
supply. Such firms also form associations in order to create more institutionalised
channels for the diffusion and promotion of their products. One such association is
the Association of Greek ICT Firms (SEPE). SEPE is a non-profit organisation, it
was founded on March 1995 in Athens, consists of more than 450 firms, mostly
software developers, hardware builders, software and hardware distributors,
telecommunications firms and consultancy firms (SEPE web site). SEPE is a
member of the European ICT Association (EICTA), WITSA and ITU. At a national
level, SEPE is cooperating with the Greek state, political parties, representative
professional, economic and social organizations, the academia and research centers
and Media, while its general aim is to secure and promote the common interests of its
members and the IT sector in general (SEPE web site). SEPE is also cooperating
with the Hellenic Association of Management Consulting Firms (SESMA). Within
the frame of this cooperation the two associations have had meetings discussing the
prospects of future common action (SEPE web site). SESMA is a non-profit
organization, founded in 1992 from the 23 largest consultancy firms in Greece.
Today the association has 58 members among whom there are Greek firms and also
international firms that operate in Greece (SESMA web site). SESMA is also
member of the international organizations: European Federation of Management
Consulting (FEACO) and International Council of Management Consulting Institutes
(ICMCI), while nationally, it is a member of the Federation of Greek Industries
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(FGI), and its general goal is the development of management consulting services
provision in the public and private sector of the Greek economy (SEPE web site).
SESMA's activities are separated into four streams: The first has to do with the
market, the second with the public relations and the communication among its
members, the third with training, conferences, etc. and the fourth with "other
activities" (SEPE web site). These professional and expert actors involved in T-0
change activities from the supply side, constitute business firms with individual
strategic objectives and visions, although most of them are under more or less control
by international supplier firms which they might represent. The SIF case study will
provide useful insights on the role of such firms in the shaping of T&O.
4.4 SUMMARY
This chapter provides a basis for the exploration of the empirical context
within which the case studies unfold. The history of international banking overlaps
with the history of technological and organisational development. The deregulation
forces in the banking industry have increased the competition in financial services.
While banking institutions were brought in front of a crisis, techno-organisational
transformation, has been offering a commercialised response to that crisis in the form
of a global supply or possibilities for T-0 change. ICTs are integrated with business
models, organisational elements, marketing principles and are configured into
products and services that suppliers can sell and users can buy. Whether banks
worldwide are forced by competition or convinced by business consultants or
genuinely seek a way to join this global Agora of T-0 Change is an issue for the
strategic management of T-0 change which would provide an answer if we look at
the case studies examined in this thesis. The following two chapters, then, will be
devoted to the two empirical case studies. In the first case, a restructuring program in
a Greek Bank (GB) will be examined, showing how the specific local actor from a
peripheral country constitutes part of the international developments in the banking
industry and also of those in the development of T-0 solutions. The second case
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study will be on the involvement of a Systems Integration Firm (SIF) in the
initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change solutions within T-0 change
instances, exploring how the actions and social choices of this particular actor within
ATOC are made and how they influence the way ATOC operates while linking
global supply of T-0 elements with the local T-0 change instances in which they are
involved. Finally, the strategies and social choices of suppliers, users and other
actors involved in T-0 change instances will also be explored.
CHAPTER 5
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A LARGE TECH NO-ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE
INSTANCE: SHAPING THE VIEWPOINT OF A GREEK
BANK
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The first empirical case study discusses large restructuring program in a
Greek Bank (GB). This change effort is one of the biggest and most extensive
changes in GB history. The aim of the effort is a transition from a product-centered
to a customer-oriented business model. The change involves a series of sub-projects
covering the areas of strategy, human resources, organizational processes, IT
systems, risk management and Loan Portfolio Management (LPM). It started in 1997
and at the time of data collection (2003) the program was in the rollout phase where
changes were implemented in GB's large branch network throughout Greece.
Following the analytical and methodological suggestions presented in chapter
three, the analytical focus here is the particular instance of T-0 change in GB; that is,
the restructuring program and the way it was initiated, designed and implemented
within the socio-economic relations and networks of ATOC. In paralleling the
analytical view with the actors' views, emphasis is placed on illustrating the point of
view of GB as an important actor emerging from this instance, the way it was shaped
and the social choices of GB in light of this change. A brief historical account and T-
O evolution of GB is, thus, provided. The points of view of other external actors are
also illustrated although within the restricted limits of the organizational structure of
the particular instance. Following the historical account on GB, the phases of
initiation, design and implementation of the restructuring effort are presented. The
social choices contributing to the shaping of this instance are revealed. These cover
choices made in relation to the initiation, design and implementation of the particular
change effort.
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5.2 HISTORY AND TECH NO-ORGANISATIONAL
EVOLUTION OF THE GREEK BANK
As mentioned in chapter three, there is a distinction between the actor and the
space where action emerges through the production of social choice. The paralleling
the analyst's view with the actor's view helps understand how social choices are
produced. There is a need, however, for a historical profile of the main actor
involved in this case study. This will provide the context for the emergence of the
particular T-0 change instance in GB. Although T-0 change instances are at the
centre of analysis, their links with other events and socio-economic relations in time
22and space will help to avoid a snapshot account of an actor or a social situation .
1929: GB was founded in 1929 as a non-profit organisation, provider of credit to
the agricultural sector aiming at implementing programmes for financing
both the activities of the primary sector of the economy and the processing
and marketing of agricultural products, and enhancing rural development.
1950: In the 1950s, GB expands its activities in the agricultural sector by founding a
number of companies which produce farming products and exploit resources
all over the country.
1980: GB expands its activities in the non-agricultural sector, by developing both a
broad branch network all over Greece and a variety of new financial products
and services. To the same direction, the bank enters the insurance industry.
1991: GB becomes S.A., broadens the spectrum ofbanking and financial services
and acquires participating interests in specialised financial companies, thereby
expanding the GB group of companies.
2000: GB increases its capital in order to join the Athens Stock Exchange, where its
shares have been listed since January 2001 and the Greek state is its major
stakeholder.
Figure 5.1: The History ofGB
Source: GB Web site
The above figure shows some major moments in the corporate history of GB
since its foundation. Today, GB is amongst the one hundred and fifty top European
Banks (The Banker, September 2003) and the fifth largest bank in Greece (total
assets, 31/12/2002)23. GB was not always a bank in the traditional sense of the term.
22 Due to lack of research involving the specific firm, data for this section come from the bank's own
web site, annual reports of the bank, reports of the regulatory bodies in Greece (Bank of Greece,
relevant ministries), reports of various associations (HBA, INE/OTOE). The main bulk of data, then,
comes from interviews as well and from experiences while doing fieldwork.
23 For some key numbers see Appendix.
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It started out as a credit institution for the agricultural sector in the late 1920s. In
the 1950s it expanded its activities within the agricultural sector and in the 1980s it
started showing tendencies for expansion outside the agricultural sector. Although
agriculture still remained their main focus, given their specialisation determined by
law, they also showed the first tendencies to enter commercial markets. From
institutional and T-0 perspective this meant that they had to be transformed into a
"real" commercial bank. From the beginning of the 1980s and for 15 years thereon a
series of T-0 changes took place in order to transform the credit body into a
commercial bank expanding into retail. It was a challenge for GB to be able to
compete with newer more innovative and flexible commercial banks within the
Greek environment. Changes were slow and incremental reflecting movements of
adjustment to the banking developments and to the unfolding and expanding
strategic directions of the bank. Organisationally, new offices were created, others
were eliminated, a large branch network was developed throughout Greece, new
financial products and services were launched and two insurance companies were
also founded.
A wider opening to the commercial retail markets occurred in 1991 when the
guidelines of the Second Banking Directive (Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC
of 15 December 1989) were applied in Greek banking. The institutional
specialisation characterising the Greek banking system, which restricted specialised
credit institutions to operate outside their special area of activity was abolished
(Christopoulos et al, 2002:815-817; Hondroyiannis et al, 1999:378-379). The way
for GB to enter commercial banking was not straightforward. This change meant that
specialization in a particular area must be determined by market conditions rather
than by legislative constraints. Although GB was legally permitted to enter
commercial banking, commercial banks were also permitted to enter the sphere of
the agricultural credit market. GB could not neglect the long established relationships
with the agricultural populations and focus only on the newly explored commercial
markets. The change in the institutional environment of the GB from monopolising
the agricultural credit market and no competition to a double-sided competitive
challenge both in the agricultural and commercial markets posed corporate survival
challenges. In 1991, then, the GB became a S.A. while they also founded a group of
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companies that offered financial products and services, i.e. mutual funds, life
insurance, credit cards, leasing, IT, supplementary pension schemes consulting.
Up to that point in GB's history a series of incremental T-0 changes took
place leading to the shaping of a business model characterised as product-centred. A
top manager of the bank referred to this long term historical T-0 and institutional
transformation of the bank as follows:
Organizational changes happened, new offices were created, others were stopped,
mergers and so on. A structure was created similar to the structure that a modern
bank should have within an intensive competitive environment. It was a structure
which could be called product-centered. (TP1, top manager, interview 30/05/2003)
The organisational model of the bank, then, was based around the products and
services they were offering to their customers. Technologically, GB was mnning a
few applications most of which were built in-house, however, computerisation was
still quite restricted and segmented. In 1997, a realisation that this model was no
longer effective led to a decision towards a large scale restructuring.
This historical note on GB shows how the co-evolution between the GB and
its environment play a role in the strategic initiation of T-0 change instances towards
incremental or more radical transformation attempts. The incremental transformation
of GB from a specialised credit institution for the funding of the farmers into a
commercial bank created many inconsistencies in the T-0 and cultural evolution of
this institution. Although the bank decided on product-centred organisational model
after 1991, which pointed to a certain vision and a certain direction, this model was
problematised in 1997 and a transformation was designed and implemented. In the
following sections, the particular T-0 change instance from product- to customer-
centrality is presented.
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5.3 A T-0 CHANGE INSTANCE IN THE GREEK
BANK
5.3.1 Initiation: Framing the Problem - Building the
Vision
Given GB's situation, its top management started considering a large T-0
change effort that would transform the corporate identity of the bank and would help
the re-direction of business and marketing strategies. For this purpose, an evaluation
committee was formed consisting of top managers of the bank and other external
specialists. This committee framed the problem with the existing model of the bank,
built a vision for its future business and marketing direction, composed a call for
proposals, which was published in the press, to invite specialist firms and afterwards
they evaluated all the proposals to make the final choice of one. A top manager of
the bank summarises the initiation of the GB T-0 change instance while explaining
his own role in it:
I'm one ofthe two to three people thatforesaw and shaped the changes ofthe bank;
we made suggestions to the general director, we argued on the reasons why the bank
should change, we designed the changes with the consultants that we hired and today
we are bringing them to realization [...] We identified the need, we convinced the
central management and the ministry that we have to move on, we mapped out the
needs, what needs to be done, we shaped, in a way, the project, and then we
informed the interested parts about it and they started to come and do presentations
to us about what they can offer us. (TP1, top manager, interview 30/05/2003)
There are two sources of information on the problematisation of the existing model
and the vision for a customer-centred one. The first source is a systematic
documentation of the problematisation process found in power point presentations
from top managers participating in the evaluation committee, while the second
source is a more free expression of the problematisation process by my interviewees.
I shall attempt to present both.
For a systematic problematisation of the existing model organisational and
operational aspects of the GB were examined in relation to each other. They are
presented in the figure below.
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ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
Distribution of responsibilities STRATEGIC
Communication lines Strategic planning
Models and processes Risk Management
Decision making Internal and external communication
Exploitation of financial resources PRODUCTIVE
Managerial control Deposits
Coordination Loans
Support relations amongst org. units Intermediation
Skills and qualifications Operations
Training Fund management, etc.
Personnel motivation CONTROL AND SUPPORT
Technological automation Audit





Figure 5.2: Organisational and Operational Aspects ofthe existing model ofGB
Source: Based on a Power point presentation by PM, overall project management,
22/10/1999.
The results from a cross-examination of the organisational and operational aspects
formed an understanding of the existing condition of GB. This served as a basis for
problematisation and for direction of the search for relevant solutions. In
organisational terms the product-centred model presented problems which were
framed and codified as organisational, HR & cultural problems and technological.
They were seen as affecting the operational aspect in terms ofstrategy, HR, IS and
processes. These operational problems, in turn, were projected in a quantitatively
measurable form as having effects on the processual efficiency of GB, i.e.
commercial inefficiency (ability to develop new products and adapt to market
conditions) financial inefficiency (ability to manage risk, ability for profitable
development), internal and organisational operation inefficiency (ability to manage
resources, apply standards, make decisions, cross departmental communication,
efficient control and coordination) and inefficiency of development of infrastructure
for continuous improvement (HR management and development, development of IT
infrastructure) (source: power point presentation by PM, overall project
management, 22/10/1999). Intervention on these aspects was seen as essential
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towards the realisation of a new vision in terms of strategic focus, customer
central orientation and cost.
Regarding future directions, a few criteria were used for the evaluation of
alternative, possible models. I shall call those "rhetorical techno-organisational
models", in the sense that they embody various T-0 trends that influence the
direction of a T-0 change instance and might be seen as crystallising various
globally available possibilities for T-0 change. These models are rhetorical in the
sense that they exist in terms of the actor's awareness of them but it is not certain
whether or not they will be selected. The four groups of criteria used for the
evaluation of the rhetorical T-0 models are shown below:




* Decision making efficiency
b) Specific organisational criteria
* Strategy support
* Adjustment to external environment
requirements
* Development of core competencies
* Paralleling to stakeholders
requirements
* Operational model support
* Consistency with historical evolution
of GB
c) Materialisation of organisational
choice
* Entrepreneurial culture/climate
* Position of employees union
* Position of top hierarchical
people
* Position of top management
* Levels of employees skills
* Financial cost
d) International banking experience
* Success factors
* Problematic factors
Figure 5.3: Criteriafor the evaluation ofrhetorical T-0 models
Source: Based on a Power point presentation by PM, overall project management,
22/10/1999
As shown in figure 5.3, a mix of general and specific to GB principles are expressed,
while the best choice of a model would be the one able to achieve some
compatibility between the general and specific aspects. This systematic
problematisation of the existing condition with the use of statistical categories and
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criteria pointed to the direction of a transition from the product-centred existing
model to a customer-centred new one. The vision, therefore, to be achieved was the
creation of a new competitive commercial bank by means of a T-0 change that
allows the transformation of the business model from product- to customer-
centrality.
Apart from the methodological and systematic problematisation of GB's
current model the interviewees also referred to various technological, organisational
and cultural problems emerging from the current condition. They supported their
arguments with various examples. Interviewees offer a more general justification of
the change and its direction by engaging in a 'dominant change discourse' circulated
throughout firms and organisational hierarchies. One common major problem they
referred to was the multiple recording of the customers. Customer identification for
the old product centered system in GB was not a working reality. In cases where a
customer was buying two different products from GB, s/he would be recorded twice
as two different customers. This aspect was emphasized by interviewees, especially
top managers of GB and external consultants, when they were asked to describe
GB's condition prior to reorganization. For example, an external project manager for
the whole restructuring effort, said:
The previous system did not put you in the logic of identification. So, you would go
there saying 'my name is Kaniadakis' you would go somewhere else saying that
you've changedyour ID card because you lost the old one. The system did not
predict thefact that they had to erase you in orderfor you to be unified and link you
to all the new accounts. Therefore, you were recorded twice. Multiply this byfour
hundred and seventy branches, times thousands ofcustomers [...] it makes it a huge
problem and it's tragicfor us. We've been trying to solve itfor two and a halfyears
but we haven't succeeded yet. (PM, overall project manager, interview 19/05/2003)
This leads to the discussion about the IS of the bank. Prior to reorganization GB did
not have very sophisticated IS. It was described as an antiquated system, built in-
house24, supporting only deposit products. Loans were processed in paper, there
were not many computer terminals in the branch network and finally, up to 1997 the
24 The fact that the IS was developed in-house meant for the external expert informants that it was not
or it could not be as sophisticated as an integrated software package.
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bank did not have ATMs. The same informant describes the condition in regard
to the IS of GB:
We are talking about a bank that had an antiquated system, developed in-house, the
loans were not getting in the system, only the pure deposit products were, which
means that in fact there was nothing! You had a loan and you wanted to askforyour
account balance and they couldn't tell you. They had tofill an application, in paper,
to the central office and then to send you back your card after a week and a half if
you knew the director (with humor). [...] When the card would reach your branch,
the clerk, ifhe remembered it and he likedyou personally, he would give you a call
to let you know. To put it simply, when I started with the bank in 1997 it was
unbelievable. We 're talking about an antiquated system, ofthe most antiquated
systems, in every sense, in Greece. (PM, overall project manager, interview
19/05/2003)
A consultant from a subcontracting supplier firm also explains:
The bank didn't have the infrastructure to provide modern banking products, to
design a banking product and offer it. They also didn 7 have the informational
infrastructure, and the process and the marketing channel to do that. (SCF, manager
subcontracting supplier firm, interview 05/02/2003)
Regarding the organisational processes and structure of the GB, interviewees
describe the previous condition as chaotic. Although organisational processes and
description of roles existed typically they were not working as they should.
Informants expressed their frustration regarding the organisational and processual
condition of the bank up to 1997. An interviewee from the project management firm
said:
[...] there were not processes, organizational structure at a central level and at a
branch level. They existed but it was chaos, nothing was working. The situation was
so 'hunched'!... (PM, overall project manager, interview 19/05/2003)
Prior to the 1997 reorganization, the marketing strategy and focus of the bank
was mostly directed towards service provision neglecting development work. No
new products were developed, marketing was underdeveloped and there was no
effort to enter and maintain a good position in the market. Additionally, the bank was
not fully exploiting the large branch network throughout Greece (OPF1, senior
manager, interview 19/02/2003 and OPF2, director, interview 21/02/2003). This
strategic lack of focus was associated mainly with the organizational culture of GB.
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Most interviewees mentioned two aspects of organizational culture
contributing to the problematisation of the existing condition and the justification of
T-0 change choices towards customer-orientation. These are the "public servant
mentality" and the "comer-store mentality". These aspects were affecting the
performance and competitiveness of the bank but also caused problems during
implementation due to difficulties in changing them. The public servant mentality
refers to the 'comfortable inertia' emerging from the security of being employed in
the public sector, given the permanent status of such position. In turn, this caused
lack of motivation and no obligation to work extra. The public servant mentality was
prevalent in GB and its negative effects were revealed when bank employees showed
resistance to the reorganization project. The comer-store mentality refers to the
marketing strategy of GB and its inability to develop new products and approach the
market more dynamically. More particularly, informants, both external consultants
and also branch managers who were supportive to this change, described GB's
branches as comer stores where customers walk in to buy banking products the same
way they go to the comer store to buy a pack of cigarettes. After finishing acting as a
specialized institution, GB had made no efforts to develop a rational marketing
approach. Additionally, GB's existing customer base was comprised mostly by
farmers with low-income levels, with specific characteristics and mentality.
Throughout its many years of servicing farmers, GB had adjusted to their special
customer characteristics, demands and behaviour.
During the late 1990s, however, they decided they had to abolish this
mentality and develop a sophisticated marketing strategy, as it was not enhancing the
visions of customer centrality. A top manager of GB compares the old model with
the new one with reference to the importance of organizational culture and mentality:
The old one was [...] a product centered bank, it was serving customer oflow
income levels, with specific mentality (the customers), the lowest level in Greece, and
today they are asked to serve other cases too. Entrepreneurs. All these years, by
serving specific customers, the bank had been adjusted to the demands of the
customers, the behavior of the customers [...] now, there's needfor a new attitude,
new character, new mentality. The bank had never gone outsidefor the development
of its market. Today, they are asked to go outside, for thefirst time. This is a big step.
It needs different kind ofpeople. (TP1, top manager, interview 30/05/2003)
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The framing of the problem in the GB led to the formulation of a vision
for a new bank with a new identity. The links between the problematisation of the
condition, the development of a new vision and the way in which to bring it to
fruition were shaped by various factors that were considered. These factors were
systematically examined and broken down into indicators, while they were also
discursively circulated throughout the T-0 change instance. Based on the
problematisation of the existing T-0 condition a vision was built to guide the T-0
change effort. This vision was not finalized in the initiation phase, only in general
terms. In terms of design, it was still developing up to the point where the new
strategy of the bank was formulated. An informant from the IT firm explains:
When we were starting the project, our task was to modernize the bank. We knew the
steps to do that, we didn 't know the aim 100%, we just had the tools to do it, and I'm
saying that we didn't know the aim because we didn't know what the strategy was.
After the strategy of the bank was formulated we all had a vision which was the
accomplishment of the strategy ofthe bank (ITF1, project manager, interview
29/03/2003)
A more general vision, however, was to create a new modem competitive
commercial bank with a new identity and aligned with the T-0 principles of
customer centrality. A top manager makes the following claim on the new vision:
To transform the state bank with a restricted market into a bank ofmultiple
activities, competitive, [...] that was the vision. To transform the bankfrom a purely
agricultural bank into a bank ofmultiple activities focused on the customers. (TP1,
top manager, interview 30/05/2003)
The realization of the newly formulated vision was linked with technological,
organizational and cultural transformations aimed to solve problems of performance,
competitiveness and control of the processes and the resources. As it will be shown
in chapter seven, the initiation of the particular T-0 change instance in GB can
illustrate business choices of the GB to open up its organizational boundaries, expose
itself to the ATOC environment in search of T-0 change elements and rhetorical T-0
models. In doing so, a variety of other diverse actors, such as suppliers and
specialists are allowed into the instance and contribute to the particular processes of
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problematisation and vision-building, thus, acquiring their share of control of the
instance.
5.3.2 Design: Actors and Resources Included in the Project
The specific change program, in line with the framing of the problem,
encompasses four major aspects of change which crystallized into various sub-
projects: Strategy, Organizational Processes, Human Resources and Information
Systems. There is also a fifth sub-project named direct interventions, which includes
changes that could not fit in any of the other four categories, mainly a Risk
Management project and a Loan Portfolio Management (LPM) project. A wide range
of expert groups, both internal and external to the bank, was involved in this project.
The estimated cost of the whole effort was around € 14,500,000, with a three-year
timetable and a workforce of approximately a hundred and fifty people (source:
power point presentation by TP2, BPR project manager, 22/10/1999). The whole
change effort was BPR driven. Although the strategy project provided the basis for
the rest of the sub-projects to acquire more specific vision in terms of "what needs to
be done", the organizational processes sub-project (BPR) was placed at the centre in
terms of "how it should be done".
Figure 5.4: Total restructuring program
Source: Based on a power point presentation by PM, 22/10/1999
In perceiving this restructuring effort as an instance of T-0 change, it is
important to identify the resources and actors that were mobilised, their origins, the
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choices these actors are called to make, the way they enter the project, the way
they are organised and the way goals are achieved. The process of designing T-0
change instances shows how ATOC is mobilised for a particular T-0 change
instance to be constituted and carried out.
Two types of actors are emerging from this instance. GB is one and various
external actors comprising a consortium of specialist firms are the others. Although
the concept of actor was eventually associated with firms there are different groups
of people even within the same actor that were directly involved in the T-0 change.
The directly involved persons represent different actors-firms. Knowledge and
resource management during the instance calls for such an organisational
arrangement. It will be examined, therefore, what kinds of organisational actors were
physically involved in the instance, what was the process of entering the instance and
what kinds of resources they carried into it.
Four groups of people were identified. These are: GB's top management,
branch managers; branch employees', and the consortium ofexpert firms, involved as
external players. The consortium of experts consisted of various firms that formed a
partnership in order to carry out the various sub-projects, meaning that a wide variety
of external, specialist knowledge was needed. The channels and ways through which
internal and external actors entered the project space are the following:
Bank staff (internal players) enters the program space instantly, since the
whole reorganisation effort is organised around the specific bank. There is still,
however, an identifiable entering process related to the decision by the top
management to proceed to reorganisation both of the central management offices and
of the branch network. This entering process is related to different timing during the
life cycle of the project. For example, branch staff did not enter the project space all
at once; rather, they were entering gradually in four-month intervals as the project
was unfolding (described by informant OPF1). The positive or negative attitude of
the various branch employees towards the reorganisation effort was also a criterion
for the time of entering the project space. For instance, some branches were more
positive than others and they volunteered to enter the reorganisation space, while
others expressed a more negative attitude and resistance. Eventually, they were
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forced to do so. Initial attitude towards entrance to the instance was crucial for
the relevant success or failure of the project in regard to each particular branch, as
verified by informant OPF1 (senior manager, interview 19/02/2003). The role of the
branch managers was also crucial as s/he influenced the creation of that positive or
negative attitude, a view expressed by branch managers but also verified by OPF1
(ibid.).
Regarding the expert actors25, they entered the project space after a selection
process through a competition of consortia of expert firms. The evaluation committee
composed a competition announcement, a call for proposals outlining the various
subprojects and the required actions for the project and was published in the press.
Various consortia were formed by specialist firms, which developed respective
proposals in order to compete for the GB reorganisation project. Afterwards, there
was a selection process, where the committee had to choose one proposal for the
specific project. There were four consortia participating in the competition.
Consulting, suppliers and IT firms had formed these consortia to cover the
requirements of various sub-projects. Specific subcontractors were hired with
specialized knowledge to cover various aspects. In all these consortia, the main
contractor, the consortium leader was always the IT supplier, which shows the
importance that was attached to the technology as a leader of T-0 change. Finally, a
specific consortium was picked, which was led by a Greek IT firm, the biggest in the
country. The rest of the partners were foreign firms of international reputation and
operation which maintain offices in Greece26. There was a group of firms for each of
the sub-projects. Organizational processes firms, a strategy firm, a HR firm, firms for
the direct interventions sub-project and various other firms that were supporting the
main consortium by providing various tools and specialized knowledge and finally
another firm in charge of the project management of the whole restructuring effort.
Internationally recognized firms comprised the rejected consortia as well. One
25 The process of formulation of consortia, their evaluation and selection by the evaluation committee
as well as the criteria for that selection were described by various informants, mainly people
participating in that committee but also confirmed by other informants that could provide a descriptive
account of the design of the project. It is not necessary to provide any exact interview quotes since
there are no any major differences in different descriptions of this process.
26 The names of the firms comprising the consortium will not be mentioned for obvious reasons.
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consortium, however, was led by a foreign bank that had built their own in-house
solution. The criteria for selecting the specific consortium are described by PM:
From thefour competing consortia we chose the ITfirm onefor two main reasons:
They had a lot better know-how on Greece and the rest of thefirms that made
proposals were emerging serious problems which we saw during on-site visits that
we made. That is, in Spain where we went, the consortium ofAccounting Firm could
not convince us that they were doing goodjob here (in Greece), they had a project
with another bank which was a complete failure, anyway, we didn't reject them for
that reason, the consortium of the bank with the in-house solution had not a very
good representation in Greece, the system proposed by another consortium had not
installed it nowhere else apart from one bank in Greece, which was still in the
process ofdevelopment, while the one we chose, at least had the two banks in Greece
plus two or three banks abroad, so we were convinced that in terms oftechnology, at
least, we could get a good project. Additionally, the rest ofsub contractors in the
consortium were in a very good level in relation to competition, thus, we selected
these ones. (PM, overall project management, interview 19/05/2003)
These criteria and the formulation and constitution of the consortia reveal two
important points: First, the evaluation and selection committee was looking after
solutions offered by firms that combined experience and success history both at a
national and international levels; and second, the solution needed for the GB case
was thought of being provided mainly by the suggested for adoption IS -a packaged
IS for banking - while the other sub-projects were thought of as complementary and
of secondary importance. This was because these sub-projects were aiming to
transform the user environment in a way that the IS would work, although the whole
project was BPR driven. The choice of "what to buy", therefore, was determined by
the criterion of which IT system is the most reliable technologically as well as of
who supplies it. The choice of "how to implement" it and make it work was affected
by the BPR methodology. Furthermore, discussions with people not involved in this
reorganization effort pointed to the direction of the politically significant position of
the selected consortium leader (the IT firm) in the Greek IT-related market.
Informants from the second case study referred to this specific firm as having very
good relationships with the Greek government and that they almost monopolized
projects in the public sector. With the Greek state being the major stakeholder in the
bank, the selected consortium was presented by these informants as having an
advantage regardless of the quality or suitability of the offered solution.
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A combination of internal resources available to GB with the selection of
missing resources from the external environment comprised the elements necessary
for the shaping instance to take place. External resources, then, represent the lacking
elements for the reorganization effort to be carried out in-house. The degree of
exposure of the GB to the ATOC is analogous to the scale of the change effort and
the resources already available to them. What kind of resources are we talking about,
then, besides the physical presence of the external and internal representatives of
various actors? Where did they come from and how did they become a part of this T-
O change instance? The examination of the groups of people directly involved and
the elements they carry besides their physical presence will shed some light27.
5.3.2.a Bank Top Management
Bank Top Management consists of well-educated people. Most of them have
postgraduate education or PhDs, either from Greece or from abroad. They either
have technological or business background, or both. They also have a very good
knowledge and perception of the international trends in banking. They carry
knowledge about various technologies and business ideas that are used in
international banking. Additionally, they are carriers of the EU legislation
environment. GB's top managers have a very good knowledge of the sector and the
Greek market. They are aware of the T&O developments of other banks in Greece,
they are highly networked (formal and informal networks), and they have access to
the T&O solutions selection environments. The various legislations here become
more specific with directives from the Bank of Greece (BoG), the main regulatory
body in Greek banking. Top management receives various circular letters which they
diffuse throughout the branch network and the central offices. Some of them as part
of their networks have strong political connections and good relationships with the
27 In terms of adequate documentation, these collective profiles of the groups of informants directly
involved in the T-0 change instance were constructed by information they were providing during
interviews when they were asked to say a few things about themselves, what they do, their
background and their personal professional history. Also, interview data on the role of different
people in the project were used for this profile (i.e. the significance of branch managers to the
implementation of the changes). Although there were variations and the sample was not so big, I
attempted here to give a reliable summary, an average of what these different types of informants
were bringing into the T-0 change instance.
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government. These connections were useful for a smooth and quick development
of the reorganisation project. Their physical and organisational presence is also
important. By belonging to the top layers of the hierarchy of the organisation, they
have a high decision-making power and they are the ones that have the final say
regarding the direction of the change project. They have good knowledge of the
condition of the bank and a sense of how this condition came to existence, through
personal experience. Finally, they have access to the branch network.
5.3.2.b Branch Managers
Branch managers have restricted access to the external environment of the
bank, although they have a very good knowledge on the Greek banking industry. In
general, they are well-educated people, but not necessarily. What is considered more
important is their working experience. Most of them have worked for the bank for
many years starting from the lower echelons of the hierarchy eventually becoming
branch directors. They are quite important players in the reorganisation effort
because they constitute the bridge between the top management and the branch
employees. They are people with many years of experience, they have excellent
knowledge of their branch and its resources (human and non-human) and for this
reason they have authority to implement the new organisational structure of the
branch. Over the years, they developed a large informal network with their
colleagues from other branches which allows them to know the problems that emerge
elsewhere with the rollout. Finally, they are the ones who contribute to the positive
or negative attitude of the whole branch towards the reorganisation effort. It is not
surprising that the branches where the branch manager was more positive towards
change showed better transition results than other branches where the director was
not so positive. Branch managers are, indeed, the "kings" of their branch, they seem
to know their territory better than anyone else, they know all the branch employees
personally and they enjoy high levels of trust by them. A manager of a branch in
which the change was relatively successful explains how his positive attitude
influenced change results:
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I had a positive attitude towards rollout since the beginning and I supported it
and my advice to other colleagues is always the same: to do whatever they can for
this system to succeed. Because we don't have an alternative. There is no alternative
option to adopt ifwe abandon rollout. We have this. Andfor this to happen much
time and work was spent and the best people ofthe bank. This is it and we have to
support it. I sometimes go to the training centre and I speak to people, directors'
teams, about the way we got in, the way we achieved the results. It is not
propaganda, it's a reality which we believe in, we've experienced it and we are now
transferring it. (BM2, branch manager, interview 03/04/2003)
5.3.2.C Branch Employees
Branch employees have also a restricted access and perception of the
international and national scene. They have a restricted knowledge of the Greek
industry. They are both people that have worked many years in GB and people that
have recently been hired. A large percentage of them are university graduates. They
are organised into a GB's Employees Association, a union concerned with financial
issues, access of the employees to the hierarchical mechanisms, insurance issues etc.
Branch employees, especially the older ones, have also formed informal networks
with their colleagues in other branches and have knowledge of the various problems
that were emerging or were about to emerge. Apart from their skills, qualifications
and experience, they carried into the project the everyday practical problems
occurring in each branch. They had an opinion on the design of the processes,
although their opinion was not always heard. Regarding the reorganisation effort,
branch employees were treated mostly as a resource and not as actual players with
power to influence. Their influence on decision-making was restricted to feedback
extracted by the consultants. Every single one of them had to go through training for
their new role. They expressed various concerns most of which were associated with
the everyday life in the branch. Finally, the branch employees are the ones who most
frankly portray the organisational culture of the bank. They are the ones who seemed
to be more affected by this change as their job descriptions changed radically.
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5.3.2.d Consortium of Experts
Most of these firms were international firms operating offices in Greece as
well as in many other countries. This gave them access to expertise from many
countries and contexts having formed large databases of previous accumulated
know-how and experience. People in these firms are highly educated experts with
Master's, MBAs and PhD degrees and with many years of experience in the field. In
terms of their expertise, they are quite diverse, with business experts and
technologists (engineers) in a variety of specialisations. These firms are part of the
international market and also part of the national more particular market. They know
the trends in new technology and business ideas development, they have a good
sense of the international competition and they manage and promote their expertise
and the products and services they sell in order for them to be absorbed by the local
markets. They have a good knowledge on banking processes, they are informed
about the trends and regulations in the banking sector, and their products and
services are influenced by the international standards, like ISO. They also form
partnerships on an ad hoc or more regular basis with other expert firms like in the
GB case. Upon their selection for participation in the project, they gain access to the
particular settings of the user organisation and as part of their job they record and
evaluate the local circumstances in order to apply the international knowledge they
carry. In other words, the expert firms provide a good bridge and a good channel for
material and non-material elements to be used for the reorganisation effort.
Relatively speaking, they demonstrated the power and authority that their knowledge
and experience gave them as experts to influence the direction of the change and
contribute to the formulation of the visions in regard to the future of the user
organisation.
After the decision for the initiation of this shaping instance there was a
concentration of the necessary resources (knowledge, ideas, material technologies,
visions, business models etc.) by means of the players carrying them.
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GREEK BANK EXTERNAL ACTORS
Top managers IT firm (consortium leader)
Branch managers Strategy firm
Branch employees Organisational Processes firm (initially





Figure 5.5: Players directly involved in the instance
The above figure shows the different actors involved in the reorganisation effort as
well as the different groups ofpeople from different hierarchical levels and roles
physically involved in the project and forming an organisational structure of the
reorganisation effort. From the GB then, top managers were involved, branch
managers and branch employees, while from the external actors technical and
business specialists that were designing and implementing the project were involved.
Following the initial choices to proceed to radical restructuring, further
choices were needed in relation to the design of the change effort. Such choices
referred to the mobilisation and combination of internal and external resources,
ATOC elements and rhetorical T-0 models with the vision for the future GB model.
Given the configurational character of the instance and the multiple actors involved
the criteria for such choices to be made were pursued by the use of political power
and influence of the various actors, however, the process of designing an instance
involves choices that bring the abstract, indeterminate ATOC environment closer to
the particular circumstances of the local instance settings by combining internal and
external resources and circumstances. In other words, as it will be shown in chapter
seven, through such choices the ATOC environment becomes more particular to the
specific T-0 change instance in GB.
5.3.3 Implementing T-0 change: The various Sub-Projects
As shown in figure 5.4, the whole change effort was divided into five sub-
projects: The Strategy project done by a Strategy firm (SF), the Human Resources
project by a HR firm (HRF), the Organisational Processes project by two firms that
later on merged into one (OPF), the IS project by the consortium leader (ITF) and the
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project of Direct Interventions (LPM, Risk Management) by another firm (DIF).
The project management of the whole effort was done by another international expert
firm (PMF). Some of the expert firms formed farther partnerships with other
subcontractors; thus, the network of actors was expanding. For instance, the OPF
subcontracted a firm, which was providing a software program used for the recording
of organisational processes. The same subcontractor also provided training to the
people from the OPF on the use of that software (consulting on-the-tool). Some of
the firms involved had little or no contact with the GB. For instance, people from
DIF met with people from GB very few times, since their customer was the
consortium leader. Similarly, the firm providing the process recording software had
little contact with GB since their customer was OPF. In such complex and diverse
conditions set by these special social arrangements it is not hard to sense the wide
difference in perspectives and the nature of different socio-economic relations of the
actors.
Within such complexity and heterogeneity there was an increasing need for
total supervision of the whole change effort, which should be independent from the
rest of everyday activities of the banking organization. For this reason, a separate
independent office was established, the so-called reorganization division which was
housed in the bank's central offices building. Reorganization division consisted of
people from the bank along with people from the expert firms, working under the
same roof. This resulted in a smoother and more efficient development of the project
which was characterized by the participants in the project as "a very smart move" on
behalf of the bank's central management. Reorganization division provided the
spatial and cognitive boundaries within which the players were negotiated and
decided on the direction of the change. This structure was also crucial in providing
common grounds for better communication between the experts. In other words, the
implementation arena of this particular T-0 change instance acquires a material
hypostasis through the creation of this separate division. Let us discuss now the
various sub-projects.
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5.3.3.a Strategy (strategic development of markets)
The logic behind the division of the instance into various subprojects and the
recruiting of the experts gave priority to the strategy project, which had to be
chronologically completed first in order for the rest of the subprojects to unfold on
the basis of a new strategy. In the strategy project the newly formed business
objectives as well as the various critical factors for business success were set. The
new strategy of the bank posed an opening on the market to new segments. This
suggested expansion to include new customers, new competitors and the
development of new distribution channels. These changes led to new challenges for
the organisation undergoing them, which would be met by T-0 transformation. The
promise of this transformation was that it would lead to the ultimate satisfaction of
customer needs, and the introduction of the principle of "triple A banking" (Anytime,
Anyhow, Anywhere) (TP2, BPR project manager, power point presentation,
22/10/1999). This would bring the desired goal of customer centrality by changing
the identity and the marketing focus. What was the meaning of T-0 transformation in
terms of the design of the change? As mentioned earlier, it meant four things, which
are portrayed in the division among the various subprojects: redesigning
organisational processes, redesigning organisational structures, redesigning the roles
of the employees and redesigning the information systems. The new strategic
business goals were, therefore, directly linked to further changes that took place.
BPR was, then, promoted as the best way to achieve customer centrality. The
strategy sub-project, however, was the one that would provide a basis for the rest of
the projects to unfold. In other words, the strategy sub-project referred to the
sophistication and shift of the bank's business and marketing strategy towards
expansion into new markets enhanced by a new, customer-oriented approach. The
strategy project was necessary for the new change vision to be crystallised and
systematically framed.
5.3.3.b Organisational Processes
According to power point presentations on the BPR project (by TP2 and PM,
22/10/1999), the consecutive steps that needed to be taken were: recording of the
existing organisational and operational structure; redesigning the processes into a
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new operational model; formulation of a new organisational structure based on a
centre-periphery arrangement; description of new employees roles; composition of
training manuals; operational rules for each unit; development of process-oriented
IS. Basically, the above steps portray the BPR project where they had to record and
redesign the organisational and operational processes of GB, both at the level of
central management offices and the branch network. When I asked my interviewees
why they chose to do BPR and what it meant to them, the majority said that they had
no other choice and that these kinds of changes are only done with BPR.
Additionally, they see BPR as a methodology to reengineer organisational and
processual changes. Why was BPR so necessary? The large scale of organisational
transformation seemed to provide a justification and legitimization for the use of
BPR. A top manager, responsible for the BPR project explains:
Changes were big and we had to go with a BPR methodology, a redesigning of the
processes, roles, systems, etc. With small changes this could not happen and that's
why we chose a BPR methodology regarding processes, systems, HR, informatics,
everything. (TP2, BPR project manager, interview 10/02/2003)
When the same informant was asked what were the alternatives they had apart from
following a BPR methodology, he said:
When you have very big changes to do, you do a redesigning ofthe process at a
business reengineering level, ifyou want to claim that you are doing something in a
correct way, otherwise, everything is in the air. (TP2, BPR project manager,
interview 10/02/2003)
The strategic re-orientation was of a significant scale which meant that the
organizational and processual changes needed to be done with BPR, which was
believed to provide sophisticated methods for this effort. The use of BPR was
justified by the new strategic focus of the bank. Apart from being a methodological
tool, the BPR discourse served as a justification mechanism in regard to the direction
of the changes. The consultants who possessed knowledge of the BPR methodology
used it when facing resistance regarding organisational changes. One of our
informants when referring to the phase of acceptance and approval of the designed
changes by the central management and the rest of the people working in the bank
explicitly illustrates this conflict of opinions:
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You design a new organizational structure, and this structure, before it gets
approved by the bank, you have to inform all branch directors, the totality ofthe
employees, the central management [...] these stages are very painful and everyone
says their own thing, they give their own opinions on everything. Everyone thinks is
an organizer (being sarcastic). (TP2, BPR project manager, interview 10/02/2003)
Central Management Offices
Firstly, there was a reorganisation of the central offices. According to
interviewees working on this project (OPF1, OPF2, TP2), the criteria for the
formulation of the new organisational structure of the central management offices
were related to the customer units the bank has or wants to have, the kinds of
products and services they offer, the kind of IS available to support such changes, the
competitive advantages of the bank at the centre and the periphery, and so on.
Regarding the latter, GB has a big advantage in the periphery due to the large branch
network and traditional know-how on agricultural issues.
The product-centred system of GB, at the level of central offices, was
organised based on the various products of GB. Thus, they had offices for deposits,
dispensations, loans, crediting, which were portrayed at the branch level as well. The
new organisation of the central offices in accordance with the new strategic
orientation of the bank required the creation of new offices and the transformation of
old ones. According to power point presentations on this project, confirmed by
interview data, some of the central management offices that were transformed were:
state and public organisation division, individuals and farmers division, enterprises
division, corporate clients division, network support division. They also had separate
offices dealing with organisational issues of the bank such as HR division, IT
applications division, group strategic division, risk management division, internal
audit division. This was considered as a more sophisticated organisational structure
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Figure 5.6: Organizational chart ofthe GB central offices
Source: GB website
Branches Rollout
The local particular settings of the GB and the resources available affected
the decisions on the direction of the new organisational and operational structure of
the bank. More particularly, the GB had a large branch network expanded throughout
Greece. This was a crucial factor in determining customer focused marketing
strategies and the opening of distribution channels. The availability of such a large
network could not be neglected and thus the decision to proceed to reorganisation of
the branches as well. As 0PF1 explains:
Everyone wants profit and efficiency but it's how you realize that. GB and Citibank
have different perceptions ofwhat an individual customer is. They define them
differently. Bank ofCyprusfor instance, without having such a wide network they
might want to follow such an approach via phone banking, e-banking etc. GB has the
branch network, so I'll make sure that my structure and my approach ofthe
customer to happen through the branch. Other banks that have no network but they
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have good technological infrastructure might choose to approach customer-
centrality with different ways. Or in some areas where I have network, I approach
via my branch while in other areas Idon't have presence and I'll approach via other
methods. (0PF1, senior manager, interview 19/02/2003)
The OPF, responsible for the reorganisation of the central management
offices, also took over the reorganisation of the branch network. This helped to get a
sense of continuity between the different tasks. The branch transformations were,
thus, seen as a consecutive step to that of the central offices transformation (OPF1,
senior manager, interview 19/02/2003). First, there was the design of the new way
that the branches would look like and then the rollout process started.
At the branch level, changes involved organisational, technological, cultural
and also architectural changes. As mentioned earlier, a group of branches would
enter rollout every four months. According to OPFl's description of the rollout
process, the consultant from the OPF would first go into the branch and develop an
initial organisational structure plan, based on various criteria, mentioned above; then,
they would try to embody the old organisational structure into the new one by
replacing existing personnel into their new roles and also allocate the newly-hired
staff. Some general guiding principles for this include: the condition and volume of a
branch, the condition of the local market and the profile of their customers , and the
opinion of the branch manager who knew the personnel very well. Regarding the
positioning of individual employees into their new roles, some special criteria
include: seniority, history of the employee within the GB, performance, requirements
of the new position for qualitative and quantitative efficiency and employee's skills
(professional and social). A two-month period of training followed. After training,
they went to the branch and started working. The consultant from the OPF remained
at the branch until the four-month period was over and provided on-the-spot support.
During the on-the-spot support the consultant helped the personnel to apply their new
28 For a branch at the centre of Athens it would be highly unlikely to have individual farmers as
customers, but it is most likely to have private enterprises. The Athens branch, therefore, should focus
more on attracting and servicing "urban" customers by developing the appropriate banking products,
i.e. business loans for companies. Another example is from a branch outside Athens. The area the
branch was situated in was under development due to the 2004 Olympic Games and literally looked
like a construction site. The director of this branch stressed that in light of this entrepreneurial
mobility and rapid development in the area they had to "have their eyes open" in order to attract new
business customers and take advantage of the situation.
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responsibilities and the new way of operation of the branch. Every new role
presupposed specific tasks and everybody was tested on them. This means that
changes were also happening in the initial design of the chart if an employee could
not reciprocate to the requirements of the new role29. As a consultant puts it "if we
see that one does not fit with the new role that is been given to him in the new chart,
there is a chart modification" (OPF1, senior manager, interview 19/02/2003). Apart
from the typical qualities and experience of each staff member, their personality and
social skills was also taken into account when their replacement was discussed. For
example, they would not place a grumpy and impolite person in a position requiring
direct servicing of customers or approaching prospective customers on a face-to-face
basis. These modifications were happening after the training and during the on-the-
spot-support period. The final chart of the branch was delivered by the end of the
four-month period and the consultant was leaving the branch going to the next one.
The process of constructing a new organisational chart by including new
roles with lots of replacements involved was not an easy task since there was the
issue of interfering with the hierarchy of GB. A consultant from OPF explains:
We 're looking at how things were before change [...] each branch has specific
personnel, with specific experience, specific hierarchy. This is very important
because although the bank has entered the stock market, it maintains some structures
ofpublic law, which means you cannot mess with the hierarchy easily, [...] so, we
take the existing personnel, and based on their experience and theirposition in the
hierarchy, we embody them into the new organizational structure, according to the
demands that every new role has. And based on that role, they come and get trained.
(OPF2, director, interview 21/02/2003)
Designers' attempts not to affect the hierarchy were reflected on the final result of
the change and the careful treatment of the old hierarchical structures. For this
reason, the criterion of seniority was taken into account in the formulation of the new
organisational charts. This shows how local particular circumstances have influenced
choices articulated by external ATOC specialists.
29 For instance, one person was transferred from deposit products to salary products. There was basic
training for the new role, to learn the new job, but the employee could not pull it off, so they replaced
him and the chart changed again.
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In terms of its organizational units, the new customer centered branch is
separated in two big areas: the area of Servicing and the area of Development of
Works. The latter has two sub-divisions, the Individuals-Farmers and the
Enterprises. The area of Development is the one that pulls the branch outwards,
approaching and creating contacts with prospective or existing customers. The area
of Servicing is a purely procedural part and supportive to the development area. The
concern of interfering with the hierarchy of GB had as a result a balance in the
relevant importance of these two areas, although they are very different and require
different kinds of skills from the personnel. OPF1 explains:
It's important to bring the customer in, but it's also important to service him in a
right way in order to remain a customer and give the opportunity to the development
area to do better sales. (OPF1, senior manager, interview 19/02/2003)
There was a deliberate attempt, therefore, to achieve hierarchical balance between
the two areas, which was a sensitive issue for the designers, and a goal in itself.
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Figure 5.7: Transformation ofbranch organisational structure
Source: Based on a power point presentation sent via email on 11/03/2005 by OPF1,
senior manager.
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The whole task of branch reorganisation required great coordination of various
things. It did was not completed with the contribution of only one team but of many
which represented the various offices such as technical support, customer offices,
suppliers of the bank, personnel office. There was also a demand for coordination
and speed. These are challenges that the working teams had to face in light of the
pressure for deliverables and deadlines.
With a great diversity among branches throughout Greece it is normal to have
variations in the results of the restructuring efforts. There was a mechanism which
evaluated the efforts in quantitative terms and showed which branches had positive
results, and which failed to adapt. The measuring of the degree of success of the
change is closely related to the indicators of the financial performance of the banking
organisation and also to the indicators used to initially frame the problem. How much
sales went up; how many new customers there were; increases in productivity and
performance. In some branches the results were impressive. For instance, numbers
such as a 500% raise in loans sales were reported, while in other branches, where the
change was not as smooth, results were not so impressive. Generally speaking, the
reorganisation was considered as successful by most interviewees although there was
a view arguing the opposite. Interviewees from the project management team
compared results from the reorganisation of the central offices with that of the
branches. As one of them said:
While at the level ofcentral offices there has been done very goodjob, there is a 5-
year transmission plan with charts etc., in the specific rollout we 're stuck badly! [...]
However, the fact that you walk into a branch now and you see that people are trying
to sell is encouraging. (PM, overall project management, interview 19/05/2003)
The above interviewee had a few objections regarding the reorganisation of
the branches. The above quote, however, reveals that some work was done on the
organisational culture as well, at the branch level. The corner-store and the public-
servant mentalities started being gradually replaced with a new culture which




The human resources (HR) sub-project was seen as a necessary inclusion in
the whole reorganisation attempt. The technological, organisational and cultural
changes that were initiated in the GB required HR interventions as well. The
organisational transformations, especially at the level of branch network, brought
about severe changes in the roles, the positions and the requirements of these
positions. In terms of organisational structure, then, employees that were previously
working in the various offices distinguished on a product basis had to be fitted into
one of the two major operational areas of the branch. Either at the development area
or at the customer service area. In terms of organisational culture, these employees
had to abolish the comer-store and public-servant mentalities, become more
motivated and focused more on product development and sales. Technologically,
they had to familiarise themselves with the new IS installed and make the most out
of it. In other words, the T-0 changes aiming to the transition from a product-
oriented to a customer-centred model required a new type of employee in terms of
skills, qualifications, personality and attitude. This was, mainly, the aim of the HR
sub-project: to design and implement the mechanisms through which this new type
of employee could be shaped and maintained.
The restructuring of organisational processes, as shown previously,
determined the new roles, their position within the organisational structure and the
demands in various areas of qualifications. In turn, the HR sub-project determined
the career path for each new role, empowerment mechanism, motivation, the
payments, personnel capabilities, training. (Email communication HRF, manager
from HRF, 11/03/2005).
The new type of employee had to be motivated and to be offered an attractive
career path, in order to be effective. Each new role and position in the hierarchy of
the GB had to be clearly determined in terms of the prospects of climbing the
hierarchy and building a personal career in accordance with the performance and the
demonstrated enthusiasm of the employee occupying such a position. In other words,
if an employee performs s/he has more chances to get promoted sooner and receive
various bonuses than other employees who do not perform. The performance
measurement was computerised and provided data to the management regarding the
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performance of each employee all positions. In the previous model, performance
was measured on a personal, subjective basis as a branch employee explains:
There was a system which was very subjective. That is, the director would make a
quality report at the end of the year, it was supposed to be objective [...] the
customers were satisfied, ifthey were saying good things about you, he (the
manager) would take a brief look at the volume of tasks to see ifyou 're doing well,
all your attitude was good, all these were put in a piece ofpaper produced by the
branch director and another superior. They were, let's say, the two judges. But it
was completely subjective. (BE1, branch employee, interview 30/05/2003)
The empowerment and motivational mechanisms that the HR sub-project introduced
were bonus and reward-based. Furthermore, the salaries for each position in the new
organisational structure were determined by the HR sub-project.
Career paths, empowerment mechanisms and payment methods were not yet
fully determined at the time of data collection. More than a year had passed since the
branches rollout started and the payment methods were not finalised, and although
the positions and roles had changed a long ago, they were still getting the same
salary as before. Interviews from branch employees show that at that point this was
one of their main problems and concerns. (BE1 interview 30/05/2003; BE2 interview
27/02/2003; BE3 interview 15/04/2003; BE4 interview 03/04/2003; BE5 interview
03/04/2003, BE6 interview 15/04/2003).
The creation of a new type of employee required investment in training. All
employees (around 4,000) had to go through training that explained their new roles,
diffused the new mentality and familiarised personnel with new technological
applications. GB maintains for more than eighteen years a training centre with thirty
permanent personnel and around one hundred and fifty external partners involved in
training and teaching activities. The training centre does not only train the GB
personnel but also offers courses and transfers know-how to agricultural industries,
cooperative associations, enterprises, banking executives and scientists, in subjects
such as management, marketing, finance, technology adoption and implementation,
skills development and in other agricultural issues (GB website).
Under the product-centred model employees were specialised in only one
product, whereas with this change instance they had to specialise in all products, in
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addition to developing their selling skills and becoming adjusted to the new job
requirements. In relation to this issue one a branch employee says:
They (consultants) are not so interested in the execution of things but rather they are
interested in how are we able to sell, to have other kinds ofskills. It's more
important to have the talent ofa salesman than that ofa technocrat. On the other
hand, though, there is the view that ifyou want to be a good salesman you have to
have a very good knowledge of the subjects, others say that ifyou have the charisma
of the salesman you don't need anything else. (BE1, branch employee, interview
30/05/2003)
Other employees were emphasising the increased intensity of their new roles and the
pressure they feel from the new performance measurement techniques:
The system asks from the same personnel to do multiple things than those they used
to do. To intensify their attempts. And these attempts are recorded. With this new
system they can see the amount ofwork you do. How many customers did we serve?
How many collections we made? It is a real count. This happens through the
computer. This is another dimension; we 're getting into other issues. The human
issues and how the bank worker should be. I'm not saying that things should be
relaxed, but the system is becoming more "cold-blooded". It measures you. (BE2,
branch employee, interview 27/02/2003)
Furthermore, in regard to the intensification of tasks and the organisational culture:
In the reorganization case, where you demolish something and build something new,
there is a lot ofwork. While you 're servicing the customer you also have to talk to
the other colleague on how you should change subject and distribute the roles.
Therefore, there are parallel jobs happening in many spots. The philosophy used to
be "corner store ". The customers would walk in and get a loan, for example. But
now [...] it's a system which is very demanding. More work to do. (BE1, branch
employee, interview 30/05/2003)
The HR sub-project aimed to the creation, maintenance and sustainable
improvement of the human resources available to the GB. In doing so various
mechanisms were introduced in order to adjust the HR to fit with the recent T-0
changes. The specific HR sub-project, however, in comparison to more general T-O
changes was described as a short-term solution in light of this transition while a long-
term development strategy and its integration with wider HRM policies is still
lacking (Petridou & Glaveli, 2003).
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5.3.3.d Direct Interventions
The direct interventions sub-project referred to two projects that did not fit
with the rest of the changes but had to be done for a number of reasons. These were a
Risk Management project and a Loan Portfolio Management (LPM) project, carried
out by the DIF, which was subcontracted by the consortium leader.
The direct interventions sub-project mainly relates to issues of control of the
internal processes and the management of risk factors. The inclusion of these
projects was not a GB choice; they were rather forced by the Bank of Greece (BoG)
with certain laws. In relation to the LPM project, for example, the relevant normative
act from the BoG has the code name 2438/6.8.98. It forces financial institutions to
establish internal rules of controlling their processes by setting up an organizational
structure that supports the effective operation of what was termed as Internal Control
System (ICS). ICS is a set of control mechanisms and processes covering all
activities of credit institutions (Bank of Greece Governor's Act No. 2438/6.8.98).
The regulatory principles and the standards set by the BoG were embodied in the
LPM application. The same act forces banks to establish a Risk Management Unit.
As the act commands, credit institutions should conduct systematic risk monitoring
and management and protection of the institutions assets from loss. Credit
institutions should have adequate mechanisms and organizational structures enabling
the timely detection, analysis, control and management of risks entailed in banking
activities, which should be supported by information and communication systems
that ensure the flow of timely and reliable information necessary for decision making
and control (Bank of Greece Governor's Act No. 2438/6.8.98).
The direct interventions sub-projects involve IT applications the
implementation of which also requires organisational changes. Regarding the LPM
project, for example, in order for the experts to design the relevant application they
had to define the organisational environment this applications could operate in. The
BPR job which would determine the organisational environment, however, was not
yet completed. The firm responsible for the LPM project could not wait for the BPR
project to finish in order to do the LPM on top of the new organisational structure.
Instead they proceeded by suggesting and implementing a few organisational
changes. The BPR experts that came afterwards to do the BPR project had to take
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these changes into consideration. These changes involved the closing down of
some offices and the renaming of some others. This was not a simple thing to do
because of the close dependence of the GB on the Greek state which had not been
fully abolished yet. An interviewee from the DIF explains:
[...] in orderfor the organizational structure to change and add a new management
office, there's needfor the issue to be discussed in the parliament and to be
published in the Government Gazette. Unbelievable! (DIF, general manager,
interview 04/03/2003)
Keeping the above in mind, they renamed some offices with the involvement of
some agriculturalists with knowledge of economics.
After the changes in the organisational environment, they moved on to the
processual part of the project where they defined some basic principles. This related
both to the old and new portfolios, things that were seen separately, up to a point.
The definitions of these processual principles were embodied to some suggestions
they made on how some things could be transferred from one portfolio to another.
Upon the acceptance of these suggestions, they wrote detailed user and procedure
manuals on the newly automated process. They included information on how a
transaction is done, how it was done before, and so on.
Another step that would normally have to be done was the recording of
system specifications. The packaged IS GB had bought, provided the operational
environment for the LPM project; therefore, there was nothing to pre-record. They
pre-recorded, however, what they call Notes Origination, that is, the whole process
from the moment when a loan application of the customer is received, its processing
and its approval or disapproval. Additionally, the LPM project involved an
application in relation to the different approach of the consumer and entrepreneurial
loans. This was not a very sophisticated model, as it was one of the existing best
practices, a statistical model similar to Microsoft Office EXCEL. The DIF suggested
to GB to run it and see how it works. The DIF created two sets of specs and
elements, which made it relatively automatic. With this program you could predict
statistically the possibilities of a loan not to get paid. Finally, there was an
educational program, with topics suggested by the DIF, in order for the personnel to
get trained on them.
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After the designing phase the GB put the above in action. Firstly, they
turned the user manuals into a circular letter and they distributed it throughout the
network. Nevertheless, there were further modifications of the system. The bank
piloted the system in some branches in its initial form, they gave it to some
programmers internally, they turned it into web-based application, they did the
rollout and eventually it operated everywhere. The user of the information handled
by this system is the Risk Management Unit. These systems were offering a
possibility for collection and processing of information centrally.
The Risk Management subproject started and ended in parallel with the LPM
one. It was exactly identical in structure. DIF designed the organizational structure of
the new unit. GB did not have a previous Risk Management Unit, therefore,
everything needed to be done from scratch. An informant from DIF illustrates:
In the LPMproject we did re-engineering, in the second one we did engineering, it
was from scratch. (DIF, general manager, interview 04/03/2003)
This involved the writing of large volumes of definitions, methods, processes, topics
and recruitment. The research for the writing of these volumes was extensive and it
covered most of the relevant international bibliography, resources from the Bankers'
Association in the UK and so on. This piece of international knowledge was
translated but the whole process involved a selection of how this universal
knowledge could be used for the specific bank. As the same informant puts it:
[...] we discussed it in a logic ofawareness about what these things (international
resources) are, which are the best ways for the specific bank to use them, we did not
suggest them the most sophisticated ways that exist, we told them that in their
condition they should startfrom some simpler things and then move on to something
more complicated (DIF, general manager, interview 04/03/2003)
Apart from the above there was also training and recruitment ofpersonnel to work in
the newly formed Risk Management Unit. They brought in people from the branch
network, familiar with the topic, they trained them and they tested them; some of
them were hired. Lastly, there were the specifications of the IS, which were done in
the same way like the LPM project. The LPM and the Risk Management projects
lasted about 6 months.
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For the completion of these projects by DIF, there was some know-how
transfer which was done internally. One of their partners-firms from Sweden offered
know-how on similar issues from the Swedish experience during 1980s and 1990s.
The particular condition of GB was crucial for the completion of these
projects. Some of the factors were related to the kind ofproducts the GB offers, its
large size, its particular organizational structure, the fact that they did not have a
previous version of a Risk Management Unit, their decision to change the core IS,
and finally, in this case, political issues. In relation to the latter, GB's central
management faced difficulties where they had to cause a little damage to the "social
face" of the bank. For instance, the changes within the frame of risk calculation and
sophistication of the loans involved political cost. As our interviewee illustrates:
The bank needed to make some decisions that might seem cruel, or to know that the
press will protest or thefarmers will go on protesting against the bad GB that wants
to take our cows because they gave us a loan ten years ago and we didn 't pay, but
some things could be done ifthere was the option oftranscending some political cost
that exists regarding some decisions. (DIF, general manager, interview 04/03/2003)
The top management of GB were careful at taking this political cost and proceeded
rather conservatively in relation to the changes relating to loans and the terms under
which they credit them or not.
Regarding the success or failure levels of these subprojects, they are
considered quite successful, in general. There were some issues in the beginning
regarding the expectations of GB and what DIF has to offer but this was diagnosed
^ early on. As a general manager from DIF puts it:
Ifyou leave the gap between customer expectations - consultant's design till the end,
you 're screwed. You have to work on that distance from a very early time and try to
bridge it and make one common image regarding what needs to be produced.
Luckily, we saw this early enough and we fixed it [...] the customer rarely knows
what they want. And it makes sense. The customer wants to get as many things as
possible. It's ourjob to explain to them that in relation to the time and the price/cost,
this is what you can get! There is always something better; there is always something
more. (DIF, general manager, interview 04/03/2003)
Additionally, this shows the relative character of what is considered success or
failure. An interviewee from PMF explains:
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Ifpreviously you had one loan and now you have five loans, that's 500% increase in
sales. But still the bank next door sells more loans than you. (PM, overall project
management, interview 19/05/2003)
5.3.3.e Information Systems
The IT sub-project is a very important part of the change because, in a sense,
it represents the informatisation of the organisational processes of GB. As mentioned
earlier, although the execution/implementation approach was BPR driven, the choice
of the selection of the consortium was highly influenced by the reliability and
technical soundness of the IS, as well as the reputation and position of its supplier.
Additionally, there was an introduction of new processes. The transformation to a
customer-centred system required an IS that fitted into the new organisational
philosophy.
The bank's previous system was built in-house with in-house developed
applications. The new IS consists of an integrated banking package (I shall call it
PACKAGE from now on). It is a product developed by the ITF, and it is marketed as
a professional solution that fits universal banks. Among its main objectives and
fundamental concepts are: the promotion of customer orientation and relationship
banking, enhancement of competitiveness in changing market environments,
improvement of efficiency and quality of service to the customer, improvement of
security and authorisation mechanisms and fully support various organisational
structures (see PACKAGE leaflet). This product was designed using state-of-the-art
software methodologies and tools (CA SMART certification), with security
specifications according to international quality standards (ISO 9001) and its
modular design allows for expansion and adaptations according to changing user
needs (see PACKAGE leaflet). More particularly and in regard to its design,
PACKAGE consists of a core system and of additional systems. The core system
consists of some core banking operations such as: customer management, deposits,
general ledger, funds transfer, product management, loans and foreign exchange.
This core system constitutes a basis on which a variety of additional systems may be
incorporated according to the specific needs and priorities of the user banking
organisation. Such additional systems are: MIS, Auditing, Collaterals, Budgeting,
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Profitability, Risk Management, Liquidity Management, ATMs/POSs
Management, Phone/Remote Banking, Letters ofCredit, Letters ofGuarantee.
The modules of the software package might be adjusted to the user
organisations according to its particular organisational settings and its strategic
orientation. In other words, there is a process of customisation where the software
package is adjusted to the requirements of the bank. Criteria for customisation are
related to the kinds of products the bank offers or wants to be offering, the kinds of
customers, the operational mode of the bank. In the GB case, this process was quite
difficult and time consuming because of its particular circumstances. As an
interviewee from PMF explains:
[...] it was extremely difficult; it was a very difficult bank, because we have loans
which are regulated. For instance there is a farming loan for cotton in Northern
Greece and there is a natural disaster. What kinds ofpeople get involved after that?
There is deregulation of the loan, there is our insurance company, what kind of
insurance will they give them, the ministry ofagriculture that gives you guidelines
that we fund and support those people and a loan that you start in a way A might end
up to a way B. Thus, it needed a special customization even in the very simple things.
In other words, it has to do with the definition of 'what is a product'! (PM, overall
project management, interview 19/05/2003)
The above products along with accounts, transactions, dispensations, deposits,
investments and other processes had to be adjusted to the particularities of the
customer segments. This transition took place with the involvement of the directors
and sub-directors of the various divisions of GB who were assisting external experts
with the customer segmentations.
Another criterion was the difference between the level of central offices and
branch network. This difference was important in terms of spatially balancing the IS
and the organisational processes of the bank, which also reveals how the BPR project
and the IT overlap. Which processes are taking place at the branch and which go to
the central offices? PM illustrates:
What leaves the network and what goes to the centre? I.e. ifI have my loans, loans
means paperwork, some customer appliesfor one, the responsible for loans takes it
[...] where does it go after? Do they stay at the branch level? At a peripheral level?
At a central offices level? Or do they even go to the dispensations committee which is
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in the central administration? This role allocation was done by the BPR. (PM,
overall project management, interview 19/05/2003)
In terms of its technical architecture, PACKAGE is designed to operate in
multiple operational environments. It is compatible with multiple servers, multiple
databases, programming languages, and interfaces. The process of designing,
developing and marketing such a package involves extensive and long term research
internationally. In order for the various modules of the PACKAGE to be selected and
included in its packaging, there was research on new banking products, new trends,
new management visions and ideas, new processes, new regulations and so on. For
example, in the next version of PACKAGE the designers of the product would have
to include the new accounting models and the standards of Basil directive (ITF2,
manager, 13/12/2004).
PACKAGE was implemented gradually in the GB, a few modules at a time.
In the annual report of the bank there is a section referring to the progress of the
project as a whole with reference to the various sub projects. In the year 2000 for
instance, it is reported that:
• The first group of PACKAGE applications (Support Systems,
Customers, Products, Cashier's Offices, Security, Loans and
Collateral) were completed and delivered by the bank, while these
applications would be put in operation by the first half of 2001.
• The central accounting system was at the testing stage, while
implementation had begun regarding the systems for Letters of
Guarantee, Deposits, Movement of Capital & Purchase/Sale of
Foreign Exchange, Securities and Safe Deposit Boxes.
• The task relating to the Technological Infrastructure of the units
making up GB's Network had been completed. Thus the bank had
480 points of sale (Branches, Customer Service Counters,
Cooperatives) with the latest technology equipment comprising
3,500 terminals, 1,600 printers and 420 laser network printers.
(Annual Report, 2000: Section on Structural and Technological Modernisation)
The IT sub-project was time consuming and took up more time than other
sub-projects. The greatest bulk of work for this project was the transfer of the bank's
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database into the system. This data referred to the customers of the bank but also
the internal information, such as directives. In terms of alignment between the IT
system and the organisational transformations PM holds an absolute opinion:
Is it possible for those two ever to be aligned? In a market that is modified every
week? Therefore, ifyou ask me if they are aligned, no they are not! And they won't
befor the next ten years at least. Does the human and organizationalfactorfollow
the IT and visa versa? Ifyou ask me at a theoretical level in paper we've reached a
60%-70% alignment. We have the would-be IT system, and the would -be
organizational andjob description level. We see that in reality there is a difference.
The organizational re-designing moves with very muchfaster speed than the re¬
designing ofIT. That is the rollout has been done in about two hundred andfifty
branches. Regarding IT, there are aboutfifteen branches so far. (PM, overall project
management, interview 19/05/2003)
The reason for this difference in speed is quite interesting and PM offers a quite
reflective explanation:
There is a history which you have to transfer gradually to a new condition. Customer
identification: No one here deals with it. They don't know what it is about. How can
you manage to put all your customers on-linefrom your old system? [...] When you
have loans and loan history and you want to put it in the new system. You know what
this means? I don't know ifyou can capture the volume [...] imagine all these loans
with history that does not exist in the old system...to try putting them into the new
one! When you press the button to turn on the loans program, you have instantly
125,000 loans. Loans, collaterals, contracts, estimations, re-estimations [...] we are
trying gradually to build our base. (PM, overall project management, interview
19/05/2003)
The long un-computerised history of GB creates a tremendous amount of
work to be done in building the IS and a database that would work in line with the
organisational processes. The processes, therefore, might be redesigned according to
the new system but there might not be any information to process. At the time of data
collection this was still a problem that GB and external specialists were struggling to
solve.
The presence of different actors, as well as the audibility of various
organisational voices, such as the branch employees, makes the implementation
phase highly political and quite heterogeneous and complex. Also, this phase should
not be seen as separate from the initiation and design phases. For instance, many of
the issues that were brought up in the initiation and design phases were transferred
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and dealt with during implementation, such as the issue of changing
organisational culture. Nevertheless, the implementation of the GB T-0 change
instance involves further choices that will ultimately configure ATOC into the
particular situation of the GB.
5.4 EMERGING ISSUES ON THE GREEK BANK
INSTANCE
The difficulty of communication among the various direct players, the
conflicts and power relations amongst them were significant challenges for the
successful completion of the GB T-0 change instance. The involvement of a variety
of expert groups in the project along with the participation of the bank players
created a heterogeneous environment in terms of the knowledge deployed, the
various actors' perceived interests, and perspectives and so on. This heterogeneity
needed to be bridged in order for the involved players to communicate with each
other in a meaningful way. The relationships formed were between the experts and
the bank top management, experts and branch players and also communication
between top management and branches through the links provided by the bank's
organizational structure.
At the level of the relationships among experts there was a difficulty in
communication among them. This was a result of the differences between the various
sub-projects and also a result of the fact that these heterogeneous players were not
"speaking the same language" and had different viewpoints. Experience from
participation in similar projects helped overcoming communication problems as
OPF2 says:
We had to attain common language and common view. The engineers have different
perceptions than the business consultants. The experience helped us. (OPF2,
director, interview 21/02/2003)
Other interviewees who said that it was organizational politics and conflicts
of interests that caused problems and not just different backgrounds questioned the
Tack of communication' argument:
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In was not lack ofcommunication. It was disagreement on the project and also
conflicting interests. For example, the firm responsiblefor the IS did not want to
have clearly recorded processes because clear processes meant clear technical
specifications, and thus, more work. The firm that brought the strategy part from
abroad didn't want to put much effort in order to customize it in the bank. They were
saying 'this is what you have to do'. But the GB does not even look like the National
Bank ofGreece. It's a special case. (SCF, manager subcontracting supplier firm,
interview 05/02/2003)
Interviewees also emphasized conflicts emerging out of the different times in which
the deliverables were presented. For instance, some of the experts were finishing
their task on time and they were complaining because other expert firms were
causing delays:
[...] we had the typical problems of 'who causes delays to whom' amongst the
consultants mostly, absenteeism, because the project was very demanding and
because the projects were connected. (ITF1, project manager, interview 29/03/2003)
Conflicts among consultants were mostly expressed during meetings for closure of
the deliverables:
[...] in orderfor the deliverable to become accepted, there were internal meetings
taking place, there was a presentation from the consultant, there was discussion and
defense, and after a painful and full ofblood' process we could reach to an
agreement and the signatures were coming in. And every deliverable was, then, a
reference pointfor the continuation of the project. Such problems were many (SCF,
manager subcontracting supplier firm, interview 05/02/2003)
Nevertheless, all experts interviewed referred to the experience of this project
as something quite useful for their development as individuals and as professionals.
The extended project life cycle made the experts participate naturally in it, a routine,
and eventually it became a point of reference for their personal careers. All conflicts
were overcome and everyone seemed happy with the results. This T-0 change
instance also provided the opportunity for a merger between two of the firms
involved. Initially these firms were hired separately but during the project's life cycle
they merged into one.
In terms of the relationships between expert firms and GB top management,
the situation is also interesting. The role of the experts was to make suggestions for
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top management to decide which of the suggestions to follow. Decisions were
made centrally within the reorganization division and then they were diffused and
implemented throughout the central offices and the branch network. Interview data
shows that there was some tension regarding the final decisions of the direction of
the change also leading to conflicts and replacements of various people, showing that
negotiations between the bank managers and the experts were not always smooth:
There was difficulty in harmonization between the consultants and the executives of
the bank; thus, there were many conflicts and many exchanges ofpeople. The best
diplomats survived even though they might were mild as personalities and could
harmonize situations, in contrast with others who were more qualified but also more
aggressive. (SCF, manager subcontracting supplier firm, interview 05/02/2003)
Additionally, the expert knowledge and international experience of the expert
firms gave them the power to promote certain solutions, or point to certain directions
instead of others. GB's top management negotiated the acceptance of experts'
proposals on political grounds. Even through the negotiation process was
painstaking, the proposed changes in this case were greatly supported by the general
director of GB, in comparison to other cases where the central management might
not be so supportive. This support was explained by one of our interviewees in terms
of the political connections of the general director with the government:
[...] usually the general directors and the deputy directors, that is, thefirst and the
second levels ofmanagement are appointed not by criteria ofmeritocracy but by
political influences. Therefore, one political 'clan' appoints someone, another
minister someone else; someone else might have been forgotten from a previous
government, which might have been a different political party. These people then,
have political back ups. In such a situation, black or white, what do you have to do?
Fire one and hire the other, but because you can't do that [...] you 're stuck with
them [...] In the specific case, the administrator had powerful, the most powerful
possible bonds with the whole specific political party. Therefore, he was 'the law'.
There is no concept ofdispute there. Whatever he was wishing [...J it was
happening. That simple. It's a unique case; there are two or three people that can
have such an access to the government. (SCF, manager subcontracting supplier firm,
interview 05/02/2003)
Regarding the relationships between the experts and the branch employees,
things vary throughout the large and diverse network of branches. In some branches
changes were implemented more smoothly than in other branches. The change effort
152
encountered certain levels of resistance on behalf of the employees at the lower
hierarchical echelons, mostly by older employees with many years of experience. It
was harder for older employees to change their mentality. Younger employees were
more positive as they perceived this change as an opportunity to climb the hierarchy
quickly, based on the new system of performance assessment. This new system was
causing uncertainties for older employees who were afraid of losing their jobs to
younger and ambitious employees.
As mentioned earlier, the role of the branch managers was crucial in
initiating, maintaining and diffusing a positive or a negative attitude towards change.
For that reason, some branches were more "successful" than others. The relationship
between experts and branch employees was also full of tensions, as the branch
employees had not initially understood the role of the consultant. A consultant
reports:
[...] some employees think that we went there to do their work. 'You came right on
time, come and take care ofthese papers'. Every person tries to get comfortable.
(OPF2, director, interview 21/02/2003)
Additionally, the consultants were facing hostility and disbelief by branch
employees as they felt that their experience of many years had deteriorated. Common
comments circulated amongst branch employees in the beginning of the experts'
entrance were:
'Since this person is coming and we pay him to be wise, he has to prove it every
other second' or 'who are these people that came here and tell us what to do?\
(OPF2, director, interview 21/02/2003)
Nevertheless, the consultants were meeting the employees in whom
employees were expressing their thoughts and opinions. Some of those opinions
were implemented, mostly the ones concerning practical measures. The formal
concerns of the branch employees regarding the rollout were expressed in the union
newsletter. More or less, these referred to the system of matching of the roles from
the old to the new system, hierarchy, intensification of work as a cause of de-
humanization, dislocation of the working relations and increase ofprofits by further
exploitation of branch employees. They also argued that "the working relations have
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not been transformed, they were rather turned upside down into a fluid condition
not of positions of work but rather of roles" (Employer's Union Newsletter - see also
Appendix). Changes at a more general level, however, were not a matter of
negotiation between the consultants and the employees. Although there were
attempts by employees to modify their roles, the consultants had to make clear that
decisions were made, some things had to be implemented and there was no other
choice:
Everyone things that they '11 modify their new role tofit their liking. There has to be a
homogeneous way ofoperation. And it has to be the way that the central
management decided. There is no negotiation. If they argue something, you counter-
argue by saying: 'what you said was taken into account and the bank decided this'.
So there is nothing else to negotiate. (OPF2, director, interview 21/02/2003)
Finally, the employees more negative towards change were the older ones. It
was difficult for them to change their mentality but it was also difficult to accept new
ways of doing things. Younger employees were positive towards change and
perceived it as an opportunity to fulfill their career ambitions.
The geographical location of a branch made a difference in terms of
interpretation of the transition to customer centrality by the employees. In branches
in rural Crete, for example, branch employees could not easily justify this transition.
As one branch employee puts it:
Regarding the customer-centered system, I have doubts if this is the best system
because we 're not a huge company with many floors. We have a restricted space
[...] we didn 't need to be so much customer centered (BE1, branch employee,
interview 30/05/2003)
Additionally, in small branches with no corporate customers, where the great bulk of
customers are still farmers, the transition to the new model did not make much sense
to some of the branch employees, mainly in peripheral areas.
Finally, one interesting issue that emerged from this case is the variety of
perceptions, interpretations, and the meanings that direct players attached to the
reorganization effort. The first question I asked all my interviewees was: what is this
project about? Indeed I received, interestingly enough, different kinds of answers.
The expert consultants were answering by describing the socio-technical constitution
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and the gradual unfolding of the various tasks and phases project. For instance,
one consultant gave the following answer:
The bank in 1998 decided to do reorganization in many parallel subjects,
introduction ofnew information systems, new applications, change in the crediting
systems, new systems ofHR, and the issue of the change ofthe organizational
structure and operation. Ourfirm works on the part ofthe operational and
organizational reorganization. It had many stages ofanalysis, proposals, decision
making, until the analytical skeleton ofthe designing was determined and then we
moved gradually to the materialization phase, where we started applying the initial
propositions. It started as a pilot project, in relation to the network, changes that
have to be made in the network, in the central level, and then we moved on to the so-
called rollout, that is, the total inclusion ofall branches. We have various stages [...]
gradual inclusion ofbranch teams. However, the designing existed, what was
happening was adjustments based on the needs ofthe materialization, the current
conditions, emerging issues [...] from then on, wefollow strictly the direction of
network change. In the beginning there is a scanning of the network with many sub-
goals referring to the upgrading ofthe bank and the branches. That's where we 're at
right now (OPF2, director, interview 21/02/2003)
Another consultant replied:
It started in 1998; it was a three-year project. It had a few sub-projects. One was
HR, the other was strategy, the administration systems and another that had to do
with processes and the other was informatics. And there were consultants, ifI
remember well, one company did the HR, another did the software, a third one had
the part of the recording and improvement ofprocesses and another one had the
project management. We were a supporting company to thefirm that did the
organisationalprocesses (SCF, manager subcontracting supplier firm, interview
05/02/2003)
Banking players, such as branch managers and branch employees, were answering
by focusing on the content of the changes and the new organizational environment in
their branch. A branch director answered like this:
[...] it's called rollout and it's based on the redirection of the branches and of the
bank where the branches are becoming sales centers. For example, loans are not
decided in the branch but in some centers, which are the central offices. So the
branches are freed in order to deal with sales firstly and not the approval ofloans. If
a customer walked in and wanted a loan, the branch wasted time with the approval
of the loan. We didn 't have time to be engaged with marketing and how to sell a
product. Now, these kind ofprocesses left the branches and went to a centre (BM1,
branch manager, interview 11/02/2003)
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Another branch manager:
The attempt is about the change ofphilosophy ofwork in the branches. Transform
branches from points ofproduct sales to points ofcustomer servicing. So, the system
is now becoming customer-centered. The customer in order to get served was coming
into the bank and had to go to various departments and offices. Now the customer
goes to a section that administers him from the beginning to the end. That is, the
philosophy ofcustomer servicing changes. The areas are the same, but the
administering ofcustomer servicing changes completely. Every colleague in the bank
has a specific role and mission, they know them, and I think this is the great success
of the system, which undoubtedly has great results (BM2, branch manager, interview
03/04/2003)
A deputy branch manager:
With the new system, branches have some areas with some people in charge ofthem,
we are the area ofdevelopment of the enterprises, there is also the area of
development of individuals-farmers, and the area ofcustomer servicing. Every
employee, from the director to the last cashier, has his own position, and his role.
We believe that with this system the bank will be able to improve its financial
condition, its competitive position, it '11 be moreflexible in the banking sector, the
decisions will be made faster, we '11 be approaching the customers better, we have
developed the ATMs and people won't wait in the queues (BM3, deputy branch
manager, interview 27/02/2003)
Different interviewees when asked to define the reorganization project,
focused on different aspects depending on their role and their position. Experts
emphasize the methodological design of the project and how it unfolded in various
phases, which reflects their role as experts. The bank players, however, tend to base
their definition on the content of the change and how things became different than
they used to be in relation to their responsibilities.
By referring to the relationships amongst different groups of visible actors
involved in the GB instance and by looking at how different interviewees define the
instance, a variety of voices comes to the fore each of which is based on and
promotes a certain but different rationality. The variety of rationalities and
viewpoints can be identified at the arguments of interviewees and the ways through
which the politics and economics of negotiation of choices are revealed by the quotes
provided above. In chapter seven, it is shown how the co-existence of such diverse
rationalities can be theorized in the context of the T-0 relationship.
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS
This case study focused on a large restructuring program in GB as a
particular instance of T-0 change. It was approached through the point of view of
GB, that is the user organisation, in order to explore and explain how certain
decisions during the initiation, design and implementation of the instance were taken.
It seems however that the size and scope of the particular instance was such, which
required the involvement of large numbers of external specialists and suppliers that
took over large amounts of control and responsibility of the change effort. Although
the particular T-0 change instance initially was methodologically approached with
the intent to illustrate the point ofview of the user organisation on ATOC and the
particular instance, it turns out that this viewpoint was shaped by the involvement of
the external specialists and suppliers that were designing the program in
collaboration with internal expertise. Therefore the user organisation viewpoint
exists and emerges from this instance to generate and direct social choices on the
management of T-0 change, however, it seems to have been a product of negotiation
and influence by the extended external expertise involved.
The role that external suppliers and specialists play in the initiation, design
and implementation of the T-0 change instance in the GB directed my interest and
my attention towards exploring in chapter six the involvement of a systems supplier




THE VIEWPOINT AND ROLE OF A SYSTEMS
INTEGRATION FIRM ON THE SHAPING OF TECHNO-
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE INSTANCES
6.1 INTRODUCTION
T-0 change instances still remain at the centre of analytical focus in the
second case study. In this chapter, however, I will not examine only one T-0 change
instance, but the viewpoint of a particular actor, SIF, on ATOC and their role and
involvement in the initiation, design and implementation of various T-0 change
instances. The case study focuses on how a firm conceives the ATOC environment
and strategically plans and negotiates their role and involvement in the initiation,
design and implementation of T-0 change instances. This is to identify how this
particular actor makes social choices during their participation in various instances,
what kind of challenges emerge during this process and how SIF's management
copes with them. For this reason, empirical data are more closely associated with the
particular actor, its historical evolution, its organisational structure, its productive
activities, the ATOC network they are part of and the mechanisms that produce
social choices during T-0 change instances throughout their customer base. It is
necessary to collect information on the actor, its corporate identity, its strategic
focus, its organisational structure and productive activities in order to be able to
account for the emergence of social choice within ATOC networks and how do they
influence the shaping of the relationship between T&O during instances of T-0
change. Reference will be made to various T-0 change instances, mainly in relation
to banking and with a particular customer, The Bank, because SIF's main activity, as
an ATOC professional, is to profit from the initiation, design and implementation of
T-0 change solutions throughout existing and prospective customers.
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The chapter consists of a historical account on the development of SIF
and its engagement with banking, a mapping of SIF's external environment and how
it is mobilised towards the development of T-0 change solutions for specific
customers, the process of initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change
solutions and finally, the relationship between SIF and one of its largest customers,
The Bank.
6.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SIF
6.2.1 Foundation, Mergers and Name Changes
SIF is an IT firm active in the area of systems integration. It is a Greek S.A.
specialising in the development and commerce of technological solutions, turn key
solutions or specific parts. The history of SIF30 has been unfolding in parallel with
the history of the whole Greek IT sector; SIF, together with IBM Hellas, are the
oldest and largest IT firms operating in Greece. SIF's history after its foundation is a
product of a series of mergers both at international and national levels.
SIF's history starts in the 1960s with Mr CD, the owner of one of the largest offices
in the world in city planning carrying out large residential development projects
mostly in the third world. Mr CD needed statistics for the distribution of housing
needs, or distribution of traffic flows in a city. Computers could be used to produce
the statistics, but would prove expensive. Mr CD, therefore, thought that it might be
better if he became a representative of a multinational IT firm and, thereby, profit
from the provision of IT services in Greece. He, thus, created his own resource base
which he could use for free or with transfer pricing for his office. He rejected IBM
because of its inconvenient subsidizing policy. MSIF (before mergers) at that time
was using advanced technology, although it was not as commercially successful as
IBM. In 1964, then, Mr CD started a distribution partnership with MSIF and created
a Greek IT firm (SIF Annual Report, 2003). SIF was, thus, founded and started the
promotion and distribution of MSIF products in the Greek market. In 1970 SIF
30
Parts of the history of the firm have been developed by narrations of my interviewees while others
from SIF documents. Relevant quotes are provided when available and appropriate.
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became a S.A. (FEK 1595/31.12.1970) under the same name (SIF Annual
Report, 2003). In 1988 (FEK 3607/12.12.1988), after the international merging of
MSIF with another multinational specializing in network technologies, the Greek IT
firm bought the representation of that firm in Greece under a different name (SIF
Annual Report, 2003).
International mergers did not necessarily mean that the Greek firm would
follow at a national level. During the 1988 merger, for example, a question was
raised whether the Greek IT firm would be able to buy the representation of the
newly merged firm. This would be both of technological and marketing importance.
An external academic consultant to SIF explains:
[...] in this case, the technology transfer was quite important but there is also the
expansion of the markets. The newfirm had a very large base on the markets, they
had a very goodpersonnel, know-how about important sectors, such as airlines,
banks and the public sector, so beyond the technological reasons, there were reasons
ofaccess to the markets and the quality ofthe personnel which brought operational
sufficiency [...] Technologically, what was important in this merger was the
combination of technological mainframes ofMSIF with network technologies. (EAC,
academic, interview 7/10/2004)
The Greek IT firm, however, did not have the funds to assimilate the other firm and
one of their customers, The Bank, got involved and solved the problem. Academic
consultant explains that:
[,.]the general director of The Bank, who understood the importance ofthese things
and the merging of technologies, said that he would help with capital but he would
participate himself taking advantage ofthis mergerfor his own bank. He got in with
30%. Since then, the bank has stock presence with a percentage between 15-33% in
the SIF. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
At the end of the 1990s, and now relatively autonomous, SIF decided to
attract more capital and develop their activities. They, thus, attempted to enter the
stock market to solve their funding problems. There was a question though of
whether the firm could enter the stock market under the same name. A new name
was eventually decided upon which would be reminiscent of the previous firm, with
all the funding problems. This name change also helped them to become both more
independent from their suppliers and start developing their own activities and
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strategies. As they state in the 2003 annual report, "the change of name aims to
clarify for the benefit of our public investors that our firm is completely independent
from MSIF" (SIF Annual Report, 2003). In 1999, it was renamed as SIF and entered
the stock market. The main shareholder of the Greek IT firm is Mr CD's son, Mr D,
who owns nearly 40% (SIF Annual Report, 2003).
1964: Foundation of SIF. Mr CD starts a distribution partnership with an
international IT firm.
1970: SIF becomes a S.A.
1975: SIF sell their first MSIF mainframe in The Bank.
1988: International mother firm merges with another multinational network
technologies firm and SIF follows the merging at a national level with the
involvement of a large customer, The Bank. SIF next changes its name and
starts exploiting network technologies for branch automation solutions.
1999: SIF changes name, re-considers its marketing strategies and enters stock
market.
Figure 6.1: History ofSIF
Source: Based on SIF annual report, 2003 and on interviewees narratives.
6.2.2 From Distributor to Systems Integrator
In 1960s SIF was doing various jobs of data processing, accounting offices,
government projects. Whatever computing needs there were at that time in Greek
society were shared between IBM Hellas and SIF. Gradually some banks started
asking for IT services in order to digitize and process their archives; earlier, the
circulation of information was done physically with cards and card punching.
Programming issues also arose. Banks during that time used Fordham and other
kinds of languages like Pascal to carry out their, mostly in-house, programming.
SIF's management realized that they had to take advantage of these emerging
prospects. Their customers up to that point included: the Army, Organization of
Telecommunications of Greece (OTE) and so on. In the beginning, therefore, their
clientele consisted of state-owned organizations and also a few firms big enough to
buy IT products and services.
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In the banking sector, no MSIF mainframes had been installed. They were
installed only in 1975 when The Bank's director, a trained engineer, who was the
inspirer of this attempt and had the knowledge to communicate with technologists,
wanted to acquire their own mainframe computer and develop their banking
processes around it. This was a time in the banking sector during which the
mainframe computers and the organization of banking operations around that
computer by building in-house applications became fashionable, and as an
organizational model was taken up from the airline industry. An academic consultant
to SIF confirms:
The model ofairlinefirms started 'touching' the banks, because this organization -
where we have big network systems around a big mainframe - was something which
was developed mainly by the airlines and then taken up by banks. This was an era
where all these things had started to mature. The airlines had been quite developed;
the banks had started using their organizational model. (EAC, academic, interview
7/10/2004)
The director of The Bank, decided on social and technological reasons, to buy a
MSIF, not an IBM mainframe. The social reasons were in reference to The Bank's
director's confidence in the local market and his ability to control the processes of
the bank, whereas, the technological reasons involved the relevant supposed
superiority in some aspects of MSIF computers over IBM. The policy and culture of
the supplier and the way they manage their inter-organizational relationships was
also a determining factor for this choice. The same interviewee explains:
The Bank thinks that IBM is too oppressing and manipulative and sometimes the
control of the internal processes is lost by the way IBMpenetrates into them. For
example, IBM has a very hard customer corruption policy internationally. In order
for them to keep a relationship they offer large premiums. For example, ifa director
or someone else wants to leave IBM, this means that they significantly reduce their
income. These things were detected and understood very well by the general
manager ofThe Bank and said no to IBM. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
The Bank's manager also had friendly personal relationships with Mr. D, thus
explaining how SIF enters the banking sector.
Due to the fact that most of the mainframe computers installed in Greece
were IBM, entering the banking sector for SIF meant that they had to focus mostly
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on branch automation where profit prospects were better, although they still
maintain the second customer base in mainframe servers in Greece after IBM (SIF
Annual Report, 2003). The 1988 merger enhanced the possibility of developing
activities in branch automation by accessing network technologies. There was a
technological problem of how to combine IBM mainframes with MSIF branch
automation. A sales manager explains:
When SIF started dealing with banking IBM had covered most of the mainframes in
the Greek market. So, SIF got directed towards the offer ofbranch automation.
There is an issue ofhow to combine an IBM mainframe with MSIF branch
automation. This can be combined with the APIs (Application Program Interfaces).
(SBA, sales manager, interview 22/10/2004)
On the other hand, entering the banking sector influenced SIF's identity and
its role in the economy. This expansion of activities meant that SIF people had to
learn banking. Of course, in the 1970s, this was not such a big requirement due to the
role of such firms in the economy. As the director of information services division of
SIF explains:
The mentality ofITfirms back then was that they were developers ofhardware and
software. Every business organization had their own informational environment,
within which they were building their own technologies and software products. Our
role back then was to get trained and learn the products ofour supplier. We would
teach The Bank techniques to exploit their IS but we wouldn't teach them how to
write the accounting or payment applications. We didn't know how. They were doing
it internally. This wasn 't our role. Our duty was to teach them how to exploit the
machines, make intelligent data bases, and so on. Ifthey would put banking or other
kinds ofdata in it, that was theirproblem [...) our role was more restricted in
promoting our suppliers 'products. The Bank, for instance, in 1979 asked us for two
IS, capable enough in order to be able to support their operations in their branch
network. They didn't ask us to build them two on-line systems. I would have said to
them: You need two large IS, you need a network, you need applications, and so on,
and I can help you build them. (DIS, IS director, interview 18/11/2004)
The management of IS in banking, at this early period of computerization, did not
require extensive training on banking processes on behalf of IT suppliers. With a
general banking training, they could solve any emerging problems. It was not
necessary for SIF to be any more involved in their customers' business processes.
The restricted role of IT firms in this early stage of their development was also due to
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the partnership structures formed with vendor companies. Firms like SIF were
more exclusively dependent on their mother firms, in this case MSIF. Gradually,
things changed and SIF became more independent from MSIF and their role changed
from a simple distributor of various products to a system integrator. The director of
information services division explains:
[...] as technology was developing and what we call IT business was transformed,
ourfirm made the analogous adjustments. First ofall, our dependencefrom MSIF
was reduced and they allow us to develop complete integrated solutions. The
requirements ofour customers have changed over the years. Today they askfor
complete solutions. What does it mean? Software products [...] they say: I have this
problem: I want to organize my sales unit and I know that IT can give me some
solutions. Therefore, you have to develop applications, to set up a network, to get
supplies, hardware and so on. (DIS, IS director, interview 18/11/2004)
An ex-managing director of the technical divisions and pre-sales of SIF refers to the
relative independence from MSIF and SIF's ability to develop individual strategy:
Nowadays, things are more relaxed. For example, SIF doesn't want to be exclusive
distributor ofsome ofMSIF's products. Now products are more open and can be
distributed through various channels. (XMD, ex-managing director, interview
15/12/2004)
As the development of IT and its penetration into businesses has changed
requirements, it also changed the role and activities of various actors in the economy.
The activity of system integration is becoming more important and SIF adjusted to
this new requirement. On the increasing importance of system integration this former
managing director reflects:
[...] system integration is becoming more importantfor the reason that the
complexity is increasing. Even large customers find it hard to maintain the know-
how levels that they need. Therefore, although the customer did the integration, now
they realize that they can't do it, in other words, it's too expensive to do it
themselves. To maintain human resources with high expertise in all these fields is too
expensive and it cannot reciprocate to the standards ofcompetition. Since this is
expanding, business firms now do outsourcing ofcomputerization, and that's what
system integrators do. (XMD, ex-managing director, interview 15/12/2004)
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Additionally, the integration activities and services of the firm seem to represent
a continuously increasing percentage of the IT projects while hardware supply seems
to have become of secondary importance (SIF Annual Report, 2003).
Although system integration is gaining increased importance, the
transformation of the role of particular firms such as SIF also depends on the
business models of their vendors and how they develop their distribution channels.
An ex-managing director explains:
[...] the role ofsystem integrators and ifthey gain importance or not is related to the
business models ofthe vendor companies and how they develop distribution
channels. Dell, for instance, sells directly to the customers. IBM has a few ways of
selling. They have various channels but also sell directly. (XMD, ex-managing
director, interview 15/12/2004)
In the gradual transformation of SIF from provider to system integrator the
technological direct link between system software and user applications played a
significant role. As one of our informants suggests:
[...] whoever installs a mainframe is the one that will take care ofthe system
software also. System software is the one that creates platforms on which the end
user applications are built. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
It seemed, therefore, like a logical choice for SIF, as the business and technological
environment was changing, to start develop their knowledge base and become more
active in system integration and the writing of user applications for customers they
already had supplied with MSIF products. For this reason SIF created long-term
relationships with few large customers in the Greek market showing their desire to
embed within the local market settings.
Organizationally, SIF is separated in various productive divisions: Marketing
and pre-sales, information services, customer support, R&D, and financial and
administrative services. All these divisions are providing services to the business
units of the firm, namely, the public sector, private sector, telecoms and financial
services sector (SIF Annual Report, 2003). Different people with different
specializations are recruited for each of these business units. This organizational
structure reflects a strategic attempt for a better knowledge management and
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expansion of activities in the markets by perceiving the markets as groups of
customers.
To summarize, I have discussed how SIF was created, how it expanded its
activities in the banking sector and how its role in the economy changes as
technological and business environments are transformed. This shows how SIF's
viewpoint on ATOC and their relationship with it historically sets the basis for the
promotion and negotiation of choices that influence the involvement of SIF in
various particular T-0 change instances, thus contributing to certain ATOC
configurations. A closer look at SIF's external environment will shed light on how
ATOC is conceived and acted upon by SIF.
6.3 LINKS WITH EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
A firm like SIF, whose main activity is system integration - that is, the
selection, assemblage of various components and their configuration into complete
solutions for particular customers - needs links, channels and networks through
which to gain access to elements that could possibly be used for the development of
a solution. The external environment of SIF and the ways it is managed contributes
greatly to the way solutions are designed and implemented in SIF's customers. The
links of SIF with its external environment are provided by contacts with various
actors. Extended discussions and interviews with executives from SIF helped the
mapping of their external environment. As shown in the figure below, this includes:
suppliers, partners-competitors, customers, the Greek state, SEPE (Federation of
Hellenic Information Technology and Communications Enterprises), EPY (Hellenic
Society of Computer Scientists), various universities and research centers,
standardization bodies (i.e. ISO), regulatory bodies for the business areas they cover
i.e. Bank of Greece for their banking solutions. All these contacts form a semi-stable
network of links with the external environment which is mobilized during SIF's
activities. Let us examine these players more specifically and their relationships with
SIF.
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Figure 6.2: SIF's links with external environment
Source: Based on a drawing done by SBA, sales manager, during interview
22/10/2004
6.3.1 International Suppliers
SIF has become part of a network of international partners that supply
technological products or complete solutions, depending on the partner. This network
is comprised of international firms, like IBM, Oracle, Microsoft, HP, Nortel and of
course MSIF. SIF has signed one-year distribution or commercial partnership
agreements with such firms and most of them are automatically renewed (SIF
Annual Report, 2004). In 2003 it was estimated that more than 80% of the products
that SIF used for solutions came from suppliers with whom they had signed
distribution agreements (SIF Annual Report, 2003) while this percentage dropped to
60% in 2004 (SIF Annual Report, 2004). SIF has established partnerships with a
certain degree of permanence while it still remains open to new ad-hoc co¬
operations. SIF's main supplier is MSIF since 1964, while the rest of the suppliers
are selected on the basis of compatibility of their products with those of MSIF (SIF
Annual Report, 2003). Supplies from MSIF, however, even though they are
increasing in the long run, in terms of absolute value they constitute a progressively
smaller percentage of the total supplies of the firm (SIF Annual Report, 2004).
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As mentioned earlier, the business models of vendor companies and the
way they choose to develop distribution channels influence the role and identity of
system integrators like SIF. SIF has a special relationship with MSIF. The ownership
structures and dependence from the MSIF are crucial in determining the role of SIF
as a system integrator. As an academic consultant to SIF explains:
At an international level, MSIF, in contrast to IBM, had the policy ofbreaking down
their representation into relatively independent offices. Their representatives were
notjust branches ofa multinational company. They were autonomous companies
that were representing MSIF in the various local markets. They had, though, to
maintain some standards, that is, they were something between representatives and
franchising, in some sense. Thus, even today SIF, which is quite independent, is
amenable to various forms ofcontrol by MSIF. Ofcourse, this has led to a condition
where firms like SIF start developing their own strategies. Whether they match with
the interests ofMSIF or not, is a matter that differs according to each case. For
instance, in the cases that MSIF wants to maintain the absolute control of things,
they do not give the representation rather they establish branches which take over
service bureaus. For example in Cyprus they have service bureaus for some reason.
(EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
Furthermore, on the relationship and dependence of SIF from MSIF:
MSIF has the policy ofleaving great autonomy to its local distributors who may then
develop their own strategies regarding the development ofproducts, solutions and
services. For example, SIF might do remarketing on many ofIBM's products in
various projects... Ofcourse, this was known by MSIF [...] there are some rules.
MSIF has knowledge of things. Also, MSIF has placed a person within SIF to watch
things and control things and discusses all the conditions with them. Also, there is a
manager who is in charge ofa large territory ofEurope and who comes here often
and discusses these things. I know this from when I was workingfor the e-learning
project in The Bank where we used an IBMplatform. First, we asked MSIF if they
have the product or not. Then, we told them that we'd get itfrom IBM. They tried to
stop us but we explained that ifwe don't do this we 'd have more general problems
with the whole project. So, they accepted this in sorrow. So, the logic is that there is
discussion about these things, but they cannot stop some things from happening
because there is no other way. Ofcourse, ifSIF does a remarketing ofIBM
mainframes instead ofMSIFs, then there is a big proble?n. Ofcourse, it doesn't make
sense to do such a thing because much of the money comes from selling mainframes.
Ifsomething like this would happen, then obviously the relationship between MSIF
and SIF would be over. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
SIF, although it started out as - and still is - a MSIF representative, over the
years, developed partnerships with various other international supplying firms in
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order to cover the needs of the increasingly demanding markets. Also, as the
SIF's activities expand to various areas, new partnerships are formed with other
suppliers independently from MSIF. For instance, they formed an agreement with
Nortel for enterprise solutions and later the agreement was expanded in call centers,
as part of SIF's activity in the area of telecoms and SIF was proclaimed as a "Gold
Solutions Partner" with Nortel networks (SIF Annual Report, 2003). In doing so, the
human resources of SIF had to go through special training and take exams in order to
be certified by Nortel (SIF Annual Report, 2003). Apart from the relationship with
MSIF, then, there are various other partnerships. A few more-or-less permanent
partnerships for SIF include:
EMC: DISKS AND STORAGE SYSTEMS
IBM/HP: other hardware - PCs, microcomputers etc.
Oracle, Microsoft, etc.: for software
Nortel: telecom products
Etc.
Figure 6.3: Some ofSIF's international suppliers and what they offer
Source: Drawn by SBA, sales manager, during interview 22/10/2004
Partnership with international suppliers does not only mean the transfer of hardware
or software products, which might be accompanied with relevant services whenever
required. A manager in the financial services unit in the information services division
explains:
[...] we have a web ofsuppliers that offer us hardware, applications, or in some
cases, complete solutions with services. Or they might offer us just consultancy
services. For example, we might ask MSIF to send us a guru in topic Xfor a period
of time and they send us some guy. (MFS, manager, interview 26/10/2004)
In regard to how this network of suppliers is shaped and maintained, the same
manager refers to the motivation of creating a new partnership linking it with market
competition:
This is a very wide network ofpartnerships which sometimes is determined by
opportunistic or competitive issues. Some of them are more long term while others
are ad hoc. (MFS, manager, interview 26/10/2004)
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Additionally, the wide range in prices of technological components of solutions
also seems to determine the formulation of new partnerships. As managers of SIF
claim, if a customer wants a cheap solution, then they will try to achieve this low
price by forming a partnership with a supplier who offers cheaper technologies. The
role of SIF as a system integrator makes it necessary to maintain a network of
partnerships and suppliers of products, which will comprise the solutions they
develop. As an R&D manager in SIF explains:
More traditionally, we have partnerships with firms that offer some product. This has
to do with thefact that I'm a system integrator and I choose components. (MRD,
R&D manager, interview 16/11/2004)
6.3.2 Partners - Competitors
Apart from the international contacts, a system integrator forms partnerships
with other system integrators, or consultants or subcontracting firms on a more ad-
hoc basis at a national and international markets level. That is, they form horizontal
partnerships with other IT firms or specialist firms within the same market settings.
Depending on the case, these partnerships might take the form of "subcontracting" or
"consortium". SBA explains how these two work:
You hire subcontractors when your percentage ofwork within the project is large
enough. When your responsibilities cover just a 10% ofthe whole project you do not
hire subcontractors because you take the responsibility and the risk ifsomething
goes wrong. In consortia things are different. There is a legal framework covering
the whole relationship. They make papers, they go to the lawyer, they go to the tax
office, they get a tax register number, etc. It's the same as if they create a new
company but onlyfor a short period of time. When the project is over, the new
company is dissolved. This legal contract is very carefully composed in order to be
safe andfairfor both sides. Everything is counted and estimated in every detail.
(SBA, sales manager, interview 22/10/2004)
These collaborations happen because SIF might not have the necessary resources;
that is, access to technologies and the expertise to provide a complete solution due to
the scope of the project. They, therefore, turn to ATOC network and mobilize the
resources that are distributed there by forming relationships with other actors and an
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extended division of labour is created. A manager from the financial services
business unit of SIF explains:
Collaborations happen when 'the pie' is very big and it cannot be handled by a
single organization. For example, the Police-on-lineproject which costs 40 million
Euros, in order to have been done by SIF, we would have to become 3 times our size
for one year in order to gain the capacity to complete such a project. This cannot
happen. But it happens indirectly through theformulation ofsynergies. So, 'the pie'
is divided and each firm ofthe synergy does what they do best. This is how it works
all over the world, notjust in Greece. (MFS, manager, interview 26/10/2004)
In cases where the project is too large a problem arises between the various firms
because the same firms appear to be both partners and competitors simultaneously.
As MFS explains:
These [partnerships] might be with firms that are your competitors within the same
market. For example, SIF and another system integrator at the present moment are
partners in two projects, they are competitors in five projects and there arefive more
prospective projects and we 're trying to see whether we '11 be partners or
competitors. This happens in huge projects mainly in the public sector that need this
kind ofsynergies. This schizophrenic effect is in the nature of the market. Notjust in
the market oftechnological solutions, but the whole market. (MFS, manager,
interview 26/10/2004)
The legal framework behind this kind of relationships seems to provide a safety net
and a justification of this paradox. When I asked this manager to explain why they do
not have problems with the management of such relationships, he responded:
You go on to a consortium with somefirms, you sign contracts etc. you have a legal
coverage and it doesn 't matter ifyou are competing with these firms in five other
projects. (MFS, manager, interview 26/10/2004)
Further interviews with SIF's top management show that SIF is projecting an
open profile in relation to its competitors and their technologies. They do not restrict
themselves in staying "faithful" to using only the products of their partners. Various
managers of the firm claim that they are open and able to combine various
technologies and establish a variety of connections with other firms even if they are
their competitors, in order to offer a good solution to their customers. The ultimate
example of this contradictory company behaviour is that SIF has embodied in their
organizational structure know-how related to IBM technological products. They have
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a unit with technologists with training and experience in IBM products, although
IBM is their main competitor in Greece.
6.3.3 Network of Customers
In parallel with the management of the international supply and partnership
contacts, SIF also develops strategies and activities in regard to their network of
customers. The historical development of SIF and its changing role in the economy is
associated with their relationships with their customers. As mentioned earlier, SIF
started out by offering IT products and services to state organizations and the army.
As they entered other areas of activity, such as the financial services industry and as
their role as system integrator became more active there was a tendency of SIF to get
closer and become more attached to fewer but larger customers in the local market.
This is attributed to historical circumstances but also to a conscious choice of SIF's
management. The reasons they present at the 2004 annual report for their attachment
to fewer but larger customers are the following:
• SIF is one of the few IT firms that had access to technological
solutions that could serve the needs of large customers such as
enterprise servers.
• The small number of large firms in Greece along with the delayed
diffusion of computerization in Greece compared with the rest of
Western Europe and North America.
• The value from H/W and S/W along with the accompanying
services of system integration and support of solutions offers more
profit prospects than of selling PCs on a mass scale.
• Long-term relationships with large customers offer profit, bigger
than the one from the initial sale, coming from updates necessary
due to technological development, the assignment of
complementary projects, maintenance services of H/W and S/W.
• The incremental development of IS of business organizations with
small and individual updates does not pose the need for mass
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replacement which would make the customer consider an
alternative system integrator. Also, the applications S/W
increasingly acquires more value with constant updates instead of
being devalued.
(SIF Annual Report, 2004)
Additionally, long term relationships between the supplier, the system integrator and
the user organization are seen as necessary because of the technological relationship
between system S/W and applications S/W:
• The operational environment of systems S/W is proprietary which
means that the applications S/W would have to come from the same
supplier (SIF Annual Report, 2004).
It is on the interface between system software and end user applications where SIF
developed a long-term bond with their largest customer, The Bank. An ex-managing
director of SIF also refers to the closeness to the customers and how they build long-
term relationships with them:
[...] with customers where you do or have done a core part of their computerization,
then you have a different kind ofrelationship, more close because you can also see
the perception of things under different criteria. As time goes by we have new needs,
new projects that develop and the relationship becomes closer. (XMD, ex-managing
director, interview 15/12/2004)
Finally, if SIF would easily change their main suppliers to attract new customers, this
would cause great risk in terms of their know-how base:
• On behalf of the customer, the change of supplier of IT services
would result in the devaluation of a great investment in know-how.
Also, they would need new time consuming training programs to
regain this know-how (SIF Annual Report, 2004).
This, however, is happening on a smaller scale where new supplier partnerships are
signed as SIF evolves and its customer network is modified.
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Interviewees associate the transformation of the role and identity of SIF
throughout the years with the relationship with their customers. Proximity and long
term relationships with their customers is, therefore, seen as something necessary
since it makes SIF better understand user requirements and thus offer better
solutions. A director of the information services division explains:
This transformation [of the role of thefirm] came mainly because we were always
close to our customers and we would record the new needs and requirements as they
were evolving. IT is not a goal in itself We sell products and solutions in orderfor
the customer to do theirjob. That's the mission statement ofan ITfirm. In order to
make the right tools to do thejob, I would have to learn how they work as well. This
came from a close relationship and commitment with our customers and we 've
reached a point were our concerns would be shared with our customers. We would
attempt new technological things. We might not have had the know how to do it but
we knew how to get it with the consensus ofour customers. We could have stayed
restricted to our traditional roles ofmaintenance ofITproducts but eventually we
would be extinct. We chose not to do this. All ITfirms work like that. They don't
wake up one morning saying, 'we '11 build this super-duper gadget'. They get
stimulated by the community of their customers. Then, some ofthese technologies get
diffused to the rest ofthe market as products which might be sold to a third orfourth
customer. (DIS, IS director, interview 18/11/2004)
Although some interviewees saw this proximity and dependence on few large
customers as a successful or necessary strategic adjustment to the evolving market
conditions, others saw it as a sign of 'underdeveloped marketing' on behalf of SIF.
Although the attachment and dependence on few large customers might have given
lots of profit to SIF, there is great risk involved in such relationships. An academic
consultant to SIF explains:
There is the sense that there is no needfor sophisticated marketing. Management
rationality shows that there is a needfor such a thing but there are so many things
happening with big clients [...] there is a postponement [...] When the balance sheet
shows good numbers, there is not the sense that they 're in a hurry to fix a few things.
But there is a danger to find themselves in a very difficult position. (EAC, academic,
interview 7/10/2004)
Most interviewees, who spoke about having to reduce their degree of dependence
from certain large customers, backed up this view. An attempt towards this direction
was made in 1999 when SIF entered the stock market and reorganized their business
units for better marketing and knowledge management. SIF is aware that their
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dependence on few large customers might cause dangers, on the other hand, this
was perceived as a necessary condition due to historical and socio-economic
circumstances. The risk, however, from the dependence on their customers has made
SIF develop strengths in other aspects, mainly during the initiation and procurement
of T-0 change instances, in order to feel more secure. An academic consultant
explains:
[...] these fears that we talked about have created a very strong sales and pre- sales
department where the approaching attempts to the market take place. For instance,
one thing that SIF did not do in the past and does now is that they participate in
public competitions. Those competitions don't have a very goodfinancial profile, but
it's a wayfor the firm to declare its presence. They give a small profit, but they
create significant presents. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
The relationship with their customer network has a similar nature with their
network of suppliers and partnerships. That is, some of the customers are more
permanent while others are more occasional. The business units of SIF are
responsible for various groups of customers and they maintain relationships with
them. From the financial services industry, therefore, they support mostly banks; in
telecoms they have customers such as OTE, TIM, Vodafone, Forthnet, Vivodi, etc.
From the public sector they have done projects in various ministries, elections 1981 -
2004, Hellenic Post. From the private sector they also have various customers (See
SIF Annual Report, 2004).
6.3.4 Other Actors
Although suppliers, partners, competitors and customers are the most direct
contacts of SIF as part of the ATOC network, there are other actors involved that
might have a significant influence over the initiation, design and implementation of
T-O change instances. Actors that affect the operation of SIF either directly or
through their customers' environment include: the Greek state, EU regulations, SEPE
(Federation of Hellenic Information Technology and Communications Enterprises),
EPY (Hellenic Society of Computer Scientists), universities and research centres,
generating regulations, standards, institutions and research. The Greek state, for
instance, regulates the taxation of IT products as well as the taxation environment of
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SIF's customer groups. It also administers various programs and initiatives in
regard to the development of computerisation in Greece, like the Information Society
initiative (http://en.infosoc.gr/) launched by the Greek ministry of the Economy and
Finance. SIF is involved in this and they participate in various projects through
requests for proposals.
In relation to customers' environment, EU and Bank of Greece (BoG)
directives affect the shaping of T-O solutions. SIF is informed about these directives
either through professional associations such as SEPE and EPY or directly from the
BoG. These might include community banking legislations such as the Basel II
directive for risk management. Additionally, as suggested by interviewees,
professional associations (SEPE and EPY), apart from the promotion of professional
interests, also provide a moral and ethical framework and operating standards for IT
firms. Finally, SIF is involved in various partnerships where they participate in R&D
programs with Universities and research centres.
The R&D department of SIF develops relationships with most of external
actors, attempting to implement the results of these contacts into possible solutions
for their customers. Regarding the role of the R&D department and its relation to the
developments in banking regulations an R&D manager explains:
First ofall, we read andfind out what these regulations are. Directives from the
BoG, etc. Research to find these info, study them andfor each rule that's in the
directive we try to find out how each one ofthem might affect the banking systems
[...] For instance, rule number sixteen ofthe directive ofthe BoG "touches" fifteen
application ofThe Bank. Igo to the bank and say: in orderfor you to conform to rule
sixteen you need to do these things. There is a study in the current systems to see
what needs to be changedfor the systems to be according to the directive. Then, the
bank can do these changes themselves or the ISD could do them. The R&D part is
this study Ijust described. This part is something new, the directive is new, and it
didn't exist before. As an R&D department that's the service I offer, the study. In the
first bank we '11 participate with the implementers in the implementation ofthe
changes but in the second bank, the implementers will go by themselves. (MRD,
R&D manager, interview 16/11/2004)
Apart from the new regulations and standards that are embodied in new solutions, the
R&D department is also involved in contacts with the external environment. The
same interviewee explains:
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As an R&D department, we get involved when something new is emerging. Even
ifthat is a new customer where you need a different approach when you try to get the
firstjob. All this is the pre-sales support. Therefore, we do presales supportfor new
customers, new regulations, new business models, new technologies [...] Apartfrom
new customers we also do new areas ofactivity. For instance, SIF had never done
anything relevant to culture, like the museums project [...] the goal isfor the R&D
department to do the first moves and then the other units ofthe firm to take over.
Most ofthe time though, the other departments are lazy and don't want to learnfrom
us. (MRD. R&D manager, interview 16/11/2004)
The R&D department of SIF, therefore, has a role that can be separated in three
axons, as MRD says:
Research and marketing supportfor solutions that haven't happened before; thefirst
implementation ofnew solutions, or in new customers; and the pure R&D activities
with more indirect results, what will happen in two-three years. (MRD, R&D
manager, interview 16/11/2004)
After mapping the external environment of SIF and the nature of their relationships,
it is time to explore how this ATOC network is mobilised during the initiation,
design and implementation of T-0 change instances. Challenges for SIF will be
revealed during these processes, what kind of decisions and choices are made and in
what way and how the internal organisational structures of SIF interact with the
external environment.
6.4 INITIATING, DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING
SOLUTIONS
According to Computer Desktop Encyclopedia, in regard to technology
markets, solution, "is a new IT marketing buzzword of the 21st century. Nobody
makes products or provides services anymore; everybody just offers solutions!"
(www.answers.com). Interviewees supported this view. An IT solution for business
organizations as described by a technical manager of SIF:
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[...] consists ofhardware, applications software and services. In such solutions
all of its components might come from various suppliers. Usually, it is supplier/s plus











Figure 6.4: Cheque processing solution
Source: Drawn by MFS, manager, during interview on 26/10/2004
An IT solution, as shown in the above figure, is a configuration of various elements,
products and services, that possibly have different origins within SIF's wide network
of suppliers and partners. If SIF's network within ATOC was different, that is, if it
consisted of different suppliers, the same solution would be different, in terms of its
components and the expertise used. The figure above was drawn by MFS as an
example of a cheque processing solution. The hardware of the solution might consist
of scanners, workstations, central storage, server(s) - the systemic part - offered by
several of SIF's suppliers. The software of the solution might consist of image
management, intelligence recognition software, tailor made software - the
operational applications part - also offered by various suppliers and the services of
project management, implementation and maintenance support offered by SIF alone
or with various subcontractors and partners. As confirmed by MFS, the services
provided are related to the technological products comprising the solution. This
means that the integrator needs knowledge of the products, hardware and software in
order to know how to integrate them and how to repair them if they break down.
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MFS describes the process of development of solutions which shows the
role of a systems integrator as follows:
For an integrator it is impossible to know all the products in the market. So, we offer
a packaged solution to the customer where its various components might come from
various suppliers. We offer services too along with the services of the other supplier
and this is how a solution is composed. In a solution, for instance, we got some
trainingfrom an Israelifirm and an application specialistfor a month. In other
cases, we provide all the services [...] We have a web ofsuppliers that offerjust
hardware, applications or complete solutions with services, we might offerjust
consultancy solutions; for example, we might ask MSIF to send us a guru in X topic
and they send us some guy. (MFS, manager, interview, 26/10/2004)
The assemblage and integration of various technological products and services,
however, is not enough to constitute a solution. Firms like SIF are enterprises which
aim to sell the solutions they develop and profit from this activity. For them,
something qualifies as a solution - that is the product of their activities - when it is
associated with a business or organizational problem of an existing or prospective
customer. In discussing the new trends in business and technologies, a product
manager from the pre-sales department argues:
[...] the business trends go first and the technological trendsfollow to support the
business. Therefore, you see the business needs and you try to satisfy them. In the
financial unit, for instance, the sales department ofourfirm ofcourse have a
business knowledge regarding the needs ofa bank. They follow the trends. They
know that banks have the tendency in 2008 to do this. What does it mean
technologically? What kinds ofsolutions are therefor this? We'll be prepared in
2008 to face this challenge, for example, Basel II. Ifa firm does not see the
introduction ofBasel II as a business opportunity, then this firm lost a chance. (PSD,
pre-sales manager, interview 26/11/2004)
This shows how SIF's managers perceive the market and how they search for
opportunities to develop and sell new solutions. A solution, therefore, consists of
H/W, S/W and services but only in static terms. From the point of view of SIF this
configuration is a commodity that has to be sold to a customer, and it is initiated,
designed and implemented within the framework of SIF's commercial activities. To
understand, therefore, technologies as solutions and SIF as a commercial supplier of
such solutions is important to help us realize how the nature and viewpoints of actors
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are linked with the development and promotion of choices on the initiation,
design and implementation of T-0 change instances.
6.4.1 Initiating and Composing Solutions: Developing
Proposals
Looking at SIF's organizational structure and its productive departments the
Information Services Division (ISD) is responsible for the development of solutions
and the Customer Services Division (CSD) is responsible for the maintenance and
the support of the various technological products included in a solution. In other
words, the ISD develops the solutions and the CSD provides services to the ISD, not
on the complete solution but on the products/elements comprising it. That is: CSD
signs the maintenance contracts with the customers and if something goes wrong in
the use of a solution, the customer is contacting the CSD for repairs and maintenance
support. These, however, are the "after-sales" activities of SIF. The division of
marketing and pre-sales is responsible for "finding a solution for covering
customer's needs in the right price" (PSD, pre-sales manager, interview 26/11/2004);
in other words, they are responsible, together with the R&D department, for
developing proposals to respond to the markets needs. This is where a solution and a
T-0 change instance are initiated. They make the first moves and then the rest of the
units take over.
For the initiation of a solution there must be a 'stimulus'. There must be a
customer request for proposals (RFP), either instigated by the customer or by SIF's
pre-sales department through induction of customer interest. A top manager from
ISD confirms:
There are two ways: Either the customer comes to us askingfor a solution or we go
to one ofour customers and offer a solution which we believe will be of their
advantage. (YDIS, assistant director, interview 15/11/2004)
PSD is specifying that the first way occurs mostly in the public sector unit with
request for proposals. The second is most common to the rest of the business units
where SIF develops close relationships with their corporate customers and through
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maintenance and consulting services promote solutions to them as a result of the
deep contingent knowledge they acquire through constant and long term contact with
user environments. In any case, there is a process of co-construction of the request by
the pre-sales and sales departments and the customer. PSD describes how the request
is constructed and how the proposal is developed:
Thefirst thing is the request. The requestfrom the customer does not come out of the
blue. It might come like that but it's dangerous for us because we don't have a sense
about what this project is all about. Someone else might have. In orderfor a request
to have a value, it has to have been worked on before hand. This is the responsibility
of the sales and the pre-sales department. This means that you need to have a contact
with the customer, to know their needs, to talk with them both at a business and
technical levels, and then you reach to a point where there is a fact which leads to a
request. You have to convince the customer that they will have problems in the future
in some aspects. Therefore, after meetings and presentations etc. a request is
constructed: T have this business problem and I want to solve it'. This means that I
need software to do certain things, I need supportfor this software, I need
implementation services, I need technical supportfor the guarantee, etc. Therefore,
we have to go to the customer with our proposal and offer something complete. This
means that you give them, hardware, services, support, everything, for this solution
to work. After the request, the sales person has the responsibility of the account, that
is, to promote the proposal with the right prices etc and try to win it and we (pre-
sales) have the responsibility to come up with a technical proposal which makes
sense technically, to be attractive, and offer it to the customer. Also, someone has to
have the bid management. Therefore, you determine a person who studies the
proposal, takes the various components, binds them together, makes them attractive
and present them to the customer. This person needs to have both business and
technical knowledge. Ifthe bid manager lacks some pieces ofknowledge he contacts
peoplefrom thefirm and tries to find these pieces. That is, the product people of the
firm: the man who deals with servers, the man who deals with networks etc. The key
person here would be the man who has the sense of the architecture ofthe solution.
After you develop the architecture ofthe solution then you talk with the various
people that have the servers, the networks and so on and start structuring the
solution. Therefore, we develop the proposalfor an Xsolution and we will be
partners with the X, Y, Zfirms [...] the bet is to be able to illustrate the business need
ofan organization in technological terms. (PSD, pre-sales manager, interview
26/11/2004)
Since various parts of a solution, products or services, originate from various
suppliers and partners or subcontractors of SIF, the process of selecting components
for a solution coincides with the process of selecting partners and suppliers for a
particular project. There seems to be a series of criteria that determine these
processes, all of them having to do with the negotiation between SIF, the customer
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and the partners. The following highlights negotiations between SIF, its external
suppliers, partners and the customer. PSD explains the politics in selecting partners:
[...] there are political reasons that determine yourpartners. For instance, in a
particularproject I will have to be partners with IBM. Why? Because our bosses got
together, they agreed and they said that we need to be partners for this project. From
then on, the technical people responsible will develop a proposal and based on the
policy ofeachfirm they will say: no HP, yes IBM, or we '11 put MSIF no matter what.
And this way, all this mosaic is built. Responsibilities and tasks are allocated to
various people, etc. (PSD, pre-sales manager, interview 26/11/2004)
The same interviewee highlights the political processes involved during this process
contrasting the public with the private sector:
The government has consultants and more consultants for the consultants. I'm not
saying that they give money under the table to promote certain firms, but there are
personal relationships among people and, why not, some people that have access to
the government and know these consultants might convince them to pressurefor the
promotion ofcertain solutions ofcertain firms. This makes sense. Anyfirm would do
it. In the private sector this is easier where there are no rules. You just call someone
ask him to meet and talk and then you come up with a request. There is a 'give and
take' of the ITfirms with the people that develop requests. There is a constant
relationship. There are also academics involved in committees thatform
specifications. I'm not talking about a financial 'give and take', rather a
technological one between the market and the people that develop specifications.
You can't make specifications by sitting in your office and read the prospectus.
You '11 have to talk to some people around. That's what I mean that requests have to
be worked on before hand. So, when the request will come, you won't be scratching
your head. (PSD, pre-sales manager, interview 26/11/2004)
Another interviewee, top manager at the ISD stresses the power of the customer
choice in structuring a solution and what happens when customers are not so
persistent:
Mainly, it is what the customer wants. For instance, OTE wants Oracle. Ifyou don't
go to them with Oracle in your proposal you have no chance. On the other hand, The
Bank, don't use Oracle exceptfrom some minor applications where it could not be
done differently. When there is no such requirement from the customer, or the
customer is flexible, we prefer to propose technologies that comefrom our partners
and suppliers because we know these technologies very well, we've worked with
them in the pastfor several times and we can offer a solution in a lower cost since
there is no needfor subcontracting know-how or extra training. (YDIS, assistant
director, interview 15/11/2004)
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Another interviewee, IT project manager in one of SIF's customers, The Bank,
also echoes this view:
[...] you look at the various options which are becoming limited. For instance, the
bank strategically decided that they would never use an RDBMS [Relational Data
Base Management System] which is not Microsoft. This is a strategic decision. There
are others in the market. Oracle might offer a better one, butfor some reason The
Bank strategically wants Microsoft. Therefore, for us this is a determiningfactor. We
have no choice. Things like that narrow down our options in the selection ofthe
components ofa solution. (TMA, senior IT consultant, interview 10/11/2004)
The same interviewee talks about the technical and financial evaluation of the
proposal:
[...] there is also a technical andfinancial evaluation. We can technically evaluate
and say: This is technically the best, as it happened with check scanners. But the
financial evaluation was not compatible. Therefore, we re-evaluated the condition,
we moved on to something less technically good in order to meet the financial
capabilities ofthe customer. Therefore, the choices for the solutions are examined
both technically in thefirst phase andfinancially. This process might happen during
the pre-sales phase where we do this kind ofevaluation. You can't go to the customer
with ten different options. You go with one or two. (TMA, senior IT consultant,
interview 10/11/2004)
He also refers to the relationship and agreements with suppliers as a determining
factor in composing a solution:
We have an opinion on the products and we give it to the customer. We also have
strategic agreements with suppliers. So, all these things play a role in determining
the components ofa solution. For example, you cannot go into a competition with a
productfrom a firm when thatfirm is also competing because they will be cheaper
for sure. Therefore, you '11 choose something elsefor your proposed solution. Or you
can approach thatfirm and do a strategic agreement and say, 'I'll promote your
product'. Things like that happen when composing a solution. (TMA, senior IT
consultant, interview 10/11/2004)
Despite the mobilization of a large network of contacts while developing a proposed
solution, however, interviewees accept that there is no such thing as 'an ideal
solution' in the market for a particular problem. The reasons for that seem to be
emerging from the diversity in the mobilization of this network. As TMA explains:
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There was one case where we needed a component, we didn't have it and our
competitor had it, who was competing with us for the same project. In that case we
went on without that component and in such cases the result whether you get thejob,
depends on the total evaluation of the solution. The competitor might have an
advantage in regard to the particular part, but you might have another advantage in
regard to other things, like cost, or have another component that the competitor
doesn't have. Another reason is that a component might be expensive and the
customer doesn't want to payfor it. Therefore, he was willing to sacrifice the better
qualityfor a less costly solution. Therefore, the ideal solution does not always
happen for a number of reasons. (TMA, senior IT consultant, interview 10/11/2004)
While initiating and designing a solution, within SIF's organizational
boundaries, the pre-sales department is in close cooperation with the ISD
department. As PSD explains:
Pre-sales cooperates with ISD for the proposal ofa solution and the result is
incumbent because SIF is responsible to the customer in regard to the cost of the
solution. The roles ofpre-sales and ISD are not the same in every firm. In some
firms, the pre-sales and ISD are different teams while in otherfirms the same team
develops the proposal and implements the solution. (PSD, pre-sales manager,
interview 26/11/2004)
A manager from the ISD also refers to the relation between the two different
organizational units and how they cooperate:
We, as ISD, participate in pre-sales activities when we 're needed to give advice on
technical stuff[...] In the pre-sales phase they look what solutions or components of
solutions we have access to through our partners or the ones that we've developed
ourselves. Sometimes, however, the pre-sales people don't have the know-how to
build the solutions and they ask us for advice. Pre-sales and marketing department
know some things already or through the subcontractors they cooperate with. Butfor
some technical things and specialized things they '11 ask us for helpfor building the
solution. Also, from us they'll take a timetable with the things that need to be done
and when to be done. That is, time estimation and the necessary resources such as
personnelfor implementation, hardware and so on. (MISD, manager, interview
16/11/2004)
In other words, the role of the pre-sales and sales people is to formulate and negotiate
the request with the customer and develop a detailed proposal which will include a
technical architecture of what needs to be done, a timetable and an estimated cost. It
is important to emphasize that during the building of the proposal there is an
estimation of the cost and the time needed for implementation and not an exact
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calculation. If the proposal gets accepted and the project is taken, then the
development of the solution starts from the ISD and the various business units.
The phase of approaching customers and developing proposals for solutions
represents the phase of initiation of an instance and some initial design of that
instance which is embodied in the proposals. Based on their viewpoint and access to
ATOC channels, SIF makes choices on the development and design of solutions to
be sold as commercial products. In order for such solutions to be developed choices
need to be made on which elements and which actors to include, which not to
include, based on various criteria. Such criteria that give rise to choices, as it will be
shown in chapter seven, emerge from technological and business negotiations
amongst networks of actors (suppliers, users, consultants, competitors), governed by
politics and market dynamics. Such choices are made in order for proposed solutions
which represent particular ATOC configurations to find their way towards local
particular T-0 change instances. In the next section I discuss the process of making
more particular design choices.
6.4.2 From Operational Requirements to System
Specifications
During the pre-sales phase and the process of constructing a request, the
customer, sometimes with the help of business consultants, develops operational
requirements for the solution. These reflect what needs to be done in terms of
business processes in the organization. MISD explains:
Usually the customer gives operational requirements specifications. When the
customer gives the CFP they have to know what their operational requirements are,
or this can happen by the consultants. This means that the customer must know very
well what their processes are and to be very specific. If they are organized, they
might give them in a written form. (MISD, manager, interview 16/11/2004)
During the development of the proposal, the operational requirements are stated but
later on there is further analysis of these requirements and their "translation" into
system and software requirements. MISD continues:
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During the pre-sales phase the operational requirements are usually known at a
high but general level and based on them they build the proposal. Later on, when the
implementation begins, during the requirements specification phase, there is a
detailed analysis of the operational specifications and their translation into system
specifications. In some rare occasions the detailed operational requirements are
known during the pre-sales phase. In this case, there is no needfor the phase of
requirements specification to take place and there is their immediate translation into
system specifications during the pre-sales phase. Thus, we have an exact calculation
ofcost and implementation time. (MISD, manager, interview 16/11/2004)
Furthermore, the same interviewee reflects on the relationship between operational
requirements and system software requirements:
Therefore, we have the operational specs, which refer to the processes, and on the
other hand there are the system specs which refer to the system which is about to be
built. From the operational requirement specification emerge the software
requirement specifications. The customer might give you specs on the layout ofthe
screen, ofthe prints, etc. as well. This is where the big deal is. You startfrom the
entrepreneurial processual specs and these have to be translated into system specs.
(MISD, manager, interview 16/11/2004)
The process of analytical recording of operational requirements and their translation
into system requirements is a painstaking process and, therefore, a methodical
structured way to record the operational specs is believed to be necessary and
important in order for the translation to take place. MISD describes this process:
What we do is this: First ofall, we divide the project in major operational areas.
Usually, we put an analyst in each ofthe operational areas. This analyst understands
what the customer is saying and records it. The different analysts know the system
very well and they cooperate with each other. Ifan analyst changes something in his
operational area they have to notify the analysts ofother interconnected operational
areas to do changes as well. Therefore, they produce a volume ofoperational specs
which is reviewed by all analysts, they comment on it, etc. (MISD, manager,
interview 16/11/2004)
Regarding the background and specialty profile of these analysts and how they use it,
the same interviewee explains:
We have business analysts and technical analysts. There are people that are more
business and less technical. There are people that understand both. The basic thing
is that you need to have both. If there is a business person he has to talk with
technical persons as well and to be able to communicate with them. Because what we
do is to translate the business requirements into technical requirements. What do I
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need to do on the system, what do I have to do in the code, to the data base, etc.
Therefore, the analysts listen to the customer and they translate it into what needs to
be done on the system. In some areas we had a technical analyst who also
understands the business processes, but we also might have had our own business
analyst who was cooperating with the technical. For example, there are areas which
are very processual. The approval ofthe loans for instance, is a very processual
operational area. Therefore, we '11 put a business person there, not a technical. To
understand well the processes is what it's important in this case... That's why it is
important to determine the operational areas and place the right analysts in the right
places. (MISD, manager, interview 16/11/2004)
The processes of developing a proposal and analytical requirements specification are
not always separate from each other. The boundaries between them and the role of
the specialists working in each one of them are blurred. The pre-sales people work
together with ISD people in developing the proposal. During this phase, therefore,
the ISD people and the analysts involved in the operational requirement specification
and translation into system requirements are also involved in proposal development
and have a say in the estimation and calculation of cost and of timetable since they
know what needs to be done and what kind of resources will be used. Nevertheless,
this is a process of more particular design choices which emerge from the
management of knowledge and expertise within an instance.
6.4.3 System and Applications Implementation
After the operational requirements have been agreed upon between the
customer and SIF, their translation into system requirements start, again in
negotiation with the customer, and the system starts being built. This is the system
implementation process and also an application implementation process starts. PSD
explains:
Implementation services include: installation ofinfrastructure, that is, computer
room, cables, networks, servers, PC, tuning ofthe operational systems, web servers,
proxy servers, etc. This is the system implementation which is a hugejob. There is
also a developmentjob that needs to startfor the applications of the solution.
Afterwards, we have the support services. These are the support that each firm
provides to the customer. Something breaks down and we need to fix it, telephone
support, advice, and so on. Therefore, the costs are: Initial implementation of
infrastructure, the implementation of the application, whatever that means, and the
annual maintenance costs. (PSD, pre-sales manager, interview 26/11/2004)
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Another interviewee from after-sales explains the process as well:
We do implementation and support. Onefirst phase is to build the facilities, the
infrastructure. The computer room, phone lines, cables etc. We usually do these with
subcontractors. Another phase is to install the H/W and the system software and
after that Igive it to the programmers. But the project is not completed yet. It might
finish after a year because most of the time is spentfor the development of
applications. All this time we do support on the project, that is, our own people. After
the delivery of the project and depending on what the contract says, we support the
customer. Some teams support the system some other teams support the applications.
(ASS, manager, interview 29/11/2004)
Usually, during implementation the implementers have a technical report
with the things that need to be done. A project manager in The Bank confirms this:
After the process ofdesigning a solution, there is the implementation. In
implementation there is a technical report ofthe things to be implemented, what is
about to be done, and then you start doing them. The deliverable ofthe
implementation is thefinal application that you '11 give the customer. (TMA, senior
IT consultant, interview 10/11/2004)
The passage point from design to implementation, however, is not always clear and
the translation of operational requirements into system requirements can be done
simultaneously with system and application implementation. An ISD manager
explains:
Then we start doing the specs of the system,
cannot do them in paper we do a prototype,
the customer, and ifthey agree we carry on.
Either we put them in paper or ifwe
We start doing something, we show it to
(MISD, manager, interview 16/11/2004)
Additionally, the specifications might change halfway during implementation which
causes delays and confusion. A project manager to The Bank explains:
One basic thing is that the requirements of the solution might change halfway. From
the time you get the specs till the time you complete the solution several months
might pass. So, the specs might change meanwhile. You might start with three
options but after a couple ofmonths these options might befour. So, you might have
to go back in the design phase and redo the evaluation taking into account the
additionalfactors. These changes might both refer to technological and business
aspects. For example, the introduction ofEuro. You might start a bigproject
thinking that it would be finished by a certain time and all ofa sudden things might
change and wefind out that we '11 enter the EMU. Or the Olympic games for
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instance. These factors might come from externalfactors that even our customer
has no control of The bank ofGreecefor instance might send out a new directive.
Therefore, some externalfactors might change your initial specs and depending on
the phase you 're in you might have to go a bit back in the process. Or you might
have technical stuff to deal with. For instance, a supplier might tell you that their
product works in a certain way but you find out that it doesn 't. For example, the
supplier might tellyou that their printer prints Greek characters but you find out that
it doesn't. So, you '11 have to go back and talk to the supplier and see where the
problem is. (TMA, senior IT consultant, interview 10/11/2004)
Another reason related to requirements specification and causes problems during
implementation is communication difficulties during negotiation of operational
requirements. An applications programmer reports:
One major problem during all this process is that ofcommunication and difficulty to
negotiate the requirements ofan application. Sometimes the customer doesn't know
what exactly wants and we have to guess. Then, sometimes they say one thing but
they mean something else. Or they forget to say some things and they finally say
them after the deliverable. (APA, senior IT consultant, interview 12/11/2004)
Another manager from the Financial Services business unit of SIF also refers to these
communication problems among the stakeholders of a project and links them to the
lack of a clear way for notating the operational requirements.
Following the implementation of the solution there is a process of thorough
testing of the solution. TMA explains the process:
The solution is getting tested technicallyfirst, to see if there are any technical
problems and then the business people come in and test. In this case the peoplefrom
the organization management will come and do the test. These are the people that
gave the requirements in thefirst place. Ifwe look at check processing as an
example, the business people look at the whole process. They are not at all interested
in the technical details behind the solution. They are interestedfor the job to be done
as they want it. Therefore, they might force you to employ complicated techniques in
order to make the work of thefinal user easier. This is the user acceptance test and
refers ONLY to thefinal user. Meanwhile there are also other things that are
checked. For example, can the network support this application? There are also risk
tests: will the money disappear magically? (TMA, senior IT consultant, interview
10/11/2004)
After the deliverance of the solution and the completion of the project and according
to the contracts signed SIF keeps a maintenance relationship with their customers
during which they might, as discussed earlier, approach the same customer to
negotiate the construction of further requests for proposals.
189
6.4.4 Projects
The implementation of such solutions takes place in project-based efforts. It
seems, however, that there is a great variety in the size of such projects. MFS gave a
categorization of projects that they participate according to the size, the time and the
resources needed for each project:
PROJECTS
Elapse time man/months persons
Small: 2 weeks 2-3 m/weeks 1-1.5 persons
Medium: 1-12 months 2-12 m/months 2-3 persons
Large: 1 -2 vears 20-120 m/months 10-15 persons
Figure 6.5: Various projects and times and resources neededfor them
Source: Drawn by MFS, manager, during interview on 26/10/2004
The number of people mentioned above for each project category includes only the
people from SIF. The project might include more people from SIF's partners or from
the customer.
As MFS clarifies:
The SIF — customer ratio of involvement in a project may vary. It may be 10:1 or
1:1. For instance, in a project SIF might be asked to offer a person or two for a
certain period of time; for instance, two programmers for six months. (MFS,
manager, interview 26/10/2004)
Also, in terms of how the project is carried out based on various project management
methodologies, MFS refers to difficulties in coordination of large projects:
There are working teams consisting ofpeoplefrom both supplier and customer. The
project management and steering committee meet every fifteen days and discuss the
issues that the various project managers raise. There is the general director ofthe
supplier and two general directors from the customer. These meetings never happen
as planned. For instance there were supposed to be monthly meetings in a project
but thefirst became in January 2004, the second in July, the third is about to happen
in November. This is due to the difficulty to gather such high executives in the same
room a specific date. They are all busy. This happens in the large projects. (MFS,
manager, interview 26/10/2004)
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In the next section the relationship between SIF and one of their largest and
oldest customer, The Bank, is presented. Empirical data show a special relationship
that will bring about issues regarding the initiation, design and implementation of T-
O change solutions and instances.
6.5 SIF AND THE BANK
In the section about SIF's network of customers I discussed its attachment to
a small number of large customers for a number of reasons. Some views emphasized
the necessity of being closely attached to customers for the development of good
solutions, others spoke of SIF's underdeveloped marketing and its anxiety to reduce
the degree of dependence from such customers and finally others have explained this
attachment as an adjustment to the evolution of the market conditions. The major
large customer that SIF associated its fate with is The Bank. A managing director of
SIF, opposes the underdeveloped marketing view and supports the latter explanation
in regard to the relationship between SIF and The Bank while he also explains the
difficulties of constantly approaching new customers:
It wasn't a result ofunderdeveloped marketing, it was a result of the conditions in
the market. That is, the monopoly ofthe public sector by Intracom, the political
conditions and interests, etc. Most ofthe banks in Greece had IBM mainframes and
in orderfor us to survive in the banking sector we had to find ways to expand our
profits. In a sense then, at that time we devoted ourselves to The Bank which was
giving us large projects and prospects forprofit [...] Additionally, with new smaller
customers we have to know them from scratch and we spend much time till we reach
a point to become effective. This reduces our profit. Therefore, The Bank combines
big customer with large and many projects plus lots ofroom for profit in
combination with the know-how on the customer acquired over the years, where
things have a continuity, there is lots of tacit knowledge and we don't waste any
time. Therefore, this wasn't necessarily a bad move. The Bank is a good, innovative
bank and the close relationship with them gave us the chance to create a strong
financial base in order to be able to invest in other areas as well. (DIS, IS director,
interview 18/11/2004)
As discussed in the section of the historical development of SIF, The Bank has
played an important role to the entrance and development of SIF within the area of
Banking and Financial Services industry. On the other hand, SIF has contributed
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greatly in the development of The Bank's information systems. Interview data
and written documents of major projects on The Bank reveal a history of the two
firms as it evolved in various major periods lasting over thirty years. Let us see how
their overlapping and co-influencing histories developed:
Phases 1975-1987 1988-1994 1995-1998 1999-today
SIF provides International & Installation of Relationship
MFS & Software national mergers. treasury continues with
E related services Access to systems & other new applications,
V To the bank network projects, i.e. new MF in 2000
E technologies for merging of The which supports
N Some branch Bank with SAP applications
T organizational automation another bank
S blending & Restructuring of
development of New operational 80% of the IT the IT company,
& IT specialists systems-External Company's Entering the stock
pressures to IT operations are market
A Most end user investments by related to the
S applications suppliers. bank-Stronger Decreasing % of
P built in-house bonding operations from
E SIF more 80% to 60%
C Still weak involved in
T bonding applications Bonding still
S Dev.-strong exists but more
bonding rationalised
Figure 6.6: History of the SIF-The Bank relationship
Source: Based upon a figure produced by EAC, academic.
The above table shows four major phases of evolution of the relationship between
the two firms. In the first period (1975-1987) SIF installs two MF computers in the
bank and relevant system software while most of the end user applications are
developed in house. The first signs of bonding, however, especially after 1980 when
according to some interviewees SIF started neglecting its marketing strategies,
emerge. As an academic consultant assures:
From the beginning of1980 and after, SIF started having an underdeveloped
marketing and underdeveloped sales strategy. And this is because, by then, the
'incest' relationship with The Bank had started becoming quite clear. (EAC,
academic, interview 7/10/2004)
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Also, the two firms started both developing their specialist human resources and
blend with personnel transfer from SIF to The Bank and the creation of hybrid
structures. The same consultant explains:
This early there were a few people with relevant experience in Greece, most ofwhich
had acquired this experience in the Army by using the army's computer [...] and
most ofthem were hired by The Bank while another physicist with graduate studies
in England was hired by SIF. A while later with an agreement ofthe two firms, this
?nan left SIF and went to The Bank. This is the man that later on would become the
director ofThe Bank's IT department. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
This personnel transfer was related to the relationship between SIF and MSIF as
opposed to a hypothetical relationship with IBM. Additionally, this blending created
bonding and attachment between the two firms. The same interviewee explains:
This could not have happened with IBM. You could not have a member ofIBM
transferred to a bank. This was proved to be in favour ofSIF commercially because
a part of the people that the bank had was comingfrom SIF and they thus created an
incest relationship between them, even in eras where the percentage ofactivities was
not very big [...] They realize that they feel more secure cooperating with people that
they know [...] SIF has close relationships with another bank but not very intense
because this bank is IBM oriented. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
In terms of hybrid structures, in 1986 SIF and The Bank created a separate IT
company (joint-venture). EAC explains:
XXXX, for example, is a firm that was created by SIF in cooperation with The Bank,
and the general director ofSIF was placed as a general director ofXXXX.
Nevertheless, theyfollowed their own path, generally they are not competitors with
SIF but they tried to get into some projects. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
During this first period, then, the relationship between the two firms started with
various activities. They started blending organisationally and some bonding was
created but the bond was still weak and the strategies of the two firms were still
diversified and unable to influence each other significantly. However, this would
start changing during the second period of the relationship when the bank invested
directly in SIF by getting involved in its merger with a network technologies firm.
The Bank decided to get involved in order to profit from the technology transfer
based on the view that there is a connection between mainframe, system software,
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branch automation and applications31 which prevailed soon after The Bank was
persuaded, with the involvement of international supplying companies, to adopt
operating systems, which were products of the newly merged with SIF company32.
SIF on the other hand, by including The Bank as shareholders was aiming at
ensuring a degree of commitment on behalf of The Bank33. During this period, SIF
became more involved in writing user applications and changed all the applications
to work onto the new operating systems; thus, the bond of the two firms grew
stronger. Also, the new ownership structures between SIF and The Bank had
conflicting effects on strategic planning. On one hand, SIF had a sense of security
but, on the other hand, they felt the danger from their attachment to The Bank. The
two following quotes by EAC illustrate the two different sides of this effect:
This big privileging customer had created such a great sense ofsecurity [...] they
were saying: 'whatever happens, this bank needs us'. We are talking about some
difficult times and years where the SIF's budget was saved literally because The
Bank made big purchases. And generally, SIF is very much focused and directed on
its relationship with The Bank and its internal culture is very much determined by
this relationship. This means that in some cases, the relationship ofSIF with the
external environment might be 'arrogant' which means that if the relationship with
other customers won't work, it's not a big deal since SIF can focus more on its
relationship with The Bank. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
He continues:
Ofcourse, The Bank places under competition its offers forprojects, that is, it is
possible not to give projects to its closely associatedfirms, ifthere is a much better
proposal by anotherfirm in a very good price. Or, the financial and economic profile
might show that although the technology is not the best, it will nevertheless bring
profit. So, thefact that The Bank owns part ofSIF doesn't mean that they will turn
down a more profitable proposal by anotherfirm. (EAC, academic, interview
7/10/2004)
During the third period, SIF persuades The Bank to combine MSIF technology with
Microsoft technology in parallel with a large merging project between The Bank and
31 This was confirmed by a series of discussions with EAC, which were not recorded.
32 These new systems allowed for distributed, multitasking computing (interview with EAC
7/10/2004).
33 This view was expressed by SBA, sales manager, during interview on 22/10/2004.
194
another bank. This reveals important issues on the role of SIF in the market and
how it works as well as its relationship with the international mother firm. EAC
explains:
MSIF has the policy of leaving great autonomy to its local distributors, and the
distributors may develop their own strategies regarding the development ofproducts,
solutions and services. For example, a new mainframe which was installed in The
Bank [...] there were many PCs needed and also a toolfor network management.
This was boughtfrom IBM because it was the best in the market and The Bank
wanted it. Also, many of the PCs that were connected with the network were bought
from IBM. So, SIF did what is called 'remarketing'. Also, in the year of the merging
when there were huge needs, the 20-25% ofIBM Hellas' budgetfor that year was
comingfrom this remarketing by SIF. Ofcourse, this was known by MSIF which
couldn't do anything and they were getting out ofthe PC market. (EAC, academic,
interview 7/10/2004)
In addition to this, there was the installation of both treasury systems in the bank and
various other projects of smaller scale. During this period, and especially after 1996,
the percentage of SIF staff working in projects of The Bank started growing and the
Bank related operations of SIF reached at some point about 80%34. In this period
then, the two organizations were at the closest they have been both organizationally
and strategically since the volume of activities was the largest it had been.
After 1999, SIF underwent restructuring and rationalization of their
marketing in order to decrease the degree of dependence from The Bank. A manager
from the R&D department explains:
Five to six years back this relationship was very close. The Bank was the only
customer ofSIF. But this wasn 't a good strategy because you had all your eggs
within one basket. Therefore, the goal changed and we wanted to reduce the
percentage ofdependencefrom The Bank and increase the percentage with other
customers. (MRD, R&D manager, interview 16/11/2004)
During this period SIF supplies a new peripheral mainframe which supports SAP
applications. A manager from the ISD explains:
[...] The Bank started looking at the market to see ifthere is something good to
improve the accounting system. Theyfound SAP but it couldn't be loaded in the core
34
This percentage comes from an interview with a manager from the Financial Services business unit.
The interview was not recorded.
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system. It wasn 't compatible. SAP works only in Unix and Windows. Therefore,
they got another peripheral system for the SAP. This was a process ofdetachment of
accounting. (ASS, manager, interview 29/11/2004)
With the restructuring of SIF, they started developing other business units and
created contacts with more customers and finally managed to decrease the
percentage of dependence from The Bank from 80% to 60% (SBA, sales manager,
interview 22/10/2004). There is still a strong bond but there is an effort on behalf of
SIF to deal with this in a more rationalized way. EAC explains the restructuring
attempts to rationalize SIF's marketing and resource management:
[...] there is a unit of 'private sector' within SIF which attempts to be completely
detached and independentfrom The Bank and deal with manufacturing. There are
some other departments that refer to other areas of the financial sector. Banking
division has completely been separated by The Bank. That is, The Bank has become
one separate division, and there are attempts so the people that work on the banking
division not to deal with The Bank at all in order not to be influenced by it [...] this
does not mean, however, that the firm works like that. The distinctions above work
like this within the frame ofsales force ofthefirm. And, accordingly, the sales force
creates distinctions within the pre-sales department where all the projects are
prepared. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
The relationship between SIF and The Bank, therefore, remains strong, although
more rationalized and strategies appear to tend towards diversification.
Organizationally, the two companies are still connected. MFS has provided a sketch
to explain the organizational contact:
SIF The Bank
Figure 6.7: Contact between the bank and the ITfirm at different hierarchical levels
Source: Drawn by MFS, manager, during interview 26/11/2004
At the top level, there is contact between the top management of SIF and The Bank.
At the level of middle management, there is day-to-day contact between various
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managers and at the lower level35, technical staff such as software engineers,
programmers) both from SIF and The Bank work together in the same space. The
little circles represent various different projects where people from both
organizations work together. As MFS confirms, there are also SIF staff who have
worked permanently in The Bank for more than ten years.
Finally, despite the gradation of the degree of attachment and the tensions
between the two organizations over a thirty-year relationship, they still maintain
good relationships. As DIS explains:
This relationship has to do with a long-term trust and commitment. We provide
solutions and we are tested every day. Ifwe stop offering good solutions the
relationship will stop. Within this framework of trust we have an advantage since we
know the customer. We don't have secrets with The Bank any more. That's why our
peoplefunction also as consultants to the bank. Ifwe were only looking at our own
interests and wouldn't carefor the interests ofour customers we wouldn't have the
relationship we now have. (DIS, IS director, interview 18/11/2004)
Additionally, regarding the emerging contingent knowledge and the nature of the
relationship as it developed gradually, the same interviewee explains how it works:
Our knowledge of the customer gives us the opportunity to act proactively and
instead ofgoing there and ask them what they want us to buildfor them; Igo and
suggest thingsfor them. Iforesee that you '11 need this. I've studied it and I think
you '11 need this solution for thefuture [...] In regard to the composition ofa solution
we provide alternative scenarios. We try to take advantage ofall the value ofthe
existing systems of the bank. Whenever we see that something still can be used
effectively we won't advice them to throw it away and get something new. We might
go onto a process ofgradual replacement. In our relationship ofmany years that's
what we do. And this is how we build the IS ofThe Bank. Gradually, ifsomething
that we offered was a completefailure we have the courage to say so and suggest
them to replace it with something new. (DIS, IS director, interview 18/11/2004)
Finally, as EAC explains, the nature of this relationship has led to the development
of more realistic solutions to the emerging problems:
[...] there is the issue ofknowledge of the business operations ofThe Bank and of
course the way that the IS is organized. When for instance you want to sell a solution
35
The Bank pyramid is not the actual pyramid representing its organizational structure. This is how
SIF people would perceive their customer organization in terms of working together in projects and
maintaining a relationship. In other words, this doesn't mean that the IT people of The Bank are the
lowest in the hierarchy of the organization.
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to your customer you have to make him believe that what you 're talking about is
related with the realistic problem that your customer has. Ifyou don't know details
ofthe structure ofhis system, then possibly your proposal to be much less realistic,
unless ofcourse you demolish everything and offer somethingfrom scratch. This
happens more often in Greece, demolish and replace with something else, while
abroad this doesn 't happen [...] and in that aspect, the SIFpeople have a great
advantage over the IBMpeople. (EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
The relationship between the SIF and The Bank and the way it has evolved
over the four phases as presented here, illustrates how an actor like SIF makes
strategic choices based on a very specific way of ATOC configuration and
particularization towards instances initiated, designed and implemented with a
specific user in mind. Based on various options, constraints and the strategic
management of their viewpoints, SIF and The Bank try to balance the degree of
particularity or abstractness of ATOC, by means of deciding whether they should
stay in a close, almost exclusive relationship or should they be more open to the
wider ATOC environment, as it will be shown in chapter seven when discussing the
viewpoint as an approach to innovation management.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS
The historical evolution of SIF reveals useful information on how the supply
part of the ATOC conceives and strategically plans their involvement in T-0 change
instances. Of course, not all systems suppliers have the same approach to ATOC.
Nonetheless, the role of firms like SIF in linking the international technological
supply with local contexts of use is quite interesting in shaping the way various
technologies are coupled with a variety of organizational models and structures. The
activity of systems integration with which actors like SIF are engaged, is handled by
SIF in a way that makes them develop from a simple distributor of technological
supply and a mediator in their early history, into an actor that has the relative power
to influence the process of linking supply and use. They develop their own individual
strategies, they have their own point of view of ATOC and they develop their
activities by strategically planning or adjusting to future or emerging market and
industry trends. SIF, as an ATOC professional have a specific role to fulfill in terms
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of taking part to the mechanisms that contribute to ATOC effectuation, but they
are doing so in a rather particular way while trying to maintain themselves and
dominate certain markets which will increase their profits and their status as
businesses. For this reason, the processes and the mechanisms through which they
reach social choices and decisions, relating both to the shaping of various T-0
change instances but also to the corporate future of SIF, are quite interesting.
The phases of initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change instances
and solutions do not have clearly distinct boundaries. This is because the solutions
that are developed by SIF are designed and implemented on the spot when a T-0
change instance is initiated. There is not a systematic packaging and reselling of
these solutions and therefore there is not a clear boundary between designing and
implementing a solution, which might occur for some of the technological
components of a solution. This, however, is not the only reason. The concept of
innofusion (Fleck, 1988) has captured the non-distinguishable nature of innovation
into processes of innovation and diffusion, or design and implementation.
In the next chapter, I attempt to integrate and analyze findings from both case
studies and make full use of the analytical tools suggested earlier and also see how
this attempt will help our understanding of the relationship between T&O and the
way it is shaped within the framework provided by the space between local instances
of T-0 change and the global emergence of the knowledge economy.
CHAPTER 7
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ATOC AS AN ENVIRONMENT FOR ACTION: A
VIEWPOINT APPROACH TO STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT OF TECH NO-ORGANISATIONAL
CHANGE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to employ the suggested analytical tools and
concepts in an attempt to integrate and explain the collected empirical data from the
case studies presented in the previous two chapters. The concept of T-0 change
instances can reveal processes and social choices in the initiation, design and
implementation of T-0 change and shift the focus away from restricted, one-
dimensional aspects. Considering the actors' viewpoints as they emerge from the
empirical cases helps to explain the social choices during the management of T-0
change by offering justification for these choices. The ATOC concept, finally, offers
an analytical space that embraces social and economic relations amongst
heterogeneous and diverse actors within the global knowledge economy, which is
best understood as a space between local T-O change instances and global trends and
resources within the knowledge economy and how these are linked.
This chapter, firstly, revisits the empirical data and identifies possible
problems in relation to processes of initiation, design and implementation of T-0
change instances. Secondly, it reveals the challenges that emerge within ATOC
during the management of T-0 change and how actors cope with them. Finally, it
offers an explanation on how the T-0 relationship is shaped through social choices
from diverse and heterogeneous actors within a global knowledge economy and
through instances of T-0 change.
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7.2 INSTANCES OF T-0 CHANGE:
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS FOR
ORGANISATIONAL - BUSINESS PROBLEMS
In this section, the empirical case studies will provide a first layer of analysis
where the processes of initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change solutions
and instances will be examined. Let us start with the GB case.
7.2.1 GB Case Study
The GB case provides an excellent opportunity to study the initiation, design
and implementation of a T-0 change instance. The particular history of GB, its
position within the Greek market, its relationship with the state, the relatively recent
involvement in broader ATOC networks as well as the large scope of the change
effort offer a good opportunity to examine the above processes in as much detail as
possible and reveal interesting issues regarding the shaping of the T-0 relationship.
Although GB emerges as a significant actor in this case study with a certain
conception of the ATOC, that is called to make social choices in this T-0 change
instance, it seems that social choices were influenced in a high degree by the
involvement of external specialists and suppliers.
7.2.1.a Initiation of the GB Instance
The importance of the pre-instance or pre-project phase in T-0 change has
been stressed, although not enough, in previous work (McLaughlin et al, 1999:57) in
illustrating the on-going development of technologies while being selected and
adapted to the specifics of an organisation (McLaughlin et al, 1999:57). This
argument, however, is perceived in rather limited organisational terms of selection
and adaptation. The ATOC theory allows for a wider view of this phase by seeing it
as emerging from a wider socio-economic environment. Therefore, an emphasis on
the initiation of a T-O change instance could show how broader socio-economic
relations within ATOC, but also previous configurations of T&O (rhetorical T-0
models) and their histories are enacted as negotiable elements during T-0 change
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instances. The broader socio-economic and industrial context within which the
GB T-0 change instance emerged, was discussed in chapter four. Forces ofbanking
de-regulation, increasing competition and the parallel emergence and diffusion of
relevant technological developments have created the basis for the instantiation of
the 1997 instance in GB. Therefore, the local T-0 change instance in this particular
moment of GB history emerged through the interaction of local organisational and
business settings projecting the difficult condition in which GB's top management
found themselves to be. The decision for the instantiation of this particular T-0
change instance, then, emerged from GB's management conception of themselves as
a competitive firm within a wider changing socio-economic business and industrial
environment. This move represents a social choice in T-0 management which
differentiates the GB management from a non-choice, which would be not to proceed
to a radical restructuring effort. Alternative social choices could be to decide a
smaller scale change, which would continue a segmented relationship with ATOC,
staying away from integrated, change management visions and promises.
Prior to the 1997 T-0 change instance GB had a restricted relationship with
ATOC, having gone through segmented and inconsistent innovative moments in
their history. On the other hand, subsequent developments were done at that time in
relation to new technologies (i.e. CRM software packages, banking information
systems), management techniques and business models that have been used in other
banks and were leading the way in T-0 change in banking. In terms of social choice,
then, GB also had to consider the possibility of "non-choice" which would involve a
decision not to proceed to a restructuring effort. Non-choice, therefore, takes the
meaning of a "decision not to act".
In 1997, GB opened up its organisational boundaries and outsourced
resources for a large scale restructuring which would affect the corporate identity of
the organisation. This would mark the initiation of a particular T-0 change instance
where certain socio-economic relations and their conception by particular actors
brought together an organisation with a certain, particular history and certain
technologies and business models as they had been developing through processes of
ATOC commercialisation and supply of solutions, and used and re-configured as
they were travelling in various user contexts (see Pollock et al, 2003; Pollock et al, in
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press). Top managers of the GB formed a committee with the gradual
involvement of external consultants who first started negotiating this. The initiation
of the T-0 change instance and the choice to turn to ATOC seems to have been
promoted by experts internal to the bank in collaboration with external technological
and business expertise. The size of the project in this case, however, and the volume
of complex expertise outsourced, shows that a large amount of responsibility and
control of the particular change instance was placed in external experts. Given the
inconsistent relationship GB had with broader ATOC up to 1997 a broader
exploration of the ATOC was seen as necessary. Thus, relevant external expertise
that would bridge the gap between GB and the broader ATOC was employed and
acquired great value for the success of the T-0 change effort. The particular instance
in GB, therefore, was initiated as a business decision by the central management to
agree on a mobilisation of specialist knowledge, technological and business, internal
and external to the organisation, in order for this T-0 change instance to become a
successful strategic moment in the corporate history of the organisation. This move,
in ATOC analytical terms, constitutes the initiation of a particular instance of T-0
change in GB. After the central management was convinced, the committee
composed and published a competition announcement, a call directed to the ATOC.
At the initiation stage there was a general problematisation of the existing model and
based on that, arguments were formulated supporting and justifying the move to T-0
change. These arguments refer to the difficulties of GB to manage their customer
databases, the antiquated or non-existent, sophisticated IS and relevant electronic
applications, GB's weak marketing strategy and the inappropriate organisational
culture of the bank and called for radical changes that would transform GB's
corporate and organisational identity.
The initiation of this instance for the particular user organisation with a
specific innovation history represents an opening of its organisational boundaries and
a deeper involvement with ATOC. Also, this instance means that GB allowed in its
T-0 change effort various diverse players and elements from ATOC. On one hand,
they gained access to previously lacking expertise and material resources necessary
for the T-O change but, on the other hand, they seem to have lost some control of the
T-0 change effort regarding its direction and decisions on design and
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implementation. The GB case is an example of how large amounts of
responsibility and control are transferred to the external actors who are able to set the
basis and examine the criteria for the promotion of choices. Social choices from GB
are put in a negotiation space within the T-0 change instance. The control of the
complex - due to the variety of expertise, variety of conflicting interests,
miscommunication - mechanisms that produce social choices able to influence the
direction of T-0 change was, in a sense, distributed among the diverse actors
involved in the T-0 change instance. Finally, the initiation of this instance represents
one of multiple opportunities for ATOC to find its way towards a particular case of
T-0 change.
7.2.1.b Designing the GB Instance
The analytical framing of the problem in GB led to the formulation of a
vision for a new bank with a new identity. The links between the problematisation of
the condition, the development of a new vision and the way to materialize it were
shaped by various factors that were considered, such as, the existing model of the
bank, various quantitative indicators referring to competition, performance, control,
external trends in banking and technologies crystallized in what we termed as
rhetorical T-0 models. The new vision was to create a new modem competitive
commercial bank with a new identity aligned with the T-O principles of customer
centrality, the realization of which was linked with technological, organizational and
cultural transformations with an analogous project design where the T-0 change
instance was broken down into various relevant sub-projects. This method of
management of expertise, although it provided a systematic way of executing the T-
O change, did not have a ready solution to the issue of heterogeneity and the
challenges posed by the distributed character of this innovative change.
The point to be made here is that the problematisation of the existing GB
model and the building of a new vision are in essence processes of linking/aligning
the particular circumstances of a business organization with wider trends and
elements from ATOC, based on quantitative indicators of competition, performance
and control. This way ATOC could perform its purpose as a market of commoditized
T-0 change. In regard to the direction of the vision, the different actors involved play
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their role as sources of political power and influence in negotiation. In the
initiation phase, the scope of change and the degree of openness to ATOC was
decided and this was further shaped in more particular terms through design and
implementation processes.
Given the amount of diverse resources distributed within heterogeneous
ATOC networks, which were necessary for this instance, a need emerged for the
creation of a team which would carry out the design of the change towards the
realisation of the new vision. Specific decisions and choices were generated
regarding the elements of ATOC that would be utilized for this particular instance, as
opposed to other elements that would be rejected or not considered at all (non-
choice). The specialist firms constituting the selected consortium represent the
mobilization of ATOC resources, expertise, artifacts, tools, analogous to the design
of the T-0 change instance into various sub-projects. Most of the resources were
carried into the T-0 change instance through ATOC networks and partnerships, as
embodied in specialized personnel representing various ATOC professional
suppliers, given that different actors within ATOC have access to different and
competing types of resources.
An important phase of the design of T-0 change solutions for a particular T-
O change instance is to select the components that would constitute the solution by
selecting a particular consortium amongst the competing ones. Therefore, in terms of
identifying social choices that influence the design of a T-0 change instance and
solution one needs to look at the criteria and choices of the actors used in the
instance and also the resources and elements they carry into it. The design phase of
the GB T-0 change instance starts more or less simultaneously with the initiation
phase. The initiation phase is, in a sense, an 'abstract design' which later on becomes
more particular as the instance unfolds through the making of relevant social choices
on the formulation of consortia, the selection of one of the alternative ones and the
more systematic design of the T-0 change by the various stakeholders. The abstract
design then enters the instance and becomes more particular as it unfolds within the
change project. This is discussed more later on when discussing ATOC
particularization.
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7.2.1.c Implementation of the GB Design
The various actors comprising the selected consortium have to implement the
various subprojects and as the T-0 change instance was designed, they would have
to be done in a logical, chronological order. This would give the whole effort a sense
of continuity and progress. The strategy project would have to be completed first and
then the BPR project would start in order for the organizational processes to be
determined for the rest of the projects to be informed by the new processes and then
the rest of the subprojects. Of course, the design of the T-0 change effort did not get
implemented like that at all! Although the strategy project was finished first, the rest
of the subprojects were happening at the same time and they overlapped many times
raising issues of accurate implementation of the design and in consequence causing
what has termed as 'innofusion' (Fleck, 1988), where one actor was invading the
area of another because of delays in completion. This situation caused conflicts,
delays and questions on the initial design of the T-0 change effort.
The process of implementation of the various subprojects reveals interesting
social and political interactions and negotiations amongst the project stakeholders.
Findings suggest that this process was highly political and the decisions affecting it
can be seen as made within tensions ofpolitics, in an organizational and wider sense.
This was both to the conflicting interests and varying political agendas of the
stakeholders and to the still close dependence of GB from the Greek state. For
instance, suggestions made by specialist actors for design modification became an
issue discussed in the Greek parliament and published in the government Gazette.
Another example comes from the close interrelation of the IS with the organizational
processes of the bank. In banking, as both cases reveal, technological developments
seem to follow organizational developments in T-0 innovation, although T-0
changes are seen as technologically driven (in the GB case, the consortium leader
was the IT firm but the whole change was BPR driven). This is partly due to the
promises of technologies in terms of promotion of innovation, on one hand, and
partly due to the nature of such technologies as processual technologies of modular
design where their design seems to be informed by developments in various business
domains. However, ISs and organizational processes are closely related and shape
each other. Decisions and social choices during implementation, where the sub-
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projects overlap and physical actors involved in the project are in contact with
each other, take place through political negotiation amongst these actors. For
instance, there was the issue of the centralization of organizational processes
previously held at a branch level. This was part of the BPR project. The final
decision, however, on which processes belongs to the branch and which are
centralized was negotiated between actors during implementation. In relation to this,
studies in the UK have shown how branch managers resisted the centralization of
loan approval (see BoS case in Fincham et al, 1994) in similar situations and thus
politicize the process of organizational transformation.
This politicization of T-0 change emerges from the relationship and
interaction between rhetorical T-0 models and the existing model (or universal
knowledge vs. contingent knowledge). In the UK cases above and in the GB case we
can identify instances where the previous models resist rhetorical models both in the
phases of design and implementation. In the design phase of the new organizational
structure for example, there was pressure from the bank management to the
consultants not to interfere with the hierarchical structures of the organization. In the
design phase, therefore, the existing structure was exercising strong control against
radical transformations that would affect the long existing hierarchical structures of
GB. Any resistance to organizational changes was perceived by the internal and
external specialists as due to the ownership structures of the bank, where the Greek
state was still maintaining an influential presence and this presence would make
organizational changes a highly political and painstaking process. In this change
instance then, the state had a strong i minence grise presence. In many occasions it
was a point of reference during negotiating change, even though the new strategic
direction of GB was based on its detachment from the Greek state. Additionally,
GB's personnel posed resistance during implementation, especially in branches
where more senior employees were not keen on changing working mentalities. On
the other hand, younger employees saw that as an opportunity to climb up the
hierarchy and build their personal careers. The internal organizational politics and
their managerial treatment reveal the emergence of various organizational voices
expressing interests and concerns regarding the direction of the change and their
future status within the organization. These voices add to the politicization of T-0
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change management as they were treated as disruptive during implementation,
rather than been seen as a constructive mechanism to influence design. The solution
to this emerging 'problem' was the transformation of the organizational culture and
mentality by diffusing a common change discourse throughout the organization and
convincing employees that this change was a win-win situation for everyone.
The process of implementation cannot fully be detached from the design
phase, as the concept of innofusion (Fleck, 1988) would suggest. This is true in the
GB change instance as well. The complex environment with the various diverse
actors and various interconnected sub-projects, made it impossible to maintain a
certain order in terms of discrete design and implementation phases. Initial design,
therefore, could be seen as 'incomplete' in itself or "abstract", which is completed
during implementation and use. Although typically distinct processes of design and
implementation were anticipated, in practice they were not. This was projected in
interviews as "implementation problems". In the GB case, although these problems
were expected they were still referred to as problems that needed to be solved. This
shows that external specialists believe to the "ideal" of distinct phases of design and
implementation and treat their overlapping as implementation problems, the solution
of which lies in the experts' many-year experience. It could also be argued that
design is never complete rather it is happening constantly with incremental
innovation and maintenance of the T-0 model of an organization. I do not wish to go
that far, although, arguments could be made on the blurred boundaries of these
processes and on the analytical need to conceive them as a unity, inseparable from
each other, as captured here by the concept of'instances of T-0 change'. Due to the
fact that the boundaries between these processes, initiation, design, implementation
are so blurred, their driving forces and the factors influencing the way they unfold
are of similar nature. The issues that can be raised regarding T-0 change are making
reference to all three phases.
Finally, in regard to the GB case study, the involvement of various diverse
actors with different roles, positions and power within ATOC, makes T-0 change
instances within ATOC social situations which appear to be very complex and
heterogeneous. Heterogeneity and complexity could be argued in many terms. For
instance, the different backgrounds, specializations, resources, that different actors
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carry into the T-0 change instance; the different discourses employed by these
different actors during communication; the different interests and strategic
orientation of different corporate but also organizational actors within the instance;
and finally, the different views of the world - or rather of the instance within the
ATOC - and themselves as part of this world by different actors, either action is
defined as coming from an individual and acknowledged a posteriori, or the concept
of action includes the decision-making process and the logic behind it. This
heterogeneity and complexity within ATOC and the way it works towards instances
of T-O change create challenges for the actors involved and difficulties in making
social choices and decisions for the management of T-0 change and corporate
strategic planning. These challenges will be discussed more in the next section.
7.2.2 SIF Case Study
The highly politicized heterogeneous and diverse social situation of the T-0
change instance in GB takes us to the SIF case study which reveals interesting
information regarding the involvement of a systems supplier in the initiation, design
and implementation of instances of T-0 change. SIF is a firm that develops and
promotes technological solutions for organizational and business problems in various
areas of the economy. These solutions constitute configurations of modular design,
based on the organizational processes of the user environment. They are constituted
by software, hardware and services; they are commercial products, commodities that
need to be assembled, packaged and promoted to the customer. The process of doing
so needs to be seen analytically within the framework of a T-0 change instance,
which is also a "commercial situation". Not all T-0 changes are of a large scope and
so organized; however, even the smallest T-0 transformation requires the
mobilization of various resources, which if they cannot be found in-house, are looked
for within the ATOC networks. Through the activation of social and economic
relations within ATOC, T-0 change solutions are re-contextualized (Schumm &
Kocyba, 1997) and find their way out to different contexts of use through the
instantiation of small or large scale instances of T-0 change.
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7.2.2.a Initiation of T-0 Change Instances
A look at ATOC from SIF's point of view reveals the commercialized
character of the initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change solutions. The
initiation process involves actions and decisions happening within a business
discourse. Although SIF is a specialist firm with access to expert knowledge in
various technologies and business processes through their international
collaborations, the management of these resources involves business activities that
would transform this expertise into packaged technological products. This will then
be bought by their customers through the initiation, design and implementation of T-
O change instances, while trying to establish and maintain its position as an
"obligatory point of passage" (Law & Callon, 1992) for T-0 solutions. In
organizational terms, this shows that this actor, from the supply side of the ATOC is
also a business organization; they develop strategies and they are part of ATOC's
competitive environment. For example, the organizational unit of SIF responsible for
the development of proposals is called "marketing and pre-sales", while the unit
responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the solution is called "after-
sales".
Data from the SIF case suggest that the initiation of a T-0 change instance is
a "business negotiation". The initiation of such instances is negotiated between SIF
and its customers. The stimulus might come either from the customer or from SIF
and it seems to be negotiated in business terms between the pre-sales people of SIF
and top management from the customer. The first occasion is pretty straightforward,
in terms of the initiation of a T-0 change instance, while in the latter the supplier
(i.e. SIF) approaches the customer and attempts to induce interest for their solutions
with reference to new trends. During this business negotiation technological
expertise is also required in order for the business agreement to have a realistic
technological equivalency and for a more accurate estimation of the various costs
involved. Therefore, within the business negotiation there is also "technological
negotiation" involved.
The construction of a request and the development of a proposal are two
different but closely related processes where an organizational/business problem is
framed and then a proposed technological solution is developed to solve this
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problem. The problem is negotiated between the customer and supplier with the
involvement or consideration of other factors as well - such as, regulations,
legislations, trends, other actors, and strategies - and as a result social choices emerge
and shape the solution and the particular relationship between T&O. The proposal
that is developed to solve the problem which has been formulated is an estimation of
the cost, the timetable and the resources that would be needed for the development
and implementation of a T-0 change solution. In other words, it represents a
business arrangement resulting from the negotiation of the relevant actors within a
market framework of commerce of technological solutions, as it was shown in
section 6.4.1.
The initiation of T-0 change instances is a process that is amenable to
management by different actors. SIF, as an ATOC professional specialist, wants to
initiate as many instances as they can handle given the resources they have, or can
gain access to. Therefore, they try to manage the initiation of such instances through
marketing their solutions to their customers and the development ofpartnerships
with international suppliers. The technological and business aspects of the initiation
of a T-0 change instance in terms of the resources mobilized and the nature of socio¬
economic relations (i.e. commercial, business, etc.) are analytically captured by the
concept of "techno-organizational" within which the social-choices and actions of
the different actors involved are highlighted within instances of T-0 change.
7.2.2.b Designing a Solution
The process of designing a technological solution for an organizational
problem, apart from being a process of configuring various elements (technological
design), is also a business process or rather a suggested business plan for T-0 change
that the user organization (customer) is called to approve or reject. From the point of
view of the system integrator a proposal for a solution is also a product that is
promoted to the market. Therefore, the process of selecting and adopting
technological solutions and the process of developing and promoting technological
solutions involve negotiations that lead to decisions regarding investment in
technologies within ATOC networks for the user and decisions for product
development, marketing and networking, for the integrator. In the design of such
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solutions then, why are certain decisions made instead of others? For instance,
why does a specific solution consists of certain components instead of others given
the infinite possibilities offered within ATOC? The decisions on the design of a T-0
change solution are based on business negotiations amongst different suppliers and
users and the development of networks. The configurational character of such
solutions of modular design makes the design process to be a process of network
management within ATOC's business environment, which might be different in
different T-0 change instance according to different local circumstances of the
instance. This network management is often based on meta-knowledge regarding the
actors operating in a field, generating reputation and other indicators where
technological properties and capabilities are hard to assess directly. For instance, the
relationship between SIF and The Bank was built on both technological but also on
non-technological criteria which had to do with the supplier itself.
The decision on which elements to include in a particular solution for a
particular T-0 change instance is negotiated - both in business and technological
terms - between the users and the various suppliers within ATOC who are
competing for an entrance to the particular instance and proposing alternative ATOC
configurations that will produce alternative solutions to possibly alternatively
formulated business/organizational problems. Design of a solution, then, is an issue
of technological design but also an issue of producing a commercially successful
product or an investment plan for user organizations, by suggesting alternative
configurations of ATOC's networks according to the position and access one
supplier has to these networks. Based on the SIF case study it could be argued that
the factors influencing the negotiations among involved actors leading to decision
making on the design of a solution for particular T-0 change instances could be
categorized as follows: The design process of a solution of a particular T-0 change
instance is affected by politics of negotiation and communication amongst various
actors; by market dynamics of competition and collaboration which shape the way
the networks and market structures are formed and evolve; and, finally, by the
relationship between technological and business aspects, both in terms of the
knowledge and expertise required and also in terms of the different levels of
negotiations. Important issues emerge on the management ofnetworks of suppliers,
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partners and customers, which are mobilized during the development of T-O,
change solutions and as it will be shown later, cause new challenges for individual
actors/firms.
7.2.2.C Implementing Solutions
The link between an organisational/business problem with a technological
solution, that is, between a T-0 change instance and ATOC, constitutes an initiation
and design process, which might take place in many different manners as described
above. However, there is also an implementation process that is a part of the whole
ATOC journey. The implementation of solutions as seen in the SIF case reveals
interesting issues regarding the management of expert knowledge, the interplay
between technological and business aspects of T-0 change, organisational politics,
conflicts of interests and heterogeneity. It reinforces the findings of the GB case and
also raises issues on the management of expertise, which emerged by examining T-0
change from SIF's point of view.
An interesting process that emerged from the SIF case regarding the
implementation of T-0 change solutions is the recording of operational requirements
of the solution and their translation into system requirements. The
business/organisational problem needs to be identified and translated into
technological terms. This way the process of finding technological solutions to
organisational problems is realised. Although this process starts from the initiation
phase at a more general level, it becomes finalised during implementation. The
process of the analytical recording of the operational requirements is highly
controversial and much conflict and miscommunication result from it.
Evidence from the SIF case reinforces the findings of the GB case regarding
the heterogeneity, the difficulties in communication amongst the stakeholders and
the politics emerging from the conflicting strategies and interests. Interviewees
especially emphasised the difficulties to negotiate operational requirements with
customers who "do not always know what they want". As a result, the operational
requirements might change halfway during the implementation process. This might
happen due to external factors that none of the stakeholders have control over, such
as the introduction of Euro. Additionally, this case reveals blurred boundaries
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between the design and implementation processes due to this difficulty to
negotiate operational requirements. For instance, when a common language is
difficult to achieve, the integrators develop something which has to be approved by
the customer before they move on with the design and development processes as
shown in section 6.4.3 where it shows that the translation from operational to system
requirements can happen simultaneously with the systems and applications
implementation, which also confirms the blurred boundaries between design and
implementation. This painstaking process requires management of business and
technical knowledge by the integrator. As shown in the SIF chapter interviewees
stressed the importance of placing the right analysts with the appropriate expertise to
the right place, to negotiate with the relevant people in regard to relevant aspects of
the change. This knowledge management is necessary in order to reduce emerging
problems from difficulties of communication amongst the stakeholders, conflicts of
interests, delays. This shows how the technical and business knowledge mobilised
for such T-0 change instances is carried by persons directly involved in the project
in the form of experience or formal training. This also makes the mobility of persons
an important factor of management of expertise. The SIF case has examples of
people transferred to the customer environments. Additionally, the management of
specialist knowledge during implementation requires management of networks
which are still present during this phase and continue to play an important role.
During implementation there is a need for mobilisation of technological and
business knowledge, but SIF does not hold all the necessary specialist know-how
internally; rather they might need to mobilise it externally, within ATOC. For
example, they might ask from MSIF to send them a specialist in a particular product
for a certain period of time. However, this would happen only if they could not find
the particular expertise somewhere closer. The external specialist from above will
cost far more money and thus will make the solution more expensive. Finally, there
is a series of tests of the implemented solution in regard to both its technical and
business aspects by the people that participated in the development of the
technological and operational requirements.
To summarise, findings from the SIF case support those of the GB case
regarding the design and implementation processes; however, the SIF case brought
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about a new issue engulfing these difficulties from the point of view of the
system integrator. This issue is the tensions between technological and business
knowledge in relation to instances of T-0 change and the need for an appropriate
management of specialist knowledge in order to reduce the negative effects of those
tensions. The discussion on the implementation challenges in the SIF case focused
on the translation of operational requirements into system specifications. The variety
of business and technological specialists, the changing internal organisational and
external industry environments, the communication difficulties between supplier and
user constitute a heterogeneous environment that has to be 'homogenised' during an
instance of T-0 change in order for this translation to take place. Intense processes of
negotiation and generation of contingent knowledge on the user settings aim at the
"smoothening" of this process. In T-0 change instances where the supplier and the
customer have long-term relationships and have established structures and modes of
information and communication exchange, this process appears less problematic.
Communication barriers are overcome and accumulated experience helps in the
development of common discourses at the level of negotiating operational and
system specifications. The SIF-The Bank relationship offers such an example.
However, political processes where conflicting interests interact might cause
problems similar to the GB case, such as, resistance and absenteeism. Nonetheless,
for an actor like SIF the implementation challenges emerging from the social
relations between supplier and user within the framework of a T-0 change instance
can be managed by a proper management of expert, technological and business
knowledge.
7.2.3 Emerging Themes and Issues on ATOC
From the above discussion on the initiation, design and implementation of T-
O change instances, various issues and themes emerge in relation to what ATOC
really is and how it operates.
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7.2.3.a Management of Networks and Distribution of Control
Actors are embedded in certain historically developed and evolved networks
of social and economic relations involving partners, suppliers and customers. Some
of these partnerships are more permanent while some others are formed on an ad hoc
basis. This network of contacts constitutes series of channels for better access,
distribution and mobilization of ATOC and its elements throughout various
environments. Through such channels, actors gain access to various resources which
open certain possibilities in terms of what a particular solution will be composed of
and also access to certain promises, visions and rhetorical T-0 models. When SIF,
for instance, merged with a network technologies firm, a new channel was opened
and new business and technological possibilities emerged in relation to the
participation in instances of T-0 change, by means of accessing certain technological
components instead of others. On the other hand, these networks are more or less
restricted within a globalised economy. SIF cannot have access to every technology
or every piece of specialist knowledge in the world. Although these networks that
firms like SIF are embedded into open channels to an abundance of possibilities and
options of a global selection environment, they are also structures that pose
restrictions to actors in the sense that they limit the initially or seemingly affluent
possibilities. Additionally, the fact that T-0 change is happening within such
networks poses challenges for actors in terms of the control of the T-0 change and
management of these networks in relation to particular instances of T-0 change. The
existence of these networks reinforces a "distribution of control" of T-0 change as it
is crystallized in various instances. The distributed control of T-0 change instances
means that the actors involved do not have full control of decision-making
mechanisms and mechanisms of production and promotion of social choices; rather,
they are influenced by power emerging from certain configurations of ATOC
networks during T-0 change instances. There is then the issue of how much control
is an actor willing to sacrifice or determined to acquire in relation to a T-0 change
instance. In the GB case, for instance, as shown earlier, following its decision to
open up its strategic change program, much of the control and responsibility of the
instance was shared amongst the external suppliers which were directing GB's social
choices.
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7.2.3.b Politics of T-0 change: Private Sector - Public Sector
Operating under such networks, the socio-economic relationships amongst
the various diverse actors provide a ground for negotiation on solutions to be
developed. These negotiations, which occur both in business and technological
terms, are highly politicized and the actors involved are employing power and
influence mechanisms in order to promote certain interests. Such politics might be
projected in the form of conflicts at an organizational level; however, they are linked
in wider socio-economic relations within ATOC networks and the way actors
manage such networks.
There seems to be a difference between the instances of T-0 change in the
public and the private sectors. In the public sector, where the state is involved the
political character of the negotiation shows how various actors are attached to the
state or attempt to access mechanisms in order to influence state decisions in relation
to the promotion of certain technologies or certain suppliers in the market. Some
firms in Greece, for example, have an advantage when it comes to public sector
projects because they are more attached to the government and their consultants.
However, even in projects where the state is involved there are embedded actors with
networks of power and influence. In the private sector, firms like SIF are more free
to develop contacts and networks of influence in order, on the one hand, to get access
to channels of involvement in the initiation and, on the other hand, to gain access to
the necessary partners and suppliers who will provide the elements that constitute a
solution. In short, things are not so different in the public sector projects where the
free operation of the market is demonized and things become more sensitive.
Occupational and industrial networks of power and influence in the control of T-O
change have been stressed as important by relevant literature (see Fincham et al,
1994; Swann, 1997; Clark, 1997).
One might ask the question whether actions and social choices of actors are
significantly bound to established networks or not. Whether, for example, networks
can be radically reconfigured during a T-0 change instance or whether the stability
of relationships between actors is more important (Koch, 1997). The management of
networks issue could be answered with the notions of ATOC embeddedness vs.
embodiment, as it is discussed in the section 7.2.3.e.
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7.2.3.c Commoditization and Marketisation of T-0 Change
Due to the commoditization and commercialization of T-0 change the above
politicized business and technological negotiations are taking place within an
environment governed by market dynamics. A technological solution for a
business/business problem is also a commercial product or service, which is being
invested on, designed, marketed, promoted, sold, and consumed. On one hand, the
user firms constitute a market for such solutions/products and on the other hand
supplier firms develop and offer such solutions to them. This, however, happens in a
more dynamic way where suppliers and users are involved in the creation and
expansion of markets according to their individual strategic orientation, as we have
seen with SIF and how it developed historically into a more active actor within
ATOC. As Callon argues, agents within markets pursue their own interests; they
have diverse interests as buyers and sellers and transactions between them resolve
such conflicts by defining a price (in Clark, 2000:103-104); that is, as we have seen,
they go into a business arrangement reflected in the constitution of a proposal of a
solution.
'Supply' and 'demand', 'competition' and 'collaboration' are concepts
referring to the initiation, design and implementation of T-O change solutions and
attempt to capture institutionalized, or less institutionalized interactions between
groups of suppliers, distributors, integrators and users of T-0 change solutions, as
ATOC driving forces. Particularities and strategic choices of the user determined by
cost estimation, on one hand, and the development and mobilization of supply
networks, on the other, and the power of influence of various actors within these
relationships are influencing the form of the final solution for a particular instance.
Thus, there is a negotiation which balances these interacting forces and creates
bridges between what the customer wants and what the supplier and the integrator
promotes. ATOC then is a market of technological solutions for
organizational/business problems and its market structures provide a basis for the
development of socio-economic relations amongst actors and the development of
networks and the mechanisms of production of social choice. As this study reveals,
the marketisation and commoditization of T-0 change is governed by formal market
dynamics and processes but also through informal non-technical aspects. As Pollock
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& Williams (forthcoming) suggest, social choices are determined not simply by
the properties of technologies but rather through the way that these properties take
form during the construction and negotiation of comparative measures in the midst of
technical and cultural criteria.
7.2.3.d Technological and Business Aspects
Negotiations among actors are taking place in both business and
technological terms. Agreements on collaborations and projects are discussed in
business terms by employing relevant expertise and discourse. SIF for instance when
they are thinking of starting a new partnership, think of the business prospects and
how this new partnership will bring them more profit. User organizations like GB
and The Bank are considering the positive or negative effects that T-0 change will
have on their firms as a whole in relation to the changing trends and business
environments and also they negotiate the design of T-0 change solutions in terms of
the cost of that solution based on their financial capabilities. The negotiations
between the various diverse actors would have to align somehow the business and
technological aspects of a solution. This alignment is evaluated through relevant tests
where both financial and technological aspects are examined but also during the
design process where the integrator is technologically designing a solution based on
the user's financial capabilities, organizational requirements and particularities. The
interplay between technological and business aspects of T-O change solutions makes
necessary the mobilization, employment and successful management of a variety of
expertise, where technologists and business specialists are involved in the
negotiations. The organizational structure of SIF provides evidence on how they
manage this required expertise during the initiation, design and implementation of
solutions. This way, the proposed solution becomes more accurate and the final
solution more realistic and marketable.
7.2.3.e Ideal Solutions for Ideal Problems: Embeddedness -
Embodiment and Management of T-0 Change
The way particular T-0 change solutions are initiated, designed and
implemented based on political connections, market dynamics and networks that
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various actors involved makes this process amenable to various contingencies.
This shows that there are no ideal solutions. The final solution designed for a
particular T-0 change instance is never the 'ideal solution' because decisions and
compromises need to be made due to the limited access to resources and limited
financial capabilities, despite the global availability and mobility of actors and
resources that give the sense of affluence of possibilities. For example, the users are
negotiating the best solution they can get, given their capabilities and not the
generally best solution for a particular problem. From the point of view of the
integrator, they develop solutions for problems that help being framed, based on their
own access to relevant resources and capabilities to mobilize them. Different
integrators would develop different solutions. They would most likely be comprised
of different components, different brands of servers, different applications, different
databases and also might be supported by different kind of maintenance contracts.
This is due to the different degrees of embeddedness of actors in various networks
within ATOC and also the different degrees that various actors have embodied
elements and resources of ATOC, but also due to differentiating strategic goals of
various actors. The degree of embeddedness-embodiment in ATOC is transforming
over the years when actors like SIF strategically position themselves within ATOC,
by developing new partnerships, approaching new customers, gaining access to new
resources and finding ways towards an expansion of the T-0 change instances in
which they can be involved. Their capabilities and their ability to control and
influence the development of a solution increases because they become more flexible
in their design. They might have many alternative options to choose from, and they
might be able to mobilize a variety of alternative resources for the design of a
solution. On the other hand, they might not be able to do all these things and this
depends on the problem they are looking a solution for and whether or not they have
significant involvement in and control over the process of problematisation.
Nonetheless, if a firm like SIF cannot handle all the necessary resources for a
solution of a particular instance of T-0 change, they can increase their size and
capabilities temporarily by developing ad-hoc partnerships with other specialist
firms with complementary to the particular solution resources. Such ad-hoc
partnerships are formed on the basis of instances of T-O change where various
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consortia of expert firms are formed and compete to entering the T-0 change
instance, like in the GB case. In the long run, therefore, the balance between
embeddedness and embodiment in ATOC might be transformed based on strategic
expansion or restriction of an actors' access to ATOC networks, but there is also a
temporal and short term management of the size and access to ATOC of a particular
actor like SIF, based on local market circumstances, opportunities and prospects for
participation in various instances of T-0 change. The section 6.4.1 on initiating and
composing solutions and developing proposals provide strong empirical evidence on
how actors like SIF manage networks and gain access to ATOC resources.
Market dynamics of competition, collaboration, demand and supply as well
as political influences and conflicting interests play important role in determining
which would be the final solution for a particular T-0 change instance. These
dynamics for an ATOC professional like SIF but also for a user like GB or The
Bank, are translated into issues of management of expertise and management of
networks of suppliers, partners and customers. Effective management of those
aspects would mean more control and more influence within the cycle of production,
distribution and use of T-0 change solutions, that is, more control over ATOC. The
management of the relationship between embeddedness (what I can have access to
externally) and embodiment (in-house resources acquired over the years) of ATOC
from an actor is a route to influence the development of solutions for particular T-0
change instances. All these issues and dynamics that influence the design of T-0
change solutions reveal increased complexity and heterogeneity amongst the various
diverse actors involved, which might increase uncertainty in the production of social
choices. Different political interests, different access to different resources, different
industries, different instances of T-O change, different options, comprise an
environment which creates complexity for actors from both the supply and use sides.
This causes difficulties in assessing supplier offerings and whether they would fit
particular user organizational settings.
There are five aspects regarding ATOC and the way it operates. First, ATOC
is highly politicised at many levels; namely, at the level of the importance of the
links with the government, at the level of organisational politics and at the level of
promotion of innovation. Second, these political interactions happen within a market-
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like environment and are governed by market dynamics. Forces of competition
and collaboration, supply and demand, pursuit of profit, show the increasing
commercialisation and commoditisation of T-0 change. Third, the coupling of T&O
and the process of developing technological solutions for organisational and business
problems raises the issue of the interplay between the technological and the business
aspects of T-0 change, both in terms of diverse expertise and also in terms of
different levels of negotiating and managing T-0 change. Fourth, the link between
problem and solution in terms of T-0 change shows that there is not an ideal solution
for a given problem; rather, the problem is framed according to the way the previous
three aspects are handled by the various actors. That is, the framing of a problem and
the development of a solution to that problem is a process that involves
organisational politics, within a market-like environment where the technological
and the business aspects are handled in various ways. Therefore, this process
involves decision making which is influenced by all these factors and make the final
design and development of a solution highly contingent upon various circumstances
and how the power relations and influences are negotiated. The link between
instances of T-O change and the ATOC is contingent upon the situated way actors
manage T-0 change. Finally, all the different and diverse actors involved in the
process of initiating, designing and implementing T-0 change solutions constitute a
network which create a heterogeneous and complex environment. This refers both to
conflicting business strategies and interests of different actors/firms and also to the
diversity of the mobilised expertise and other resources (knowledge and artefacts) for
the process of developing technological solutions for organisational/business
problems. This heterogeneity and complexity creates challenges for actors in terms
of developing business strategies, policies and strategic management of expertise. To
summarise briefly, T-0 strategy and policy can be understood as 'management of
specialist knowledge and other material and non material resources', which means,
in turn, 'management of networks', which itself reduces to 'management of
heterogeneity and complexity'. In the following sections it will be shown that these
challenges are dealt with through a process of self-realisation, a construction of a
corporate identity.
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7.3 CHALLENGES IN THE MANAGEMENT AND
CONTROL OF T-0 CHANGE
ATOC captures the space where development and supply, on one hand, and
various contexts of use, on the other, create a ground for the development of a global,
complex, multi-actor, knowledge based, market-like social network. The increased
complexity and heterogeneity of ATOC poses challenges for user organisations in
light of instances of T-0 change. On one hand, they invest in technology and want to
exploit a wide range of possibilities but, on the other hand, they also want to
maintain a large share of control and an important role in the strategic management
of T-0 change, although this share was not an equal one in the GB case where
external experts acquired more control as shown in chapter five. Practically, users by
narrowing their search for solutions they reduce their search costs but on the other
hand they may get locked-in to sub-optimal solutions. System integrators like SIF on
the other hand also face challenges in terms of developing and promoting to the
market commoditised technological configurations as solutions to a wide range of
organisational/business problems. They too want to maintain high levels of control in
order to be able to promote their solutions to their customers without problems. This
was empirically illustrated in chapter six in the form of the dilemma in the
relationship between the SIF and The Bank. In other words, the challenges, both for
users and system integrators are raising within the framework of strategic planning
and positioning within ATOC and the formulation of a corporate identity and a
conscious role in ATOC processes as business organisations. Finally, ATOC also
poses challenges for policy making, in terms of regulating this abstract complexity
and heterogeneity.
In this section it will be shown how these challenges are formulated for
various kinds of actors involved in ATOC, although the focus will center more on
users and system integrators. The discussion about policy issues will have a more
general character and will not only refer to regulatory bodies, such as the state or
standardisation bodies, rather to regulation that is posed all kinds of actors by the
management and control of T-0 change. In doing so, reference will be made to the
concept of organisation and its changing meaning based on evidence from these case
223
studies and the role of various kinds of organisations in T-0 change. Secondly,
strategy issues and the strategic challenges faced by both users and system
integrators in regard to the management and control of T-0 change as emerging from
the changing concept of organisation and the meaning of T-0 change will be
discussed. Finally, issues about policy will be explored. This section is about the
formulation of the environment and the challenges that form the basis for the
emergence of social choices by the actors involved in T-0 change instances.
7.3.1 The Changing Meaning of Organisation and T-0 Change
As shown in chapter two there is a lot of discussion on the changing concept
of organisation. A combination between changing business environments and trends
and strategic planning and positioning of various individual actors, in relation to the
emergence and expansion of ATOC and the way it operates, contributes to a
transformation in the meaning of organisation in relation to firms-actors. In the GB
case for instance an opening of organisational boundaries and the transfer of the
issue of T-O change from inside the organisation outside to the ATOC can be
identified. The outsourcing of technological and organisational/business expertise
and resources is moving the management of T-0 change outside the user
organisation and places it within ATOC's complex and heterogeneous networks, as
the GB case shows. Another user, The Bank, with a close long term relationship and
attachment with a certain supplier of technological solutions (SIF) has been co-
evolving organisationally with that supplier and in many cases it seems that the
organisational boundaries between the user organisation and the ATOC are quite
blurred, which gives a new, extended meaning to the concept of organisation. On the
other hand, SIF also changes organisationally and its role as a system integrator
within ATOC is also transformed, as shown in the section on the historical
development of SIF, both due to the changing external circumstances and trends but
also due to its strategic actions, attempts to control their role within the changing
environment. For example, as SIF is developing and expanding organisationally it
acquires a more active role with more access to control of ATOC and its networks.
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Also, SIF, as a system integrator who develops T-0 configurations which are
used as solutions for their customers, is an organisational configuration itself as it
embodies multilevel ATOC networks in its organisational structure. The various
partnerships with various international suppliers and the network of permanent and
ad hoc partnerships with other specialist firms and with various customers give a
very wide and distributed definition of organisation as a network. It is also the nature
of the activity and the role of SIF that allows for such distribution of organisational
structure. SIF's co-evolution with The Bank shows how the distributed organisation
may have a more permanent form based on inter-organisational relations, trust, and
attachment.
Therefore, firms, both users and suppliers, are opening their organisational
boundaries and become part of ATOC networks when it comes to T-0 change.
Davenport (2005), for instance, in relation to this trend discusses commoditisation of
organisational processes where organisations can buy organisational processes.
Orlikowski (2002) discusses 'distributed organizing' and Swan & Scarbrough (2005)
discuss 'networked innovation' in order to capture issues and challenges in relation
to the significance of the changing concept of organisation to innovation processes,
that is, to T-0 change. This changing meaning of the concept of organisation in
relation to business firms shifts the focus in the capturing and explaining of social
choice and action from within organisational boundaries of firms to external ATOC
networks. The analytical focus on T-0 change instances within ATOC helped
capturing this transformation in the concept of organisation.
7,3.2 Strategy Issues
The changing concept of organisation and the meaning of T-0 change have
influenced strategic planning for both user organisations and system integrators
raising issues of strategic management of T-0 change. In light of the shift in the
meaning of organisation towards its understanding as a more extended network, the
management of the relationship between ATOC embeddedness vs. embodiment and
ad hoc networking creates the basis for the generation of strategic social choices in
relation to T-0 change. The concept of embodiment of ATOC, in organisational
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terms represents the internal capabilities and resources that an organisation
maintains, while the concept of embeddedness to ATOC represent the resources and
elements that an organisation has access to externally based on the maintenance of
long term stable networks and partnerships. The balancing between embeddedness
and embodiment, that is, what someone has internally and what someone can get
access to externally, is complemented by ad hoc networking, negotiated and decided
upon in light of the emergence ofparticular instances of T-0 change. Of course, the
balance between embeddedness and embodiment might change over time, as the two
concepts have a dynamic relationship. For example, user organisations internalise
external elements as it has happened in The Bank in the form of personnel transfer
where staff from SIF has moved to The bank. Nonetheless, the relationship between
embeddedness and embodiment through network development is amenable to
strategic management by actors and create a basis for the generation of social
choices. Such choices might involve: What to outsource and what to develop in-
house? How to manage my resources and my internal expertise? How to balance and
bridge internal and external resources?
Embedded and ad hoc networks not only constitute channels to accessing
resources and possibilities but are also networks of power and influence at the level
of negotiation and at the level of "doing business" within markets. That is, an actor
strategically manages the distribution ofpower and influence amongst the diverse
actors embedded within certain networks of collaboration and competition. In the GB
case for example, the strong relationship of the central management with the
government played a definitive role in the design and implementation of the T-0
change instance. Similarly, SIF's partnerships with popular international suppliers
like Nortel or Microsoft or MSIF gives them a certain power to influence and shape
the local markets. Therefore, management of networks, apart from managing
specialist knowledge and resources and making certain choices instead of others, it is
also management of power to influence which determines how actors position
themselves strategically within ATOC as significant or less significant players.
Within ATOC's networks of power and influence there is a distribution of control
during initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change instances. T-0 change
instances as particular configurations of ATOC networks makes the decision making
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and the control of the instance an issue that is settled through negotiations, power
and influence relationships. A user organisation, the GB, for instance, cannot have
100% control over the T-0 change instance. This is obvious from the first moment
when external experts were involved in the problematisation of the existing model,
where they directed T-0 change towards certain routes. Also, the long term
relationship of The Bank with SIF has placed certain levels of control of the T-0
change into the hands of the SIF, which in turn handles that control through the
management of their own contacts with suppliers and partners internationally. The
distribution of control in T-0 change instances generates strategic social choices that
contribute to the management of T-0 change. These might relate to the choice by
user firms to outsource critical processes or not, something that might require the
sacrifice of the control of the T-0 change instance and its direction. Supplier firms
on the other hand need to manage the distributed control by deciding what kind of
partners and on what extent are they willing to share with them the control of an
instance and what will their role be within it. The degree of attachment to relevant
partners is also something that needs to be dealt with strategically, as the case of SIF
and its relation to The Bank reveals, which has implications for the development of
marketing strategies.
The way ATOC works presents a degree of heterogeneity and complexity.
This is a challenge for both users and suppliers during their exposure to ATOC
networks as a selection environment. When actors interact with ATOC face an
abstract, indefinite selection environment which reflects ATOC's heterogeneity and
complexity that generates social choices in terms of how to select resources, partners,
suppliers and network configurations from the global knowledge economy to be used
at a local T-0 change instance. Social choices of selection during the initiation,
design and implementation of a T-0 change instance narrow down the abstract
indeterminacy and reduce heterogeneity and complexity. The degree of
embeddedness of actors into ATOC networks helps towards that process by creating
restricted, or rather alternative routes for access to ATOC resources and networks of
power and influence. For instance, the relationship of The Bank with SIF gave them
access to certain resources within ATOC through the international suppliers of SIF.
But by selecting to buy things from SIF and maintain that relationship for a long
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time, they most likely restrict their access to the indefinite possibilities within
ATOC. In other words, the embeddedness of business organisations into certain
ATOC networks gives them a certain version of the indeterminacy and complexity
and heterogeneity within ATOC, which, nevertheless, is a restricted version. On the
other hand, the levels of ATOC embodiment within the organisational structures of
an organisation might also create constraints. For instance, the organisational
capabilities of a firm might not allow for access to certain technologies or
knowledge, or there might be financial constraints which limit the options, or
organisational structure constraints that would reject some otherwise possible
options, as it happened with the GB case. It seems then that the level of ATOC
embodiment within an organisation in terms of creating a set of T-0 change
capabilities might also limit the abstract, indeterminate possibilities mobilised within
ATOC and reduce heterogeneity and complexity for a business organisation during
decision making on technological options for business problems. Therefore, the
management of ATOC heterogeneity and complexity in terms of selecting from the
abstract, indeterminate ATOC possibilities generate social choices directed towards
the management of ATOC networks and the relationship between embeddedness-
embodiment.
7.3.3 Policy Issues
Although this study was not about policy and ATOC regulation, it is
important that the issue is introduced here but further explored in future work. Just
briefly then, it can be argued that regulating T-0 change seems to be a very complex
process. The concept of regulation must not be seen in its conventional meaning, that
is, some regulatory bodies are imposing some rules according to which relevant
processes operate. These bodies exist of course and can be seen in the face of the
Greek state, the EU, standardisation bodies, regulatory mechanisms in relevant
business areas (i.e. European Central Bank, Bank of Greece, etc.) which all have a
say in affecting somehow the development, diffusion and use of T-0 change
solutions, either by creating new processes (i.e. Risk management) or by controlling
old ones and imposing ways of their operation. However, the concept of regulation
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could be conceived in a broader sense, where actors by strategically engaging in
the management of T-0 change either as users or as suppliers and system integrators,
they contribute to the shaping of a regulatory environment for various activities
within ATOC. Studies on the shaping of IT standards (NO-REST, 2004) clearly
reveals how various actors shape the standards by which ITs are developed in
relation to various industries and business areas (health, telecoms, etc.). Distributed
access to ATOC mechanisms, resources and power by diverse and heterogeneous
actors constitutes a regulatory environment which seems to be shaped by the very
action of managing T-0 change by these very actors, as they are engaged in
processes of initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change solutions.
Conflicting interests, competition and collaboration and the diverse strategic goals of
these various actors create an environment which seems to be regulated by this very
diversity, complexity and heterogeneity. Thus, traditional regulatory bodies have
only a partial role in this process. Future research on ATOC regulation would be
very interesting.
As shown here, the changing concept of organisation and the changing nature
and meaning of T-0 change and what its management involves create strategic
challenges for actors involved in the initiation, design and implementation of
technological solutions for organisational/business problems. Business firms
increasingly need to be engaged in network management in order to manage their
access to resources, power, influence and access to distributed control of T-0 change
as effectuated and configured in various T-0 change instances. This is due to the
increasing trend for the management of T-0 change to be transferred from inside the
organisational boundaries into ATOC networks. The strategic management of T-0
change under such circumstances of networked innovation is quite challenging, as
actors need to deal with heterogeneity and complexity of ATOC networks and with
strategically settling the relationship between abstract, indeterminate possibilities and
constraints in terms of making social choices of selection. How is this happening? In
the next section the notion of "viewpoint approach" to strategic management of T-0
change emerges and explains how individual firms approach and manage the
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challenges of T-0 change, through the justification and legitimization of social
choices.
7.4 VIEWPOINT APPROACH TO THE STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT OF T-0 CHANGE: MANAGING
POSSIBILITIES-CONSTRAINTS
With actor's view guiding the analyst's view in investigating T-0 change
instances and the gradual emergence of firms as actors, made the presence of a
diversity of actors, as well as the different ways through which these actors are
engaged with ATOC and its networks, more visible. Given the changing meaning of
organisation and T-0 change within a heterogeneous and complex ATOC
environment - involving different actors with differing interests, positions, roles,
goals, with different access to ATOC resources, power and influence — the existence
of different actor viewpoints is revealed. This explains how different social choices
(or non-choices) are made during the management of T-O change. For example, SIF
has a certain conception of the ATOC and their role in it as a system integrator,
which has been historically constructed and re-evaluated during T-0 change
instances. The same is true in relation to The Bank, which has a certain, different
viewpoint of ATOC and its role and nature of conduct with it. As the SIF-The Bank
relationship empirically illustrates, different viewpoints coexist and interact with
each other while making social choices for the initiation, design and implementation
of T-0 change instances. Also, the GB case offers examples of the emergence of
different viewpoints when examining the relationships between different directly
involved actors in the GB instance in section 5.4. These different viewpoints emerge
due to the diversity and heterogeneity of actors within ATOC but also due to the
configurational character of technological solutions, which allow fluidity, but also
continuity, in technology supply chain as well as a certain division of labour
illustrated during T-0 change instances. In other words, the distributed and
networked character of T-0 change creates multiple different ATOC configurations
during T-0 change instances where the diverse viewpoints of different actors emerge
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and possibly clash/interact during the shaping of those instances. Of course, it is
not surprising that different actors have different viewpoints but what is revealed
from this study is the way these viewpoints are utilised, shaped, mobilised during
complex and heterogeneous social situations that generate social choices, such as T-
O change instances. The revelation of the differing actors' viewpoints suggests the
employment of a "viewpoint approach" to strategic management of T-0 change. The
viewpoint approach refers to how actors-firms conceive ATOC and their position
and role within it, regarding the possibilities on one hand and the constraints on the
other, in relation to decisions and social choices during managing T-0 change. In
other words, these differing viewpoints have to do with the self-realisation and self-
consciousness of the corporate identity of an actor and they represent the dominant
rationale under which complex actors like SIF and GB are able to produce social
choices, or non-choices, if their viewpoint allows for non-action, necessary for
strategic planning.
Analytically speaking, the strategic self realisation of the possibilities vs.
constraints in the management of T-0 change could be expressed in structurational
terms where the indefinite, abstract possibilities represent the options an actor has for
action, that is, an ability to select, decide and act upon their decisions, while the
constraints represent the restrictions that limit such possibilities. That is, by action
one can understand the abstract, indeterminate possibilities for action while by
structure, the constraints that would limit those possibilities, while the challenging
part for management would be to create a balance between possibilities and
constraints in order to reach legitimate, justifiable decisions for T-O change. One
should not only acknowledge the "preventive" traits of structure but also its
"determining" capacities; that is, to provide historically shaped established patterns
for action (i.e. networks) which may limit one's possibilities but, on the other hand,
they reduce complexity and provide routes to effective decision making and
management of T-0 change. In the long run these structures are not as stable as one
might think since they are constantly shaped through their interplay with action.
They become modified or completely changed, new elements are enacted, existing
elements are shut down, and so on. It is argued that actors manage T-0 change, that
is, they make social choices through managerial decision making by employing a
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viewpoint approach, which enables them to balance the relationship between
possibilities and constraints and produce justifiable and legitimate choices. A few
examples from the empirical cases help illustrate the above:
In order for GB management to act, that is, to make decisions and fulfil them,
they had to choose amongst various options brought to them by their first significant
encounter with ATOC. On one hand, upon deciding on proceeding to T-0 change,
potentially they had indeterminate possibilities regarding which technologies to
adopt and the direction of T-0 change; that is, they had indefinite alternative
possibilities for action within ATOC, which constitute fuzzy interpretations of future
directions. On the other hand, the existence or the enactment of certain structures
makes things more particular. These structures are expressed through the specific
ATOC networks GB got involved in where more specific options were produced
based on constraints relating to GB's particular conditions (i.e. its financial
capabilities, available resources, organisational constraints and resistance, network
politics, direction of corporate strategy) thus making the abstract selection
environment more particular in terms of forming a definite number of realistic
options from which to choose. In short, the final decisions regarding the management
of T-0 change were made on the basis of balancing the relationship between abstract
possibilities for action, on the one hand, and structural constraints that were enacted
during this process, on the other.
Also SIF, in theory, has indeterminate options to establish partnerships with an
infinite number of international suppliers and vendors, has an unlimited number of
possible customers and ad hoc partners. These abstract possibilities are restricted by
the enactment of certain structures that constrain but also reduce complexity and
heterogeneity. Such structures might emerge due to the embeddedness of SIF into
certain historically developed ATOC networks where the role of knowledge and trust
reduce the cost and the risks in the production of social choices in T-0 change
instances. Additionally, the size of SIF and the definite number of resources and
influence they can generate and mobilise at a certain time, also limits the seemingly
infinite options for action. The viewpoint approach explains this process of self-
realisation and consciousness of the relationship between possibilities and constraints
regarding the social choices generated by the challenges of T-0 change, in the eyes
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of an individual actor's management, as it has been shown in chapter six when
discussing the SIF-The Bank relationship.
The viewpoint approach of an individual business organisation, then, in relation
to the management of T-0 change, is the conscious realisation of the relationship
between that individual organisation and the ATOC. In the involvement of a firm in
instances of T-0 change, either as a user or as a supplier, there are certain decisions
to be made regarding the management of T-0 change. In this case, the management
base their decisions on their viewpoint of the ATOC and their position within it.
Through the viewpoint, individual organisations conceive, on one hand, the abstract
possibilities for action and the structural determinants and constraints, on the other. It
helps firms become conscious of the restricted access to ATOC resources as opposed
to the abstract indeterminacy of ATOC, which increases complexity, heterogeneity
and uncertainty in strategic decision-making. Due to the position and role of an actor
within ATOC, they have a restricted ATOC share and the viewpoint approach helps
them realise that. Put differently, the "globality" and intensity of ATOC activities
gives the impression of unlimited possibilities but the limited access to ATOC
resources, power and influence enacts certain structures that cause constraints but
also enable an organisation to become strategically conscious of its condition
through the viewpoint approach and thus make social choices which are more
realistic but also justifiable and legitimate during T-O change.
7.4.1 Sharpening Viewpoints and Building Visions of T-0
Change
Although firms as actors within ATOC employ a viewpoint approach to
strategic management of T-0 change, evidence from this research shows that actors
do not have full control over shaping their viewpoint; the same way they do not have
full control of a T-0 change instance. This research reveals that during instances of
T-0 change the viewpoint of the actors involved goes through a process of
"sharpening". In other words, the position of that actor within ATOC is re-examined,
re-evaluated and re-conceived before social choices are produced. This is usually
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happening within a project-based effort like in the GB case. However, as both
case studies reveal, the sharpening process is not an issue to be solved internally
within the organisational boundaries of an individual organisation. An actor's
viewpoint is rather exposed to ATOC networks and it is sharpened though
negotiations between supply and use. This happens with the involvement of
technological and business knowledge, through organisational politics, conflicting
interests, and so on, during the process of initiation, design and implementation of T-
O change instances.
The viewpoint sharpening during the process of initiation, design and
implementation of a T-0 change instance is a process of building a vision of T-0
change and try to realise it. Based on the sharpening of an actor's viewpoint, that is,
based on the conscious realisation of the abundant possibilities, on one hand, and the
structural determinants, on the other, a certain vision for T-0 change is constructed
and realised through a project based effort. During this process of viewpoint
sharpening, global, indefinite possibilities and trends are linked with particular, local
circumstances and organisational problems of the organisation in question.
Therefore, the initiation, design and implementation of a vision for T-0 change in an
individual organisation is, in essence, a "sharpening" of an actor's viewpoint, which




Figure 7.1: Viewpoint Sharpening and Scope for Social Choice
However, since this process is not happening internally to the organisation and since
a variety of external actors is involved, the process of viewpoint sharpening is
affected by the distribution of control in T-0 change instances. Let us see a couple of
examples from our case studies:
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The sharpening of GB's viewpoint and the building of the vision for the
particular T-O change instance was done with the involvement of various
stakeholders in the reorganisation project. There was a process where the evaluation
committee framed the organisational/business problem of GB and based on that they
built a new vision on which they based the design of the T-0 change instance. The
final choices for the T-0 changes to be made were made by the GB top management.
However, these decisions were not made based only on the technical specifications
and characteristics of the technological products involved but it was more guided by
the social forces governing ATOC. This means that the management decisions that
contributed in the design and implementation of the change vision in the GB case
happened under the influence of the various external specialist actors involved in this
project. The specialist knowledge that GB outsourced and its power to influence
management decisions contributed highly to the final decisions made. The
sharpening of GB's viewpoint and the building of a vision for this particular T-0
change instance which in turn generated social choices, was done by the involvement
of various external actors during a project based effort. This effort emerged out of
the business and technological negotiations between supply and use, between
business and technology specialists, based on the diverse corporate interests of these
heterogeneous actors.
Firms like SIF also have significant involvement in viewpoint sharpening and
vision-building. They provide limited and realistic options for T-0 change to their
customers, by developing proposals for solutions to particular
organisational/business problems and promoting them. Not all system integrators
have the same amount of involvement in viewpoint sharpening and vision building.
The historical evolution of SIF into a more active player proves it. As business firms,
they have their own viewpoint of ATOC, their own access to ATOC resources and
elements and thus their own management which is strategically devoted to managing
the relation of SIF with ATOC and its networks and maintaining or developing their
position within it. Through sharpening the viewpoint of their customers SIF
promotes and supports their own viewpoint, that is, their own perception of ATOC
and their position within it and try to realise it by using it as a guide to the production
of social choices during the initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change
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instances. They are trying to realise their strategic goals based on their own
conscious realisation of the possibilities and constraints that they face within ATOC.
The viewpoint sharpening is illustrated empirically in chapter five in the sections on
the initiation, design and implementation of the particular T-0 change instance
where final choices were influenced by the involvement of external actors. It is also
illustrated in chapter six in the section discussing how SIF develops proposals and
initiates T-0 change instances by trying to influence their customers and sharpen
their viewpoints.
7.4.2 Emergence of Different Viewpoints and Legitimization
of Social Choices
The variety of different corporate viewpoints in a T-0 change instance
empirically emerge when justification and legitimization is sought for the social
choices (and non-choices) that are produced and promoted; that is, final social
choices in relation to a T-0 change instance are justified and legitimated through
their association with a negotiated viewpoint based on the direction of the instance
itself and the vision that it achieves, as it was sharpened during the initiation, design
and implementation of that instance. Therefore, all heterogeneous and diverse actors
are trying to project and promote a T-0 change instance viewpoint, in a sense
detached from any individual actor, as a common point of reference in order for the
social choices made to be justified. The diffusion of a common change discourse is
essential to the creation of an "instance viewpoint" shared by all heterogeneous
actors involved. For instance, although different actors provided a different definition
of the GB instance, they merely projected a justification for the choices associated
with this instance based on a similar shared discourse mainly around the principle of
customer-centrality.
Separate corporate viewpoints emerge representing the different actors-firms
involved in a T-0 change instance. Apart from justifying the final choices during an
instance, there is also a need to justify choices that different actors promote during
negotiations in the initiation, design and implementation phases of an instance. The
process of developing and pursuing justifiable and legitimate social choices during
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instances of T-0 change means that these choices will have to be aligned with the
overall business strategy of the firm producing them. SIF, for instance, might
promote certain social choices within a T-0 change instance through the promotion
of certain technological components. This move will have to be seen as supporting
SIF's overall business strategy. GB similarly, wants to make social choices during
the restructuring effort that will benefit their strategy in the long term. This becomes
apparent when looking at the distribution of control within the instance where
separate corporate viewpoints become differentiated and distinguished. Every
interviewee justifies their participation and the quality of their work according to the
degree of alignment the choices they promote has with the separate overall corporate
strategy of the firm they represent36. They also refer to the success of the T-0 change
instance, the benefits for their personal career development and experience and
through the differences in how different actors reflect on conflicts they have had with
other stakeholders in the project. In the case of employee resistance to change in the
GB case, there were attempts to align these diverse voices with a central GB
viewpoint (or instance viewpoint) by means of changing the organisational culture at
the branch level. Separate corporate viewpoints also become apparent when looking
at processes of allocating responsibility among the stakeholders as they serve as
mechanisms of allocation of responsibility. For instance, when problems were
emerging during the project interviewees tended to differentiate themselves, as firms,
from the other stakeholders and allocate responsibility under such basis. For
example, as a quote in section 5.4 shows, there was differentiation amongst the
external actors as specialist firms with conflicting interests within the instance.
36
The people physically involved in a T-0 change instance need to pursue social choices that will, on
one hand, develop and realise a successful change vision but also promote the interests set by the
overall business strategy of the firm they represent. The first refers to the viewpoint associated with
the direction of a particular T-0 change instance, which might be seen as benefiting the user firm or as
a stand alone successful instance, while the second refers to the alignment between choices pursued
within that instance and the overall strategic goals of the different individual firms involved in it.
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7.5 AGORA OF T-0 CHANGE: A JOURNEY FROM
GLOBAL ABSTRACTION TO LOCAL
PARTICULARITY...AND BACK
Empirical evidence from the case studies provides the necessary basis to
construct a theorisation linking the global emergence and operation of ATOC
conceived by the actors as situated in an international scale and the locally situated
decisions and actions. It is argued here that the cycle of initiation, design and
implementation of T-0 change solutions is actually a cycle from the "abstract" to the
"particular" and back. As shown above, certain local actors like GB have certain
viewpoints of ATOC and their position within it, in relation to an instance of T-0
change. Most of GB's top management projected a certain view of the ATOC in light
of their decision to proceed to reorganisation. In order to justify this decision they
had to place the particular bank and its condition within a wider framework. For
instance, interviewees' narratives referred to the condition of the bank prior to
reorganisation and how it has led to a dead-end situation. They referred to various
problems that were emerging and were mostly related to technology, organization
and culture. In turn, they referred to the situation of the Greek banking sector and
compare GB with other more innovative banks but also with older ones that had
already caught up with international trends. Finally, there were references to
international trends in banking models and technology, i.e. customer centered models
and information systems, based on business and technological principles of universal
scope. All these references describe the ATOC environment and the position of GB
within it, that is, GB's sharpened viewpoint. However, in making certain decisions
regarding the particular T-0 change instance, the local actors had to cover a distance
from the bank's situation prior to reorganization to the global principles of customer
centrality and other banking and technological trends. In other words, a process that
would link the abstract, distant, global conceptions of trends and developments in
banking and technologies with the more particular settings of the national
environment of Greek banking and eventually with the organizational settings of GB,
was initiated in light of the decision to proceed to an instance of T-0 change towards
reorganization of the bank's business model. Therefore, the linkages between global
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socio-economic relations of rhetorical T-0 models supply would have to be
linked with GB's T-0 change instance, as the social situation within which social
choices were generated, negotiated and decided. This alignment process was
empirically illustrated in chapter five when discussing the processes of initiation,
design and implementation of the GB T-0 change instance. It can be described as a
journey from the "abstract" global socio-economic environment of ATOC to the
"particular" settings of a T-0 change instance. This is a process of "ATOC
particularization", as shown in figure 7.2 later on. While the process of making
choices is unfolding during the initiation, design and implementation of a T-0
change instance, ATOC is brought closer and it is configured into that particular
instance. Most of the abstract indeterminate possibilities are excluded with the choice
of one (or a combination of certain possibilities), heterogeneity and complexity are
gradually reduced, networks are more clear and so on. The initial choice of the GB,
for example, to proceed to a large scale restructuring effort and with no previous
consistent relationship with ATOC, brought them in front of an abstract,
indeterminate and uncertain environment. Gradually, as the particular instance was
designed and implemented, subsequent choices have made that abstract environment
more particular and have configured it into the specific instance. SIF also, as an
ATOC professional, contributes to such ATOC particularizations by opening certain
channels through which they offer alternative ATOC configurations into various
local T-0 change instances.
On the other hand, there is the opposite process from the particular T-0
change instance to the abstract ATOC environment. It is argued that this reverse
process of "ATOC abstraction" is taking place merely through the same channels as
particularisation. The process of abstraction means that the elements that constituted
the particular T-0 model in a particular organisation might possibly take the road
back to abstraction, become 'rhetorical T-0 models' in relation to another instance in
another organisation, again through strategic planning and choices by the actors
articulating such elements. In the GB case, for instance, one of the competing
consortia was from an Irish bank that had developed a model in-house and they
wanted to sell it to the GB as well. Thus, the T-0 model of this Irish bank constituted
one option, a rhetorical model, for GB. It could have been selected, but it was not.
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Similarly, GB could do the same thing in the future if they find a way to market
their model and develop the relevant expertise to support it. This is a possibility and
it depends on GB's strategic plans and capabilities37.
Another way that the particular T-O change instance in GB might take the
route to abstraction is through the experts involved. The accumulated experience the
specialist firms acquire from the participation in various instances of T-0 change in
various organisational contexts and different customers might lead to the
development of standardised packages by suppliers specialising in banking
technologies. A pre-sales manager from SIF explains how packages are developed:
Packages are built based on the experiences ofa firm which started some day
making a packagefor customer satisfaction, for instance... Since the needs ofa firm
in terms ofcustomer satisfaction are more or less common from onefirm to another,
the firm that developed this software thought: why don't I sell it next door as well? In
order to do that and sell it next door and next to the next door, etc. there is a
common core. This common core was kept and became a package. Therefore, a firm
with many years ofexperience will develop such packages since they showed with
their experience that the components oftheir package are the ones the market needs.
One customer cannot give you the truth, but ifyou have done some things in ten
customers, then you start realizing some common characteristics. Also, theforces
and rules ofa market pose various standards about how processes should be done,
how transactions should be done, etc. Ofcourse, package developers will have to
take these standards into consideration. (PSD, pre-sales manager, interview
26/11/2004)
Accumulated experience from various instances of T-0 change then becomes
reconfigured into generic products that could be sold to various customers.
Therefore, it becomes a rhetorical T-0 model, a possibility for user organisations
under a certain degree of abstraction. Of course, the process of abstraction, as shown
in the above quote, is also led by market forces, and factors that regulate them.
However, not all supplier firms develop standardised packages. The decision to do so
is also depended on the market situation and the capabilities of the firm, that is, on
the firm's corporate viewpoint and its strategic realisation. The same interviewee
illustrates their viewpoint which explains why SIF has not developed such a package:
7
The story of the Irish bank reveals the changing or multiple role of banking institutions. They are
not only credit institutions but they are in a position to develop T-0 solutions, IT, specialist business
knowledge and market it internationally. They are simultaneously ATOC users and ATOC suppliers.
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In order to do such a packagingyou look at the cost. You need a series of
resources that will be devoted to this package. They will maintain it, they will
promote it in the market, you '11 have sellers for it, that is, you have a circle.
Therefore, you think after that: how many customers do I havefrom then on in order
to maintain this product in the market. Ifthere is one or two, then it's not worth it.
Therefore, in our customers we do not resell our solutions from one bank to another,
there is not a package, rather we use our experience in order to find a solution that
willfit to their requirements. For example, we use a lot our experience in
infrastructure: we can set up network, servers, we can do rollout, and so on. This
might not be a package but it is a solution. (PSD, pre-sales manager, interview
26/11/2004)
Therefore, SIF do not configure their accumulated experience into a specific product
to be sold in a wide market and thus contributing this way in ATOC abstraction,
since they do not see any prospects for profit from that action. On the other hand,
they are involved in abstraction processes by using their experience from various
instances of T-0 change in a more segmented way. Technological and contingent
organisational knowledge from various customers have given them the ability to
develop realistic proposals for their customers, towards further ATOC
particularisations. This is another way of managing and commercially exploiting
expertise and experience on T-0 change.
As mentioned in chapter two there is some work that has been done in
explaining such processes (see Pollock et al, 2003 on generification38). Here,
however, it is argued that such processes of generification, of developing more
universal technologies are also processes of abstraction, from the particular to the
abstract. They are also part of the cycle of initiation, design and implementation of
T-0 change solution within ATOC, when it comes to conceiving the links between
global universal processes and trends with local organisational circumstances and
instances of T-O change. It is also argued that the process of abstraction is taking
place through similar channels with the process ofparticularisation, which are
developed within networks and are managed and governed by market forces and
dynamics and the development and interaction of business strategies39.
38
Generification is defined as "supplier strategies for taking a technology that has worked in one
place and attempting to make it work elsewhere, and, in principle 'everywhere'" (Pollock et al,
2003:318).
39
In this thesis I did not examine processes of abstraction in depth, rather I discussed it as a







Figure 7.2: ATOCparticularization and abstraction processes
The driving forces of the ATOC particularisation and abstraction processes
are related to the characteristics and nature of ATOC as an environment of socio¬
economic relations amongst diverse and heterogeneous actors. ATOC is
characterised by market characteristics of supply, demand, competition and
collaboration. Therefore, the processes of particularisation and abstraction are
happening within such a frame. Within these market settings the social choices of
actors-firms and the way they manage T-O change is also a driving force of ATOC
particularisation and abstraction. Since, however, there is so much heterogeneity and
complexity within ATOC, there are also many different scenarios of particularisation
and abstraction, based on the particular circumstances of different cases. Therefore,
ATOC configuration into a particular T-O change instance may happen in many
different ways although standardisation processes might create more fixed and
global trends in T-O models to particular instances of T-O change, and back. In absence of in-depth
working examples from the case studies, it is hard to assess the utility of the abstraction process as an
analytical concept. However, it is introduced here as another possibility to direct social choices for
actors and it is supported by already existing research.
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understandings of ATOC configurations where the channels and mechanisms of
ATOC particularisation and abstraction appear more stabilised (i.e SIF-The Bank
relationship). Both the processes of ATOC abstraction and particularisation
contribute to the effectuation, realisation and expansion of a cycle of development,
supply, adoption and use of ATOC configurations. In this cycle, the material and
non-material, the technological and the organisational, the social and the technical,
the contextualised and the generic, the distant and the proximate, merge and are
shaped through actors' social choices and non-choices within social and economic
relations between the global knowledge economy and local instances of T-0 change.
7.6 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter the empirical case studies were analysed by the use of newly
formulated analytical tools. The concept of instances of T-0 change which re¬
directed the analytical focus, the paralleling of the analyst's view with the actor's
view and the concept of ATOC sketch the social choices and the processes that link
local T-0 change instances with the socio-economic environment of the global
knowledge economy and supply of technological solutions for
organisational/business problems. Within this framework the relationship between
T&O can be understood as it is constructed through T-0 change in business firms.
With the concept of techno-organisational various aspects of T&O are captured and
challenges for actors are revealed. The management of these challenges is explained
by the concept of viewpoint approach to strategic management of T-0 change which
illustrates managerial decision making as action that produces social choices (and
non-choices) within the social situation of a T-0 change instance. The gradual
emergence of actors-firms in the case studies illustrates that in order for complex
actors to act within an ATOC multi-actor and multi-level environment, the
production and promotion of legitimate, justifiable and accountable social choices is
necessary and the viewpoint approach to strategic management of T-0 change offers
this possibility. For the production of such social choices actors are going through a
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process of conceiving themselves as part of a wider socio-economic environment
and through managing possibilities and constraints they develop strategic planning.
The globalisation of the knowledge economy and the identification of the
global-local paradox raise issues regarding the practical and analytical linking of
these different levels through multilevel and multidimensional theoretical-analytical
understandings of the relationship between T&O. The global-local paradox
constitutes both an analytical and practical issue. Essentially, it is an issue of
conception of how actions, trends, social relations, the social in general, may be
conceived with reference to many different levels that refer both to the width and the
range the social might be seen as covering (macro, meso, micro) but also to the time
span within which the social might be seen as unfolding (long term, short term).
Therefore, the global might be referring to macro, long term societal trends and
transformations as they can be analytically conceived to describe and explain society
in general while the local might be referring to meso and micro, shorter term
moments and social relations, such as, an instance of T-0 change. The analytical link
between these can be provided by an appropriate theorisation (i.e. ATOC theory). On
the other hand, the global-local paradox also constitutes a practical issue, that is, an
issue for the actors involved in social relations. It takes the form of challenges
emerging from the need to link abstract indeterminate possibilities with local
particular circumstances in the production of social choices or non-choices during
the initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change instances. An analytical,
conceptual issue acquires a practical essence as shown in these case studies due to
the fact that actors base their actions on the development, sharpening and
employment of certain viewpoints, which are conceptual conscious realisations of





THE AGORA OF TECHNO-ORGANISATIONAL
CHANGE: TOWARDS A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF
TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANISATION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, two detailed longitudinal case studies of T-0 transformations in
the Greek banking industry were examined. The first study was about a large scale,
radical restructuring effort around the Greek Bank (GB), which was initiated,
designed and implemented under the vision transforming the particular business firm
from a product oriented business model to a customer-centred. The way this
particular case was approached reflects the suggestion of an alternative research
design and analytical perspective. This new approach places at the centre of attention
instances of T-0 change which it links with the wider socio-economic environment
within which it emerges, stretching out to a global level of the knowledge economy.
The second case study refers to the involvement of a systems integrator firm (SIF) in
the initiation, design and implementation of T-O change instances to a wider
customer base. In this study, although T-0 change instances remain at the centre of
attention, it is not only one separate instance that is examined, rather sets of
instances. The important role and increased responsibility and control that external
specialists and suppliers had in the GB case shifted the interest of the thesis from
exploring individual instances to exploring the way actors like SIF conceive the
ATOC environment and strategically plan and negotiate their role and involvement
in the initiation, design and implementation of small or large scale T-0 change
instances. Approaching T-0 change instances through the perspective of particular
actors reveals important information on how these different actors conceive, interpret
and manage such instances and the socio-economic relations they emerge from. The
ATOC concept provides a useful tool in capturing the social and economic
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environment that links local, particular T-0 change instances with the global,
indeterminate, abstract knowledge economy. The empirical case studies, then, were
examined as part of such a socio-economic environment. This thesis aims at
exploring, describing and explaining this environment while revealing how the
various actors involved in it act upon and manage the challenges it creates for T-0
change through the production and promotion of social choices. On the other hand,
the introduction of the ATOC concept along with the analytical and methodological
suggestions discussed in chapter three also open up a space for discussion on the
theoretical, analytical and epistemological contributions of this thesis.
This chapter consists of two main parts. Its structure is based on chapter three
and the formulation of two sets of research questions; a set of more general and
theoretical and a set of more particular and empirical questions. The first part of the
chapter discusses the ATOC as a space for practice, based on which the empirical
cases acquire meaning, reflecting the more empirical questions on what ATOC is and
how it operates. The empirical material of the two case studies offers some insight on
how ATOC as a space for action could be defined, based on how different actors
conceive and understand it. It is therefore seen as a space for T-0 change, as a
knowledge market, or market for T-0 change resources, and as a political arena. The
relationship between individual actors-firms and the ATOC as a practice
environment is also discussed and certain challenges for the management of T-0
change are flagged, as well as the way they are strategically approached by actors. In
the second part of the chapter, the theoretical, analytical and epistemological
contributions of the thesis and the ATOC theory are explored, reflecting the more
general and theoretical set of research questions. The action-structure and the
technology-organisation relationships are theorised, and the theoretical-analytical
capabilities of the ATOC concept are explored, pointing to the direction of a new
sociology of T&O. In this chapter then, the implications for practice but also for
theory and analysis are discussed, based on empirical material-theory co-
development.
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8.2 PART ONE: EXLORING THE AGORA OF T-O
CHANGE
8.2.1 ATOC as a Space for T-O change
Concepts such as network innovation (Swan & Scarbrough, 2005),
distributed organising (Orlikowski, 2002), innovation space (Tidd et al, 2005), and
development arenas (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 1999), suggest that innovation is
increasingly happening outside organisational boundaries of a firm and theorise
spaces where certain socio-economic relations contribute to the shaping of certain
technologies or organisations. For this reason in chapter three it is suggested that
social choice in relation to the shaping of T&O should be sought not within the
actor's organisational structures rather within the social situation within which the
actor is involved and generates that social choice. Reflecting on such literature, this
study suggests that T-O change as a social situation which generates social choice is
increasingly moving outside particular organisational boundaries and is placed
within more complex ATOC networks. Examples from the cases support this shift:
GB, for instance, historically had a restricted and inconsistent exposure to ATOC
networks and this large reorganisation project, which must be analysed as occurring
within ATOC instead of within GB's organisational boundaries by using internal
expertise and other resources. Also, SIF's relationships with their customers reveal
the role of a system integrator firm in opening up such spaces, various different
routes of ATOC particularisation and how the relationship with ATOC is managed
and maintained. The increasing outsourcing of T-O change has put to the fore inter-
organisational and inter-firm networks as increasingly significant in the shaping of
T&O. In house development of T-O change also involves an ATOC, in a sense of
involving inter-organisational networks (see Fincham et al, 1994 on in-house
restructuring based on the mobilisation ofprofessional networks), however, in this
study ATOC emerges in a way where distinctions can be made from the past and
evolutions to be spotted in ATOC's nature. This is due to its conception and
definition through the viewpoints of the actors involved in it, and since viewpoints
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are also evolving with time ATOC is also seen as evolving and can be
constructed and interpreted differently in different cases depending on the actors'
viewpoints. In the GB case, for example, T-0 change can be spotted within ATOC
networks as opposed to previous T-0 change instances they have been through, most
of which were in-house and with limited external networking involved. This suggests
an expansion of ATOC, on one hand, and its fluidity, on the other, in terms of the
diversity of technological solutions for solving similar problems and also the
plurality in supply strategies.
ATOC, therefore, is a socio-economic space within which T-0 change
occurs. It involves choices, negotiations and interactions of diverse actors that shape
the T-O relationship as they take place within the wider ATOC space. They are not
restricted in spaces such as the organisational environment of the user, or arenas and
networks defined by certain technological artefacts, industrial fields or organisational
actors and relations. The ATOC as a space for T-0 change shows how the abstract,
indeterminate socio-economic environment of the global knowledge economy can be
realised and systematically linked with particular local instances of T-O change.
8.2.2 ATOC as a Knowledge Market
ATOC as an emerging and expanding space where T-O change is taking
place has various other characteristics and dynamics that shape the way it operates.
Empirical findings of this study offer useful insights on what kind of environment
ATOC is, what it includes and how it is challenging for the actors involved in it. In
this section ATOC is revealed as a market, in terms of its structure and its driving
dynamics but also in terms of its particular content.
First of all, ATOC is a market, or better a market space. The increasing
demand for technologies and technological solutions by business organisations and
the emergence of ATOC professionals and experts in the supply side create the
dynamics of a market governed by supply and demand. It is also characterised by
competition, collaboration and abides to the formulation of an arena where social,
economic, but also cultural, political and moral relations are formed, based on the
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circulation of knowledge, the construction of beliefs, reputations, and competing
visions. The pervasiveness of technologies and business models and their ability to
become configured, re-configured and applied in various industrial activities means
that ATOC has the ability to penetrate through various sectors and industrial fields
and become configured through various T-0 change instances in various business
environments as part of the processes of ATOC particularisation and abstraction. The
markets for technological solutions for organisational/business problems although
they might be stabilised and embedded in certain socio-economic and moral
relations, also present a degree of fluidity in the way they are configured and
penetrate various industrial fields. This becomes visible when looking at how SIF, as
an ATOC professional from the supply side, enters different industrial activities. In
other words, the market networks of supply, demand, competition and collaboration
are not static and fixed, as the notion of embeddedness of the new economic
sociology (Granovetter, 1985; Smelser & Swedberg, 1994) would suggest. The co¬
existence of embedded and ad hoc networks and relations refers to the relationship
between embeddedness and embodiment of ATOC for the management of resources,
power and influence.
Regarding the content of the ATOC as a market, in relation to T-0 change,
relevant discussion can be made in relation to commercialisation and
commoditisation of T-0 change. As shown in chapter two, literature on the
commoditisation of technologies and organisational processes appears one-
dimensional, focusing either on technologies or organisations. Findings from this
study contribute in integrating different aspects of commoditisation of knowledge,
artefacts and organisational processes into the concept of commoditisation of T-0
change. More particularly, this study suggests that the relationship between T&O can
be understood as a situated convergence between technologies (or technological
systems) with particular organisational structures and Company Social Constitutions
into a commercial commodity that can be developed, sold and bought. This
convergence happens through instances of T-0 change. Nonetheless, there are
problems and limits in commoditising complex organisational technologies and
change management techniques. This is because of difficulties in assessing
technological capabilities, which make technologies fit into different organisational
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settings. Those limits, however, do not stop the processes of commoditisation and
commercialisation of T-0 change; rather, they place them within the
problematisation and negotiation environment of T-0 change instances where social
choices emerge and shape T&O. In other words, if commoditisation was a complete,
unlimited and absolute process, T-0 change instances would not be as challenging
and problematic. ATOC as a market, then, is based on such processes of
commoditisation and commercialisation of T-0 change where artefacts, knowledge
and expertise merge into commerciable products and services. This would make
ATOC a knowledge market based on the idea that different types of knowledge is
mobilised in order for T-0 change instances to be carried out.
If the relationship between T&O is seen as projected through configurations
of different forms of knowledge embodied in technological artefacts, organisational
processes, people, this study would suggest that another distinction can be made
between technological and organisational/business knowledge, apart from more
traditional distinctions such as tacit-explicit, universal-contingent. The case studies
show that there are processes of problematisation of organisation in business terms,
translation of the problem into technological terms and development of technological
solutions to solve these problems. The SIF case study where there is reference to the
processes of development of proposals for solutions, the recording of the operational
requirements and their translation into technological/system requirements, shows that
technological and organisational/business expertise is mobilised and employed.
During the various phases of initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change,
different types of experts, belonging to different organisational units of SIF are
mobilised to negotiate the initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change.
Organisationally, this expertise is distributed throughout the human resources of SIF
either as organisational/business expertise or as technological expertise, with some
personnel demonstrating a hybrid expertise either due to many years of experience in
the field, or due to relevant background and training.
ATOC as a knowledge market, therefore, reveals extended networks and
structures of supply and demand, governed by relations of competition and
collaboration. It also reveals that knowledge is mobilised and marketed within
ATOC in many different forms, as codified in artefacts, embodied in persons and in
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organisational structures. Finally, the distinction between technological and
organisational/business expertise in T-0 change instances reveals how various firms
approach knowledge management issues in managing ATOC as a knowledge market.
8.2.3 ATOC as a Political Arena
The ATOC as a space for T-0 change and a knowledge market also reveals
an arena for the emergence of ATOC politics. Some sociology of markets has talked
about market politics with emphasis on the relationship between markets and the
state as a regulatory mechanism (Lindblom, 1977; see Lie, 1997 for a review). On
the other hand, there is some literature in innovation studies that has emphasised the
role of organisational politics of innovation deriving from the different conflicting
particular interests of the actors involved as well as the status of different types of
knowledge mobilised (Swan & Scarbrough, 2005; McLoughlin & Badham, 2005).
Research findings of this study integrate these two literatures by showing that the
political aspect of ATOC is far wider than the role of state intervention as a
regulatory mechanism and it includes also organisational politics, informal networks,
conflicts between corporate interests and conflicts between diverse types of specialist
knowledge. Politics in T-0 change, then, do not refer only to the intervention of the
state and other regulatory bodies but also to social action of the actors involved as a
political action in the sense that it supports certain interests of various actors.
Additionally, a wider definition ofpolitics should have limits without including
everything, as the political process approach would imply (Dawson et al, 2000);
rather, the political character of social and economic relations should be identified
carefully on a case-by-case basis. In this study, the political characteristics of T-0
change within ATOC are identified both in the intervention of the state as an actor
rather than as an external regulatory body and also in the motives justifying the
social choices of actors trying to defend their interests during T-0 change instances.
By illustrating business firms as complex actors within ATOC and with the
distribution of control that the empirical cases reveal, the notion of actor politics
takes a special meaning. It moves away from a restricted conception of actor politics
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as organizational politics and conflicts and makes visible the politics involved at
the level of inter-firm relations. ATOC, as a multi-actor market environment with
stable and fluid networks is a heterogeneous and complex environment due to the
diversity of the resources mobilised and circulated in it and also due to the diversity
of actors involved in it. The diversity of resources creates heterogeneity and
complexity in terms of providing an indeterminate selection environment and the
diversity of actors and their active involvement in social choices during initiation,
design and implementation of T-0 change creates tensions due to the distributed
control, competition, diverse interests of actors, diverse strategic goals and channels
for achieving them. This latter notion of ATOC politics questions traditional notions
of market regulation as something deriving from more traditional sources like the
state and sees regulation as a wider concept where the role of corporate decision
making is quite as important, as Gordon would suggest (Gordon, 1996).
To summarise, the identification of the ATOC space as a political arena
integrates notions of politics of innovation that identified at the level of market
regulation and state intervention, organisational politics and conflicts, and politics at
the level of inter-firm relations relating to the strategic management of the distributed
control of T-O change.
8.2.4 ATOC and the Actor
The heterogeneity, complexity, diversity of actors and resources within
ATOC and the way it can be configured across industries and sectors through
processes of particularisation and abstraction makes it hard to account for objectively
defined ATOC boundaries as a space linking T-0 change instances with the global
environment of the knowledge economy. The importance of individual
organisations' corporate decision-making points towards an actor-based definition of
ATOC's boundaries. They can be identified when looking at particular T-0 change
instances and mapping the way particular networks were configured during that
instance. Also, the processes of particularisation and abstraction, that is, the
particular way ATOC becomes effectuated in relation to that particular instance will
be explained through the identification of the mechanisms and socio-economic
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relations that generate and finalise the negotiated social choices by the actors
involved in that instance. Nonetheless, ATOC can be defined through the paralleling
of the analyst's view with the actor's view. Actors define ATOC based not only on
their involvement in actual specific ATOC networks, but also on their conception of
the networks and the environment that they are not necessarily part of, but are still
aware of its existence. For instance, The Bank, is mostly part of the SIF and MSIF
network of technology supply since they feel more secure by being part of this long
term well established network. They are aware, however, of the alternatives that IBM
Hellas might offer. ATOC for them is defined through their actual experience with
their relationship with ATOC networks. It is also defined by the networks and
elements of ATOC that they are not part of, either due to conscious decision-making
(action) or due to inability to gain access to such networks (structural constraints).
This definition of ATOC as a space involving elements that individual actors-firms
have access to and networks they are part of but also elements and networks that
actors are not a part of, reveals a more dynamic nature of the relationship between
ATOC and individual actors. This is because it allows for change to happen and
leaves room where social choice is important. In other words, ATOC is a market, a
mechanism of linking supply with demand and the actor-based definition of its
boundaries reveals how ATOC is amenable to change through corporate decision
making by individual organisations where choices become more visible within the
frame of abstract, indeterminable possibilities that ATOC has to offer, but also the
constraints that might prevent actors or direct them away from accessing certain
ATOC elements and resources.
The identification of ATOC as a knowledge market, a space of T-0 change
and a political arena ranging from local T-0 change instances to the global
knowledge economy with subjectively defined boundaries contributes to the
understanding of an organisation's external environment. This environment is rather
complex and challenging, involving multiple actors and levels of understanding
where actors' differing perceptions of it is quite important in understanding how it
works and how to strategically manage the challenges it poses. Social choice for the
management of T-0 change is what shapes and gives substance to the actors-firms.
In this study actors-firms emerge because certain choices that need to be made need
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justification and legitimization. The ATOC environment where these choices
occur gives rise to the actor-firm and their viewpoint, which emerges in order to
legitimise and justify them. In turn, these choices contribute to the ATOC
particularisation and thus actors through social choice emerge and shape ATOC.
Respectively, ATOC as a challenging environment shapes the nature of individual
actors-firms, or better, their viewpoints of ATOC with the challenges it poses, which
generate social choices. It could be argued, then, that there is a co-shaping between
the ATOC and the actor at the level of capturing such a relationship analytically.
8.2.5 ATOC Challenges for T-0 Change Management
The exploration of the ATOC as a space of action of various diverse actors
cannot be complete before establishing its challenging nature for the actors involved
and operating in it. The nature of ATOC as a space of T-0 change, as a knowledge
market and as a political arena, as well as the fact that it does not have objectively
defined boundaries, creates certain challenges for the actors involved in it, as shown
in section 7.3 of the previous chapter. Based on empirical data, the challenges





networks for resources, power and influence
Figure 8.1: ATOC challenges
More particularly, issues emerging from the participation in the initiation, design and
implementation of T-0 change instances affect corporate management and strategy
as follows:
How do I identify and manage all the possibilities that ATOC might offer in
relation to the constraints that emerge from my position and role within
ATOC?
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How do I decide how to balance the relationship between embeddedness
and embodiment of ATOC in terms of accessing and balancing external with
internal resources?
What is the importance of networks and how do I decide and manage which
networks I am part of?
How do I manage heterogeneity and reduce complexity and uncertainty when
having to make decisions on T-0 change?
How am I able to make decisions at all within an environment of distributed
control?
The way these challenges are structured and presented, reveals the paradoxical
features of ATOC as a complex and heterogeneous socio-economic space within
which different actors and viewpoints might be clashing or aligned, competing or
collaborating. Something might be a possibility for one actor but a constraint for
another. This also shows that there is not a single solution for such challenges. After
establishing the importance of corporate management and decision making for the
initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change instances within ATOC, the
above challenges show the focus of corporate management towards resolving
emerging problems of T-0 change.
These challenges might lead to the production of social choices or non-
choices by the actors facing and strategically assessing them, meaning that actors,
based on their viewpoints, decide a scope for action. They might decide to proceed to
a radical large or small scale T-O change, but there is also the possibility of not
doing anything at all. This possibility for non-choice or non-action emerges from this
empirical research and it can be spotted mainly in the initiation phase of a T-0
change instance but also during the design and implementation phases, when a
decision is made to exclude certain possibilities altogether and not take action. This
is an important achievement of this research as it suggests a wider conception of
social choice by the exemplification of non-choice, which highlights the degree of
rationality of actors during decision-making. The concept of action as social choice,
as an analytical category must also include non-choice because it reveals how
complex actors, such as firms, based on a certain dominant "socially constructed"
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rationality decide and shape a certain scope for action in a given challenging
social situation, even before they act. The concepts of choice and non-choice take
meaning in the context that they emerge depending on what are the challenges which
generate them, and how they were conceived in terms of possibilities and constraints.
Non-choice might refer to possibilities that were not selected, or not considered for
selection. It can be defined either in relation to lack of access to alternative
possibilities due to ATOC embeddedness restrictions, or in relation to conscious
neglect of certain possibilities for action, depending on actors' strategies and visions
of the future.
The above could inform the management of technology and strategy
literatures by offering a more realistic, more relativist and less mechanistic focus, by
understanding management challenges as portrayed by the actors facing them. To
summarise, the challenges of T-0 change management are: access to relevant
resources, power and influence within ATOC while making or not making and
negotiating social choices through balancing possibilities and constraints during the
initiation, design and implementation of technological solutions for
organisational/business problems.
8.2.6 Facing ATOC Challenges: A Viewpoint Approach
The prospect of a T-0 change instance creates a challenging social situation
where actors are required to make decisions on certain choices as well as the
promotion and negotiation of these decisions with other actors within ATOC. In
doing so, they employ a viewpoint approach, that is, they start examining their
strategic identity and their relationship with their environment. It is argued that
viewpoints are developed by the immediate access to experiences but also by the
imagination of non-experiences, that is, the ability of actors to imagine the
environment they are not directly part of, through secondary information. Different
actors have different viewpoints of ATOC because they are embedded in different,
alternative networks within ATOC. They embody different kinds of ATOC elements,
and they conceive in different ways the rest of the ATOC networks that they are not
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part of. The differences in viewpoints of different actors are also due to their
different roles, different or competing strategic interests and access to different
resources. They emerge because of the distributed and networked character of T-0
change within diverse and heterogeneous ATOC networks; they are illustrated when
seen within a T-0 change instance. The viewpoint of an actor is important for the
management of T-0 change because it helps them become conscious of their
relationship with ATOC in order to conceive and manage the possibilities it offers
them in relation to the emerging constraints, when they find themselves in a social
situation that generates social choices or non-choices.
The viewpoint approach - the consciousness of an actor in reference to
themselves and their environment - their capabilities and their possibilities for
choice, narrows down the scope for action in T-0 change instances. This happens, as
shown in chapter seven, during the process of viewpoint sharpening where abstract,
abundant ATOC possibilities become particular in order to fit local specific
organisational settings.
As shown in chapter two, strategic management of technology literature has
been struggling since the 1980s to find ways to incorporate technology strategy into
the overall corporate strategy of a business organisation (Husain & Sushil, 1997).
The viewpoint notion reveals how certain social choices directed to management of
T-0 change can be seen as part of the overall corporate and business strategy of the
organisation. This is not to suggest that a centralised management exists within
organisations and that all the individuals within organisation share similar views on
what would be the right choices, that there are not organisational conflicts and so on.
On the contrary, it is suggested that the conflicts and the negotiations are extended
from within organisational boundaries into the ATOC space and the process of
decision making is a rather complex process negotiated amongst the diverse actors
involved directly in a T-0 change instance. Individuals directly involved in T-0
change instances, however, represent business firms which need to be benefited by
the social choices of this particular instance. Alignment between the social choices
promoted by an actor in a T-0 change instance and its overall business strategy is,
therefore, required. This alignment is desirable because this way the decisions made
during the initiation, design and implementation of a T-0 change instance and their
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promotion, appear as fully justifiable, legitimate and accountable since they are
aligned with the overall strategic goals of an organisation. In the GB case, for
instance, the decision to adopt a certain software package was aligned with the
decision for restructuring from product-centred business model to customer
orientation. In summary, an actor's viewpoint serves as a basis of legitimizing and
justifying social choices during T-0 change instances in the process of aligning
technology strategy with overall business strategy, even though actors do not have
full control to sharpen their viewpoint. This means that the alignment of social
choices made during T-0 change with their overall business strategy, although
desirable, does not guarantee success and efficiency. That is, although choices might
be legitimate and justified, they are not necessarily optimal under given
circumstances. Nonetheless, the concept of viewpoint embodies the dominant
rationale expressed by complex actors, like business firms. It constitutes a resource
for social choice, which is constructed through historical processes and it is re¬
examined through sharpening processes and, finally, it is realised in instances of T-0
change through legitimizing and justifying the social choices it generates.
It could be argued here that the management of T-0 change, that is, the
management of the challenges during instances of T-0 change, could be seen as
synonymous with the management of viewpoints. The final decisions made for a T-O
change instance emerge out of the interaction of various viewpoints as they are
sharpened during the initiation, design and implementation of that instance. In the
final stage of viewpoint sharpening the organisation, either user or system integrator,
is in a position to consciously realise the meaning and the significance the final
negotiated decisions have for their corporate and technology strategy.
The shift away from more managerial to more political and processual
understandings of T-0 change, discussed in chapter two, has illustrated the
importance of organisational politics and processes; it also shifted the interest away
from strategic centralised decision making within the firm towards a networked,
multi-firm social situation. Social choices and action are theorised as part of
organisational conflicts and politics, while more complex action is not captured
under a single concept. Firms, then, lose their status as paramount actors capable of
shaping T&O within a complex ATOC environment, while innovation is accounted
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for through negotiations between actors positioned within different organisational
hierarchies, promoting differentiated interests and agendas. The social situation of a
T-0 change instance is no doubt challenging for individuals within organisations in
terms of their interests being jeopardised. However, ATOC theory and the viewpoint
approach are re-establishing firms as important actors producing social choices
although without losing awareness of the complexity of the actor. The viewpoint
approach as a management tool pulls organisational politics and conflicts - that is,
social choice in Political Process Approach terms - towards an alignment with the
corporate viewpoint of the firm during the process of viewpoint sharpening. The
viewpoint as a management approach, thus, promotes and pursues an ethical
commitment to a dominant rationality overarching separate individual political
interests. This way central management reclaims action and social choice during
instances of T-0 change as it can be accounted for within broader ATOC networks
and not just within restricted organisational boundaries. The viewpoint approach to
strategic management of T-0 change shows how semiotic power and micro-political
power are integrated into a disciplining power (see McLoughlin, 1999:159-164), a
dominant rationale, which represents actors' viewpoints of ATOC, by placing a T-0
change instance within a multi-actor, multi-level networked environment. By
conceiving ATOC as a space of practice and action, the firm as an actor emerges and
claims action and social choice during T-0 change instances. Actors-firms are
represented by their viewpoint, which absorbs internal organisational politics and
conflicts and instead politicises inter-firm relationships within wider ATOC
networks of technology supply and use.
In terms of social choice as strategic choice, the viewpoint concept shows
that social choice is not only influenced by the external social and political
environment as Child (1972) suggests, or just by internal conflicts and political
negotiations of individual or group interests and agendas. The viewpoint pulls
internal organisational politics towards the externally influenced viewpoint
sharpening process and aligns them towards a commitment to a dominant rationality
of T-0 change. Viewpoint also provides legitimization and justification of social
choice and non-choice, both in terms of strategic management of T-0 change but
also in terms of managing internal conflicts and processes during implementation.
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The way management frames this alignment might point to the understanding of
organisational politics either as disruptive and therefore eliminated by the viewpoint
approach or as constructive and therefore included in the sharpening process towards
a more robust decision-making process. The viewpoint approach as a management
tool resolves issues mentioned above by helping central management to reclaim
action within a complex social situation. As an analytical concept, the viewpoint
helps to link socio-economic relations at a micro-level within organisational
boundaries with socio-economic relations at the level of inter-organisational
networks. It helps capturing the relationship between single separate individual
rationalities with more complex wider collective rationalities.
Viewpoint approach What it is What does it do
Dominant rationale of a complex Narrows down choices
actor
Management mechanism to Rationalisation, justification and
produce and promote choices legitimization of choices
Mechanism for actors to Links technology strategy with




Figure 8.2: Viewpoint approach: what it is and what does it do.
In the first part of this chapter, the ATOC as an action and practice space was
explored, based on the empirical findings of the case studies. Certain characteristics
were identified in relation to its nature, the way it can be challenging for the actors
involved in it during instances of T-0 change as well as how such actors approach
and resolve the ATOC challenges. In the second part of the thesis, the theoretical,
analytical and epistemological implications of the ATOC theory are explored, in an
attempt for theory development in parallel with the empirically based exploration of
ATOC as a practice space.
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8.3 PART TWO: TOWARDS A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF
TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANISATION
The exploration of the ATOC concept through the examination of empirical
cases in Greece has made it possible for such empirical material to contribute to
further theoretical, analytical and epistemological advancements. More particularly,
based on the empirical findings this thesis is able to present interesting developments
in the theorisation of action and structure, of technology and organisation, of micro
and macro and global local, fundamental distinctions in social sciences, which have
also influenced the interdisciplinary study of the T-0 relationship, as shown in
chapter two. In the following sections it is discussed how the ATOC theory may
contribute to the theorisation of such analytical distinctions and make analytical and
epistemological statements which will point to the direction of a new sociology of
T&O.
8.3.1 Theorising Action and Structure
The emergence of the business firm as a paramount actor in the shaping of
T&O offers new dimensions in the explanation of the motive for action as social
choice or non-choice made during T-0 change instances. In existing STS literature
scholars have talked about relevant actors, actions, relevant social groups that make
social choices in the shaping of a technology or an organisation (i.e. Koch, 1994).
However, such actions, such social choices influencing the shaping of T&O have not
been conceived as actions or choices initiated on the basis of making business
decisions. Such actors, when making certain decisions, which shape a technology or
an organisation or both, have not necessarily an intention to do so, as their main
activity might not be technology or organisation development. They are rather
engaged in decisions and actions that influence the T&O relationship by means of
improving their business opportunities. SIF, for instance, although it belongs to the
supply side of technologies, would not have an interest in developing a high-tech
technological application unless there were business prospects to profit from the
marketing of this application. This does not mean that technologies and organisations
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are shaped by unconscious side effects of business activities. Instead it is
suggested that the nature and corporate identity of such actors as business
organisations within a certain environment and certain strategic goals, determines the
consciousness of their influence on the shaping of technologies and organisations.
For instance, research on the development and evolution of ICT standards (NO-
REST, 2004) shows that certain actors might exercise pressure for the establishment
of certain standards according to their position and power to influence. This is done
consciously but the motive to do so is not the shaping of a technology as a goal in
itself; rather, the business benefit they might have from such a move. Social choices
in the shaping of T&O, therefore, although they are generated in a socio-economic
space outside the actor, should not be completely detached from the actors business
identities because the legitimization of those choices will not be revealed and
interests, political power and motives behind certain choices will remain hidden.
Additionally, the above does not mean that the shaping of technology is
driven by conscious, strategically planned business motives only. The point to be
made here is that although business organisations in various industries have been
adequately studied as important actors, either as users or suppliers, who make social
choices and can influence the shaping of a technology, these choices have not been
explained or justified as driven by the nature of such actors as business organisations
and their conscious realisation of this nature. In this study it is shown that the level of
consciousness of actors' choices as business choices is very high. Actors might not
have a full control of that consciousness but this consciousness is still shaped within
a "business rhetoric". Social choices have been conceptualised as political, social,
serving certain interests of actors. Paradoxically, they have not been conceived as
"business choices". This is not to reduce the shaping of T&O to a business
negotiation, rather decision-making and choice is conceived as part of the concept of
action and also linked with the conscious realisation of the nature of the actors
performing such an action.
The emergence of the business firm as an important actor reclaims social
action as attributed to more complex entities, like business firms, which are operating
in a multi-actor, multi-level challenging environment. This is contrary to a
theorization of social action as driven by political interest and lost in the midst of
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organizational politics and conflicts, as a political processes approach would
suggest, or as motivated necessarily towards the shaping of a particular technology
or organization, as certain constructivist approaches would argue. ATOC theory
seeks the motive behind social action within the identity and nature of the actor as a
complex entity, as a business firm and as expressed through choices and non-choices
that actors make and promote during instances of T-0 change. Nonetheless, as it was
previously shown with the viewpoint approach, organizational action is also taken
into account but ATOC theory theorizes it as integral with the emergence of business
firm as central actors in T-0 change within ATOC. Williams & Edge (1996) suggest
that choices in the shaping of technology are essential but not necessarily conscious.
They argue that they are inherent both in the design of individual artefacts and
systems and in the direction or trajectory of innovation programs (1996:886). This is
true and it becomes apparent when examining technologies retrospectively, after they
have been shaped to a certain extent. In doing so, however, the link between social
choices and the actors producing them is lost and not complete reference can be
made to the rationale and legitimacy of the origins of certain social choices. ATOC
theory and the emergence of the viewpoint approach effectively links the social
choices with the actors producing them. These findings contribute to various kinds of
literatures by integrating and making more visible issues and socio-economic
relations in the management of T-0 change.
The debate between research focusing on action and structural accounts in the
study of technologies and organisations, although too complex to be resolved by this
single study, nevertheless, useful comments can be provided on the relationship
between action and structure. The management of T-0 change could be seen as an
action-structure interplay. This study suggests that action and structure, both as
analytical concepts and their interplay as a social phenomenon, are not fixed
categories, they are not "black-boxes", to use a SST term. Their content and meaning
is bound to the social situation that generates them; basically, through the
interpretation of that situation and its environment, by the actors involved in it based
on their viewpoints. As Clark (2000) argues, "structure, agency and reproduction
must acknowledge that structures are historically and contextually specific. The
reproduction of social structures involves situated practices which have to be
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assembled" (Clark, 2000:82). In this study, the action-structure relationship is
understood in terms of producing and promoting social choices during the initiation,
design and implementation of T-0 change instances within ATOC. Action can be
understood as the development of social choices by individual firms and the power to
impose them in order for them to influence the particular social situation towards a
certain direction, as justified by their individual viewpoint. Structure is constituted
by the elements enacted, to use Giddensian terms, during this social situation that
constrain, restrict, limit, determine and enable certain choices to be made and
promoted. Additionally, as the viewpoint approach would suggest, the concept of
action includes observation of other actions, prediction, imagination, planning,
evaluation, and also interpretation. Actors have the ability to observe social
situations and attach meaning to them, that is, identifying various elements as actions
or as structures. For instance, the fact that IBM Hellas has strategically acted, given
the circumstances, in a way that they had covered most of the Greek market's needs
for mainframe computers in the banking industry appears as a structural constraint to
the SIF's management. This influenced the way they are producing and promoting
social choices during the initiation, design and implementation of T-O change
instances. An actor conceived another actor's action as a structural determinant. The
concepts of action and structure, therefore, are situated on and constructed by the
social situation they refer to, the wider environment of social and economic relations
within which that situation emerges, as well as the differing viewpoints of the actors
involved in that situation. The action-structure interplay is, therefore, captured as
embodied and expressed by an actor's "rationality". It constitutes the interpretation
of a challenging social and material situation, based on the actors' viewpoint of
themselves as part of their environment.
The action-structure interplay within ATOC becomes open to various
interpretations due to the variety of indeterminate possibilities that exist, on one
hand, but also a variety of particular structural constraints, on the other, as different
actors might perceive them. The viewpoint approach to strategic management of T-0
change enables business organisations to settle the challenges and the uncertainties
the above condition poses. The employment of a structurational vocabulary
illustrates what corporate and T-0 managerial action involves and how decisions are
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made based on the conception and interpretation of the possibilities for action
and the structural constraints. Additionally, it makes areas of action and intervention
within ATOC more visible and more open, as actors attempt to position themselves
within ATOC, gain access to resources and power and influence. These areas of
action and intervention within ATOC, a heterogeneous and complex environment of
distributed control become more open and visible for actors by realising and focusing
managerial action on the challenges that the management of T-0 change poses.
The challenging ATOC environment generates social choice, that is, action
which aims to resolve and manage the difficulties of T-0 change. Different actors
understand ATOC in different ways, they are configured in it through being part of
different networks; however, all of them need to face the challenges emerging from
being part of such a socio-economic reality. Managing possibilities-constraints,
networks of power and influence and access to resources, reducing complexity,
reaching optimal decisions, surviving competition and the distribution of control are
all common challenges for both suppliers and users participating in instances of T-0
change within ATOC. In understanding how actors manage these challenges, I tried
to examine them through the eyes of different actors and found that the social
choices made and promoted during T-0 change instances are based on these actors'
different viewpoints. These differing viewpoints serve as a basis to make legitimate
and justifiable, yet not necessarily optimal, choices due to not having full control of
their viewpoints and the process of its sharpening.
This discussion on action-structure promotes reflexive reading of existing
literature in T&O as well as reflexive future research and analytical approaches that
make use of these terms.
8.3.2 Theorising Technology and Organisation
The development of ATOC as an analytical concept alongside its increasing
empirical salience as a socio-economic space for practice, offers an opportunity to
rethink the concepts of T&O and the way they are coupled in the context of instances
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of T-0 change. In doing so, ATOC theory responds to shortcomings of existing
models of conceiving T&O. Let us be more specific:
8.3.2.a Problematizing Organisation
Studies that focus on organisation are not consistent in terms of how they
define the concept. Some see it as whole firms, others as work organisation, others as
processes, others as resources. In the context of T-0 change, this thesis suggests that
the concept of organisation refers to:
the negotiable elements of the user organisation i.e. processes, marketing,
HR, and so on.
rhetorical elements of models developed elsewhere and are considered for
adoption (rhetorical T-O models or metaphors or visions).
The concept of organisation, therefore, becomes present in these two forms and
refers mainly to the business/organisational aspects of T-0 change. When these two
understandings of the concept of organisation interact within a particular T-0 change
instance a certain organisational/business problem is framed seeking a solution.
During the initiation, design and implementation of technological solutions for
organisational/business problems, organisational elements are framed, negotiated in
both technological and business terms and discourses, based on previous T-0
configurations or more generic models which are parts of "rhetorical T-O models"
circulated within ATOC. Next, a technological solution is developed to solve the
particular problem. Such elements might include organisational culture, processes,
resources, routines, capabilities, organisational structures and the extent to which
they can be problematised, changed and reconfigured during instances of T-0
change. The concept of organisation takes meaning during T-O change instances
through the "problematiseable" elements and aspects that can be examined as part of
a problem that needs to find a technological solution. These elements and aspects
might refer to processes, structures and resources, but they are understood as parts of
a problem as it is constructed and negotiated in business terms. Negotiation, of
course, does not mean that organisations are totally plastic and malleable. For
instance, in the case studies examined in this thesis, the organisational elements that
could not be easily changed or problematised in a certain way, either they were
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incorporated into the particular customised design or they were dealt with as
emerging problems during implementation. Organisation, then, acquires new
meaning through the process of initiating, designing and implementing technological
solutions for organisational/business problems as a set of elements that could or
could not be amenable to problematisation, negotiation and change. The nature of
actors, their role within ATOC and the nature of the social situations in which they
are involved, provide the basis for the definition of organisation under such terms.
8.3.2.b Technologies as Solutions
Technologies, similarly, have been conceived in many ways in relation to
organisations. Deterministic views see technology as shaping organisation; some
others see it as shaped by it, while still others in a mutual co-shaping relationship.
Also, some would define it based on distinctions such as material-immaterial or
technical-social. As part of the techno-organisational entity, technologies are seen as
elements constituting solutions for organisational/business problems. Managers of
user organisations might see technologies as investments, as facilitating business
opportunities, enhancing productivity, helping management of processes and playing
a rather instrumental role. Supplier organisations develop technologies as solutions,
as products to be sold to their customers or as technical configurations, depending on
the expertise employed). The interpretive flexibility in how technology can acquire
meaning is, therefore, quite high. Nonetheless, the nature of ATOC as a socio¬
economic environment, the nature of actors within ATOC as business firms and the
nature of T-0 change instances as social situations of ATOC re-configurations where
technological solutions for organisation/business problems are initiated, designed
and implemented, is a determining factor in how technologies are defined.
The large ATOC networks of technology supply and use worldwide are
developed in order to make sure that a market of supply and demand for
technological solutions for organisational problems is established and working. The
rise of the technology supply industry along with business consultants have become
part of the ATOC mechanism that circulates technologies as parts of solutions for
organisational/business problems within a variety of organisational fields worldwide.
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In relation to a particular T-0 change instance, these constitute parts of rhetorical
T-0 models which are up for selection. When selection and choice are required,
technologies are parts of the elements configured into a product that constitutes a
solution to the problematized organisational settings and acquire certain meaning in
the context of particular instances of initiation, design and implementation of
technological solutions for organisational/business problems, where such products
are sold and bought. Technologies are parts of techno-organisational configurations
(Fleck, 1993) in technical terms where software, hardware and services come
together and constitute a technological commodity, but they also constitute solutions
to certain organisational/business problems; that is, at the socio-economic context
where they will be applied. For this reason, they can be negotiated and assessed both
in technological and non-technological, business terms, based on the expertise
available to the actors participating in a T-0 change instance and on the different
phases of the development of such a solution. Usually the business negotiation
precedes the technological one. Technologies can, therefore, take on all of these
forms depending on the relationship between ATOC and the actor as well as on the
social situation that this relationship becomes prevalent.
The understanding of technologies as solutions to organisational/business
problems and the realisation that there is not a single optimal solution to a given
problem, rather the problem-solution duality co-develop in various contexts, opens
up space for the involvement of interpretive flexibility and the interaction amongst
various viewpoints during a challenging situation of T-0 change.
8.3.2.C The Techno-Organisational Concept
In contrast with the literatures with a one-dimensional focus on technologies
or organisations, this study illustrates these concepts as part of the techno-
organisational as an analytical concept. Techno-organisational is an entity that is
shaped through instances of T-0 change. Organisations and technologies as
negotiable elements during T-0 change instances which might take the meaning of a
"problem" and a "solution" are products of historical developments as well as socio¬
economic. T-0 change instances could be seen as the moments when certain
technological and organisational histories come together at a certain time and space
269
forming an ATOC configuration. The relationship between T&O is not just
technologies and organisations coming together at a certain time and place, but also
their organisational and technological histories, which have been developed within
ATOC and are constituted by various networks of socio-economic relations between
a variety of actors. This is why the T-0 relationship could be theorised as an ATOC
configuration, rather than the ambiguous term of socio-technical configuration, in the
sense that it includes a wider socio-economic environment and relations.
The fact that ATOC might be configured in many different ways means that
at a particular T-0 change instance certain technologies come together with certain
organisations instead of others. This presupposes choice. The histories of both
technologies and organisations in a T-0 change instance are very important in terms
of the legacies that might determine certain future choices. For instance, a legacy
banking system might shape future choices in relation to T-0 change. During a T-0
change instance these histories are translated into possibilities and constraints at the
level of the T-0 change instance; that is, become problematised and negotiable. At
the time of a T-0 change instance, these histories or, more accurately, the legacies of
these histories are seen as possibilities or as constraints for the change effort.
Organisational and technological histories, therefore, are re-enacted during T-O
change instances and contribute to the creation of social choices. The concept of
techno-organisational and the focus on instances of T-O change, therefore, does not
aim at neglecting the importance of histories and biographies of technologies and
organisations; rather, it reveals how these histories are conceived by different actors
involved in a T-0 change instance at a certain time and how they are incorporated in
decision making processes in relation to social choices generated during the
initiation, design and implementation of T-O change. Histories are important and this
study shows how they are filtered, re-enacted and employed in real time through the
actors involved, within a frame of exploring possibilities and constraints in the
initiation, design and implementation of T-0 change instances.
From the above, it can be argued that the analytical value of the techno-
organisational concept integrates literatures and issues and resolves inconsistencies
emerging from one-dimensional research focusing either on technologies or on
organisations on the basis of accounting for the importance of technological and
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organisational histories. The T-0 change concept captures changes in
technologies and organisations through the emergence and negotiation of social
choices between diverse and heterogeneous actors within the framework of T-0
change instances. Such social situations place certain technologies and certain
organisational elements within the same template and explore how they are co-
shaped by also taking into account the histories and biographies of the technological
and organisational elements brought together at a certain time and space.
The ATOC concept which understands the coupling between T&O as part of
the techno-organisational entity which is shaped during T-0 change instances within
ATOC as a practice space, offers a wider understanding of how socio-technical
configurations emerge (ATOC configurations here), rather than alternative concepts,
such as, technological frames (Bijker, 1995; McLoughlin, 1999). Frames provide the
shared assumptions, knowledge and expectations through which relevant groups give
meaning to an existing or emerging socio-technical configuration (McLoughlin,
1999: 160). However, the concept of ATOC as an analytical space includes wider
processes and social relations beyond certain such configurations and moves away
from a strictly organisational understanding of the T-0 relationship.
8.3.3 ATOC: A Multilevel Analytical Space
The viewpoint-based definition and conception of ATOC offers the
possibility of a multilevel theorisation of T-0 change based on the idea that actors
can conceive of themselves as part of their wider environment extending from a local
level of a T-O change instance to a global level of the socio-economic relations of
the knowledge economy. At the level of personal identity of individual actors it can
be argued that individuals understand themselves by acknowledging multiple aspects
of their identity, for example, as members of a family, as workers, as citizens of a
nation, as citizens of the EU, as members of a "global village", to use Marshall
McLuhan's concept (McLuhan, 1962). All these aspects may be parts of people's
identities although there is not immediate access or contact with all these levels and
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forces that construct these identities. They might have immediate access to some
of the social forces shaping their identity, but some other forces are more distant and
completely imagined, in the sense that Benedict Anderson uses the term "imagined
communities" to define the nation (Anderson, 1983) or in the sense that Castoriadis
uses the term "imaginary institution of society" (1975) to show how the psyche
creates stable figures for the self, ignoring the constant emergence of mental
indeterminacy and alterity by creating external social institutions that give stable
form to what he has termed as the magma of social significations. In STS there is
already work of increasing significance on the notion of imaginaries as bound to
professional practices (practice-bound imaginaries) and the way these practices
shape prospective uses of technologies (Hyysalo, 2006; Gregory et al, 2003).
An analogous argument could be made about more complex actors, like
firms. The constructed multifaceted and multilevel identity of actors-firms can be
captured by the concept of viewpoint. Through their viewpoint, firms, independently
of their size, are still able to conceive themselves as part of something wider,
especially when they interact with elements of their environment that can be seen as
having a wider, global scope. The globalisation of T-O change and the emergence of
ATOC enact multiple levels in firm's viewpoints and shape it. Viewpoints, however,
are shaped not only through the things that actors experience and have direct contact
with and access to, but also through things that are imagined. Existing STS literature,
for instance, although they have paid attention to social choices in the design and
implementation of technologies in organisations, do not examine the processes of
emergence of those social choices, rather they reduce it to an empirical issue,
examined a posteriori (i.e. Hyysalo, 2006). In other words, a viewpoint is shaped not
only by the things you see, but also by the things you cannot see but you imagine
them because "you know" they are there, either by engaging in risk taking activities
or by employing secondary knowledge. By giving voice to the actors involved in T-
O change instances, as they occur within a global knowledge economy, the
conception of multiple levels into which the ATOC space is spread and also the
interpretation and significance of this space to the actors conceiving it is possible,
since the actors' voice represents their viewpoint of the world. ATOC as a practice
space, therefore, can be conceived as involving multiple levels which can be
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analytically captured by ATOC as an analytical concept which places within the
same analytical template the local and the global, the micro and the macro.
Through forces and processes of particularisation which narrow down
indeterminate possibilities, reduce complexity and uncertainty and also forces and
processes of abstraction that generify and feed back to the global knowledge
economy insights from particular T-0 change instances, ATOC realises and
effectuates itself in a way that the global is linked with the local. Making this process
of how ATOC works analytically visible is adequate for explaining and resolving the
global-local paradox, at least as it appears in this study. The global-local paradox
finds a practical resolution, in terms of employing a viewpoint approach to manage
indeterminate possibilities offered within the global knowledge economy, that is,
within ATOC as a space for practice. It also finds an analytical resolution, in terms
of analytically being able to capture processes and mechanisms that link the global
with the local regarding the relationship between T&O as it is happening through
instances of T-0 change.
The processes of abstraction and particularisation of ATOC could be
contrasted with the processes of de-contextualisation and re-contextualisation in
technological development. Schumm & Kocyba (1997)40 focus on processes of
technological development to analyse decisions made by the influential actors
involved in these processes. They distinguish three steps of multiple transformation
which are:
Perception and articulation of the problem.
Translation into guidelines for technological development (de-
contextualisation).
Technical engineering development work, translation back to the application
context (re-contextualisation) (Schumm & Kocyba, 1997:54).
By "de-contextualisation" they understand the process by which social needs and
interests are translated into demands for technical function; these demands are
detached step-by-step from their social context and specified according to
technological criteria (ibid.). This way they see technological discourse as apart from
40
This is not mentioned in the literature review because it is contrasted to the particularization-
abstraction model which emerged later on, after the analysis of the data.
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the organisational context but they do not examine the recording of the
operational requirements, as a process of problematisation, as a de-contextualisation.
Based on the concept of techno-organisational, a counter-argument could be that
both technology and organisations are negotiated, de-contextualised and re-
contextualised during processes of initiation, design and implementation. However,
the specialist technological or business knowledge involved in T-0 change instances
should not be seen as out of context. Analytically, the space that is conceived as a
context is a particular T-0 change instance within ATOC and not the specific
organisational boundaries of the user organisation. The translation of operational
requirements into technological specifications, therefore, is not a process of de-
contextualisation, as it happens within the conceived context of ATOC, but rather
one of the processes that contribute to ATOC particularisation. This is because this
translation is taking place based on choices and reflections on the technological
resources available to a particular instance through networks and contacts and,
therefore, it is a process that particularises the indeterminate technological
possibilities that ATOC might offer. The translators, thus, would not translate an
operational requirement into a technological function that they cannot cover; they
would not create a problem that they could not solve. There is not an ideal solution to
a pre-fixed problem, rather the problematisation of organisational structures with the
translation of the problem in technological terms and the development of a solution
to that problem all happen in the same context which is captured by the concept of
ATOC and the way it is particularised towards instances of T-0 change. Also, the
de-contextualisation and re-contextualisation processes could not explain
technological development in the context of long-term relationships between
suppliers and users, like SIF and The Bank. In such cases, for the most part, the
process of de-contextualisation does not happen at all.
Accounts such as the de-contextualisation - re-contextualisation (Schumm &
Kocyba, 1997) or localised and de-localised meanings of a technology (see
McLaughlin, J. et al, 1999:7) although they give an account of the local context,
neglect the "de-context", or the "non-context" and the fact that it is conceivable by
actors and can influence social choice or non-choice. Literature has been unable to
describe and explain non-context and it is used only as a reference point in order to
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define the context of a technology or a social situation. ATOC theory provides a
consistent and systematic account on how the non-context could be defined as
perceived by socio-economic actors, capturing it by processes of particularisation
and abstraction during the initiation, design and implementation of local T-O change
instances within ATOC and the global knowledge economy.
ATOC theory could also be contrasted to the neo-institutional paradigm
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Apart from the restricted focus on institutions, an
emphasis on symbols and rites as important and beyond choices of rational actors
and a fixation with literature studies (Clausen & Koch, 2002), it could also be argued
that the concept of homogenisation and isomorphism cannot quite fit to a complete
explanation of the shaping of the relationship between T&O. More particularly, and
in contrast to the ATOC model, it is suggested that homogenisation and isomorphism
occurs at a rhetorical and abstract level, in terms of the management of T-0 change.
Although tendencies for isomorphism might be identified at a rhetorical and abstract
level, as they are pushed by the marketing of innovation processes (see generification
literature), they could be associated with processes of ATOC abstraction. This means
that although isomorphic tendencies may be identified in the structuration of
organisational fields, as DiMaggio & Powell (1983:147) would suggest, this may be
seen as a process of abstraction in relation to the distance between T-0 change
instances with the global knowledge economy.
The realisation that business organisations tend to resemble each other can be
seen at a rhetorical level and does not simplify the challenges of T-0 change
emerging from a social situation characterised by diversity of actors' interests, CSCs,
knowledge, resources and strategies. Highly institutionalised organisational fields
and well established actors might have the ability to partially shape the criteria for T-
O change by promoting and facilitating homogenisation at a rhetorical, abstract level.
The great diversity of organisational and inter-organisational contexts and spaces,
however, oppose to the practical realisation of this rhetorical trend. In this sense it
could be argued that institutional and neo-institutional approaches tend to
overemphasise the power of certain well established institutions on the shaping of
T&O while neglecting emerging and contingent factors of the local (inter-)
organisational circumstances. The concept of isomorphism, then, is quite simplistic
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in comparison with the ATOC model which captures the complexities and
contradictions of the socio-economic relations shaping T&O. For instance, neo-
institutionalism might identify BPR as a significant institution that shapes T&O but it
does not capture the different choices and possibilities that actors make while
adopting and implementing BPR. A neo-institutional approach would not be able to
successfully conceptualise, link and analytically use the global-local distinction;
rather, it would bring about its paradoxical qualities, the ones ATOC theory aims to
resolve. ATOC framework acknowledges the significance of a neo-institutional
insight but it would place it on an analytically restricted space, at a rhetorical level
between processes of particularisation and abstraction. Neo-institutional perspectives
are meso-approaches with very specific focus and the neo-institutional lenses cannot
see as close as an instance of T-0 change or as far as a global system of socio¬
economic and market relations.
It seems that the ATOC metaphor and an analytical focus on instances of T-0
change within the global knowledge economy provides a useful analytical template
in order to capture, explore, describe and explain multilevel and multidimensional
spaces within which socio-economic relations are shaping the relationship between
T&O through managing T-O change and linking the global knowledge economy
with particular local T-0 change instances. Various concepts have been developed in
order to capture the socio-economic relations amongst various actors who contribute
to the development of technologies and organisations, even within a global
environment where the global-local issue might appear as a paradox or as a problem
to be analytically solved. The concept of "arenas of development" (Jorgensen &
Sorensen, 1999) is also an attempt to capture a space where the development of
technologies is taking place, but the focus on the technology leaves some actors,
factors and processes invisible. Another concept that might be of relevance here is
the "firm-in-sector" perspective by Whipp & Clark (1986), which provides an
analytical template to capture organisations within their environment. This concept,
however, is quite restricted in accounting for processes happening beyond
organisational and sectoral boundaries.
The most obvious template to capture socio-economic relations and how they
are formed within a global-local framework comes from an ANT perspective. In the
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TSR.2 case, Law & Callon (1992) offer a template to capture the development of
an actor-network in the building of an aircraft with reference to the global and the
local. This template, however, is quite restricted since it does not capture a space or
an environment within which the actor-network is developed. This is related to their
also restricted conceptualisation of action. They look at action by "digesting"
everything to the local actors but without placing them within a wider framework,
which would illustrate how action is performed based on decision-making choices.
They look at completed actions without examining the existence or not of various
possibilities before the actions are performed. For example, they refer to the global
and the local by using a network vocabulary. They speak of global network and local
network and of 'obligatory point passage' linking them (ibid:48). Global and local,
however, do not only refer to networks but also to environments and cognitive and
conceivable spaces within which networks are developed. This have been achieved
by including in the concept of action the ability of actors to conceive an environment
of possibilities and constraints in light of making decisions to act. The global
includes not only the networks of actors that could be linked with a particular
instance (T-0 change instance in this study, the aircraft in Law & Callon's study) but
also the rest of the possible or alternative networks that could have been mobilised
but did not. At the local level also, processes of initiation of an instance where
networks might or might not exist before the particular instance are captured and the
way networks are configured with processes of particularisation in relation to that
instance are revealed. To conclude, ANT approach could only account for a
particular 'slice' within ATOC since they take already completed one-off cases and
they deconstruct them, but they leave outside their analysis processes that illustrate
more how choices are made, how decision making is happening based on the linkage
between a local particular T-0 change instance with a global indeterminate and
abstract environment of the knowledge economy.
The way ATOC works from the abstract global knowledge economy to local
particular instances of T-0 change, as an analytical scheme resembles with
conceptions of the realist approach where "concrete" events are seen as shaped by
less concrete and more abstract mechanisms which are situated within abstract
structures (see Clark, 2000:81-82). Also, in relation to the separation of three
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separate domains, - the real, which contains natural and social objects and
mechanisms (mechanisms are defined as tendencies to behave in particular ways)
and there are real structures which endure independently of our experience and our
knowledge (Sayer, 1992:33); the actual domain which is made up of events that can
occur without being experienced; and the empirical domain which is made up of
experiences (Clark, 2000:81) - are trying to explore the degree to which structures,
although hidden, distant and independent of experience, constrain and shape
everyday patterns of action and events (Clark, 2000: 82). In addition to these and in
relation to studies in strategy, Clark argues that they overplay the capacities and
freedom of movement available to most persons (or firms) while they underplay the
shaping influence of pre-existing conditions and causal relations (Clark, 2000:82).
The notion of imagination of the non-experience which sharpens the actors'
viewpoints when are called to make social choices (or non-choices) as emerging
from this study might give an answer to how hidden structures might create
mechanisms that would shape actions and events.
8.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The employment of the ATOC concept helped capture the space between
instances of T-0 change and the global knowledge economy and resolve some of the
confusion created by inconsistent and disintegrated interdisciplinary research in the
study of T&O. The global knowledge economy has gained increasing attention in the
face of both the increasing importance of knowledge and information in societies and
the increasing intensity of knowledge and information activities, due to the
globalisation of economic activities and due to the increasing interconnectedness and
networking of socio-economic relations (see Dankbaar, 2003). In relation to the
shaping of T&O through instances of T-0 change and the emergence of the
challenges of T-O change management for the heterogeneous actors involved in it,
the tensions and the forces driving it appear constructed in a certain way. When
looking at instances of T-0 change as part of a wider environment of socio-economic
relations and how actors perceive and manage the challenges of those instances, the
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global knowledge economy appears as constructed in a certain form and is
realised through certain processes. In these processes, the social choices of actors and
the way they emerge are captured and illustrated as significant in how the global
knowledge economy is realised within the spectmm between wide abstract socio¬
economic relations and local emergences of instances ofT-0 change. The theory of
ATOC captures this journey of the realisation of the global knowledge economy
through the viewpoints of different and diverse actors. It illustrates it as a cycle from
global, abstract, indeterminate, seemingly abundant possibilities, which need to be
balanced and fit with the constraints that the local, particular, organisational, settings
of the social situation of a T-0 change instance pose, and back. The abstract global
knowledge economy, then, finds its way to multiple, particular, local T-0 change
instances through social choices of the heterogeneous and diverse actors involved in
them emerging from the interactions and negotiations of their diverse viewpoints
during T-0 change management.
The theoretical-analytical and epistemological developments brought in by
this study with the concept of ATOC point towards a new sociology of T&O by
focusing on actors and the processes that lead to the emergence of social action as
social choices generated by social situations created by the configuration and re¬
configuration of socio-economic relations within ATOC. A focus on such social
situations as emerging within a wider nexus of social and economic relations among
diverse and heterogeneous actors; the illustration of actors' viewpoint as a useful
means for a more realistic, multilevel and multidimensional understanding of the
world; and the development of new concepts that can capture previously hidden
relationships, helped provide an adequate resolution and analytical incorporation of
long-standing dichotomies in social science, such as action-structure, micro-macro
and global-local and technology-organisation. In a sense, ATOC theory does not
focus on macro or micro-objects by falling into the pitfalls of reductionism or
dualism (see Barnes, 2001) or on structure or agency. It rather exemplifies the way
complex actors make social choices and non-choices by conceiving and interpreting
the macro, the micro, actions and structures while understanding themselves as part
of a wider environment during social situations significant enough to generate social
choices. ATOC theory also shows how actors become conscious of their own actions
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and how they contrast or differentiate them with actions of other actors within
ATOC socio-economic relations.
More specifically, the general ATOC theory provides a useful analytical
template which makes the socio-economic relations that shape the T&O relationship
more visible. More particularly:
It conceives and captures the relationship between the global and the local
and how they interact in a more complete, visible way by taking into account
the viewpoint approach of different actors involved in a T-0 change instance.
It constitutes a more flexible mechanism to define and capture spaces, inter-
organisational relationships, networks of innovation etc. because it illustrates
the differences in viewpoints and strategies, the distributed control,
heterogeneity and diversity.
Makes network development more visible and complete by showing how
networks are developed in a certain way instead of another based on actors'
strategies and their management of possibilities.
Makes action more visible by associating it with the social choices and non-
choices of actors when they are managing possibilities and constraints in T-0
change instances and illustrates its importance for the shaping of T&O
relationship.
Trade-offs are more visible in the sense that it accounts for the justification of
actors' choices.
Provides a better account on organisations and their environment. The
relationship between a business organisation and its environment is not just a
geographical, cognitive, analytical, stable mapping, it is rather an issue for
management (i.e. management of networks and contacts).
Finally, it integrates snapshot studies with a wider socio-economic and
historical environment by linking instances of T-0 change with the global
knowledge economy. This way it fulfils C. W. Mills' call (1959) for
sociological imagination by linking the history of a particular instance (how it
was created through particularisation) with the history of the wider
knowledge economy, thus resolving the global-local paradox.
280
Within this context, the T-0 relationship can be captured in a certain way
and theorised. The shaping of the T-0 relationship may be conceived as ATOC
configurations and re-configurations through processes of ATOC particularisation
and abstraction by the involvement of actors' social choices and strategic
management of T-0 change. The value of this study lies on the fact that it is based on
the co-development of empirical study with theoretical, epistemological and
analytical advancements. Building on the Social Shaping of Technology tradition
this new sociology of T&O explores new ways of capturing socio-economic relations
in the shaping of the relationship between T&O. In doing so, it integrates STS
literatures that might seem inconsistent and disintegrated in the study of T&O under
an interdisciplinary prism. This way it provides the basis for the development of a
more solid academic identity. With this study I hope to stimulate the relevant
academic community and interdisciplinary networks to take up some of the ideas
developed here, explore them further and add more value to them by cross-fertilising
them with new ones in order to bring more insights to the understanding of the
relationship between T&O. In a sense, this study by making visible certain processes
and socio-economic relations in the shaping of T&O opens up a door for the
development of research agendas and programs with an interdisciplinary
understanding leading to a new sociology of technology and organisations.
Additionally, this study has value in offering practical insights to industry
practitioners involved in T-0 change management. Given the risks and the
challenges of decision-making and scoping social choice during instances of T-0
change, the viewpoint approach as a management tool could be a resource for
reflexive access of actors to the possibilities and constraints they might face.
8.5 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In general, the present study with the development of ATOC theory in
understanding the shaping of the relationship between T&O which points to the
direction of a new sociology of T&O that captures and explains local social and
economic phenomena as linked with wider socio-economic developments in time
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and space, thus bringing the study of T&O closer to C.W.Mills' call for
sociological imagination (Mills, 1959). Mills argues that "No social study that does
not come back to the problems of biography, of history and of their intersections
within a society has completed its intellectual journey" (Mills, 1959). The idea seems
to be that in social studies, personal, individual, snapshot biographies should be
linked, or seen as part of a more general history of society, in order for them to be
intellectually complete. In staying faithful to this suggestion, the ATOC model
suggests that in the study of T&O, more long term and larger scale studies of
historical and longitudinal dimension should be done that include both broader socio¬
economic changes as well as directly involved actors and particular local
circumstances. The links between these two levels, in a way that the biography of a
T-0 change instance could be linked with wider socio-economic developments in the
history of economies, markets and industrial models should be explored.
The ATOC model challenges the mode of doing case studies traditionally by
shifting the focus on instances of T-0 change, by questioning the analyst's
involvement and the time in which s/he enters the field. More particularly, a focus on
social situations rather than on technologies or organizations offers a more accurate
and reliable source of social choices and non-choices; the paralleling of the analytical
view with the actors' views offers a less disruptive involvement of the analyst and an
alternative understanding of the relevant values that govern the production of social
choices, rather than externally imposing arbitrary value judgments on the subjects of
the study; finally the time of entrance in the field in a way that phenomena are
studied as they unfold reveals the rationality and legitimization mechanisms of social
choices rather than examining the effect of those choices retrospectively, where the
link between "social choice" and "actor" is lost. Additionally, this study questions
the way that actors and issues acquire analytical and academic importance in case
studies on T&O. The sampling techniques and the analytical viewpoint adopted for
this study make the important actors and issues emerge without the influence of any
personal biases of the analyst. A challenge underpinning these innovative steps
towards a new sociology of T&O would be to manage to address them empirically
and make good use of them in various contexts of research. In terms of future work,
then, the ATOC model sets a basis for the development of further empirical studies
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that make use and are benefited by the analytical and conceptual developments
illustrated in this study.
Apart from the analytical, theoretical and empirical value of this study, there
are a few constraints and limitations that need to be mentioned and certain research
design choices to be reflected on. The limitations of this particular study as a
research process are mostly due to restrictions of the research field, of time, space,
and budget while the limitations of ATOC theory as a template for analysis and
understanding of the relationship between T&O could be resolved by further work
and engagement with the topic where various alternative possibilities will be
examined and more ideas employed. Let us discuss, therefore, various limitations
and how do they point to the direction of future research.
First of all, I had access to a limited number of corporate actors within ATOC
who might appear during processes of initiation, design and implementation of T-0
change instances. Such actors are: the state, regulatory bodies, professional
associations, unions, wide range of specialists and suppliers. ATOC theory, however,
provides an excellent framework for such actors to be conceptualised and examined.
I chose a certain amount of case studies because I wanted to develop them up to a
certain range and scope that would provide necessary empirical data to sketch the
ATOC environment and certain social and economic relations within it. Later on, the
scope was widened including more actors, however, a focus on T-O change instances
made their inclusion possible. Viewpoints from the supply and use side of ATOC
were chosen as basic actors. Other actors could have been chosen as well but their
viewpoints would not be able to be fully developed and justified due to lack of time,
space and money. One direction for future work would be to explore the role of
different actors within ATOC and how they might contribute to the processes of
particularisation and abstraction of ATOC by developing and performing their
viewpoints.
Although the ATOC theory framework is able to accommodate small sized
actors or actors that are not necessarily leading the international developments in
technologies and business models, my case studies are about actors and instances
significant enough to exemplify issues such as diversity, heterogeneity, complexity,
multiplicity of actors involved in one instance. If case studies were about smaller
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actors, SMEs for example, the issues raised might have been different and theory
development would have been tailored more on smaller actors and their relationship
with the global knowledge economy. The point is that the choice of cases might
affect the way an ATOC framework could be used, however, this flexibility might
contribute to further analytical exploration of such a framework by employing it in a
variety of cases and contexts. Besides, this is the point of understanding the
viewpoint approach; that is, to be able to recognise different issues and challenges
that different actors might bring to the surface.
In this study, although the process of abstraction was identified there was not
time and the space to examine it more thoroughly. At this point I referred to some
existing literature such as generification, standardisation, institutionalism, only to
point to the direction of future research able to capture more elaborately the process
of abstraction, which would show how local, particular instances of T-0 change
might be part of processes of creating an abstract global knowledge economy. The
same happens with issues of policy and regulation. Although there is a clear
argument in relation to policymaking and regulating ATOC, I did not devote much
space because I did not have adequate empirical data to support it. I, therefore,
presented my argument as a hypothesis or as a research topic that needs to be further
explored within an ATOC theory framework.
Apart from the above imperfections that could be explored more in the future,
I would also like to explore the analytical value of the ATOC theory and the
understanding and use of a viewpoint approach by looking further for metaphors and
concepts that could improve the understanding of how ATOC works and the role of
actors in it. For example, some concepts that we have already started looking at come
from psychology, philosophy and psychoanalytically influenced sociological
theories. More particularly, I would like to explore the notion of "imaginary" (i.e.
Castoriadis, 1975, English translation see 1998;) as part of the viewpoint approach in
relation to decision making. In Castoriadis' terms, it could be explored how actors
understand themselves as part of ATOC through processes where ATOC becomes
socially instituted. Additionally, I would like to explore notions such as "perception"
(see Descartes, for instance) or consciousness (corporate and organisational
consciousness) and how it can be usefully employed towards an understanding of
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viewpoints and the construction and understanding of rhetoric, visions, and
ATOC promises. A relevant and interesting concept to explore in this context is that
of "distributed cognition" (Hutchins, 1995). This refers to a branch of cognitive
science that sees knowledge and cognition as not confined to the individual; rather, it
is distributed by placing memories, facts, or knowledge on the objects, individuals,
and tools in our environment. Although this concept accounts for various
representations within an environment, it will be also interesting to explore the
material basis surrounding the shaping and development of such representations.
The above concepts and their employment will also make the role of history
more visible in the sense of how corporate actors develop their identity and
consciousness historically (history of viewpoint). For instance, what is the role of
organisational and corporate history of a firm in the viewpoint sharpening? Are
histories always a good thing or is it better to be forgotten sometimes? How can
organisations forget "unpleasant" parts of their histories during instances of T-0
change? Is forgetting one's history a process of social learning? Additionally,
interesting issues that might be explored in the future are related to the
embeddedness of actors in networks and how the degree of embeddedness might, or
might not, create some sort of confidence in decision making and how this might
cause rigidity towards change or not. For example, organisations with a high degree
of embeddedness in long term established networks might have gone through
learning processes which in turn might cause rigidity in exploring alternative
possibilities within ATOC for example. I could, therefore, explore which are the
factors that might make viewpoints more rigid or more flexible in decision-making
and how histories of organisations, past experiences, learning processes and degree
of embeddedness might contribute to that.
I would also like to expand my understanding of ATOC in various industries
and also government organisations. In Greece at the moment, for example, there are
changes happening for the modernisation and computerisation of government
organisations. This means that the Greek state as an organisation has opened its
boundaries and exposed itself to ATOC. It would be interesting to see how the
ATOC theory could be useful to explain T-0 change in the Greek government
organisations and ministries, while the role of the citizens would be of great interest
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here in the relationship between citizen-state. This shows another imperfection of
this study that I did not take into consideration, the role of the customers of the user
organisation and whether they had some sort of involvement in the T-0 change
instances that we looked at. This would be another dimension to be taken into
account in the future. The above are just a few possibilities for further exploration of
the analytical value of ATOC theory that the author is currently looking at.
Finally, I could have said the same story by keeping my narrative more
closely to the industry specific characteristics of banking, for instance. The
theoretical-analytical and epistemological value of this study excited me more and I
made a conscious decision to invest more on it rather than focusing and illustrating
industry-specific characteristics of banking and IT industries which would
nevertheless contribute to the enrichment of empirical evidence from Greece. Future
work closely related to various industries could develop when the ATOC theoretical-
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This is a list of my informants for both case studies. For anonymity purposes, I give a
code name to each of them, I provide their role or position and the date the interview
was taken.
GB case
(TP1, top manager, interview 30/05/2003)
(TP2, BPR project manager, interview 10/02/2003)
(PM, overall project manager, interview 19/05/2003)
(SCF, manager subcontracting supplier firm, interview 05/02/2003)
(OPF1, senior manager, interview 19/02/2003)
(OPF2, director, interview 21/02/2003)
(1TF1, project manager, interview 29/03/2003)
(ITF2, manager, interview 13/12/2004)
(BM1, branch manager, interview 11/02/2003)
(BM2, branch manager, interview 03/04/2003)
(BM3, deputy branch manager, interview 27/02/2003)
(DIF, general manager, interview 04/03/2003)
(HRF, manager from HRF, 11/03/2005- email communication)
(BE1, branch employee, interview 30/05/2003)
(BE2, branch employee, interview 27/02/2003)
(BE3, branch employee, interview 15/04/2003)
(BE4, branch employee, interview 03/04/2003)
(BE5, branch employee, interview 03/04/2003)
(BE6, branch employee, interview 15/04/2003)
(BE7, branch employee, interview 27/02/2003)
SIF case
(EAC, academic, interview 7/10/2004)
(SBA, sales manager, interview 22/10/2004)
(DIS, IS director, interview 18/11/2004)
(XMD, ex-managing director, interview 15/12/2004)
(MFS, manager, interview 26/10/2004)
(MRD, R&D manager, interview 16/11/2004)
(PSD, pre-sales manager, interview 26/11/2004)
(PSD1, pre-sales assistant manager, interview 24/11/2004)
(YDIS, assistant director, interview 15/11/2004)
(TMA, senior IT consultant, interview 10/11/2004)
(MISD, manager, interview 16/11/2004)
(ASS, manager, interview 29/11/2004)
(APA, senior IT consultant, interview 12/11/2004)
(TIF, director, interview 09/12/2004)
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(SPS, sales manager, interview 25/10/2004)
2. FURTHER ANONYMIZATION
I present here all the fake names I had to invent in order to secure the anonymity of
the persons, firms as well as brands of products I was dealing with during fieldwork
(apart from my interviewees which were anonymized as shown above). Some other
actors mentioned in the study are not anonymized due to the fact that most of them
are international multinationals and by mentioning them does not reveal any
information about my central actors' identities. Additionally, the information
provided with reference the non-anonymized actors could not be considered as
classified information since my informants were expressing personal opinions about
these actors and not to any objectively defined information of any kind.
GB Case
Greek Bank (GB): Referring to the user organisation which underwent the large
restructuring program that was studied in this thesis as an instance of T-0 change.
Strategy Firm (SF): Referring to the external specialist firm involved in the
consortium of firms that took up the GB change program and was in charge of the
strategy project.
Human Resources Firm (HFM): Referring to the external specialist firm involved in
the consortium of firms that took up the GB change program and was in charge of
the Human Resources project.
Organisational Processes Firm (OPF): Referring to the external specialist firm -
after a merger of two firms that were initially involved - part of the consortium of
firms that took up the GB change program and was in charge of the Organisational
Processes project.
ITfirm (IFF): The Consortium Leader. Referring to the external specialist firm
leading the consortium of firms that took up the GB change program. ITF provided
the PACKAGE, the integrated banking software package.
Direct Interventions Firm (DIF): Referring to the external specialist firm involved in
the consortium of firms that took up the GB change program and was in charge of
the Risk Management and Loan Portfolio Management (LPM) projects.
Project Management Firm (PMF'): Referring to the external specialist firm involved
in the consortium of firms that took up the GB change program and was in charge of
the overall project management of the whole effort.




Systems Integration Firm (SIF): Refers to the systems supplier firm, the central actor
involved in the second case study.
MSIF: Refers to the international IT company of which SIF is the main
representative in Greece.
The Bank: Refers to the banking organisation which is SIF's largest customer. It
holds a special place in the case study due to the long and interesting history of
involvement with SIF.
Mr. CD: Refers to the owner of one of the largest offices in the world in city
planning who first set the basis for SIF's foundation.
Mr. D: Mr. CD's son and the main shareholder of SIF, who owns about 40%.
3. GREEK BANK IN NUMBERS
Some key numbers (31/12/2003):
Over 2.5 million active accounts
More than 100 products and services
Powerful group of 9 financial services companies
a570 ATM's
451 branches in Greece
5 representative offices in Germany and a worldwide network of 40
correspondent banks
17,831 mil € total assets
14,220 mil € customer deposits
Source: GB website
4. SATIRIC COLUMN REGARDING INTENSIFICATION
IN THE GB CASE:
How many credit cards did you sell today?
- -Eh...
How many personal loans? How many stegastika?
Hmmm....
What? Just this little? That's bad! Very bad! You don't know how to talk to
the customers. You're not taking initiatives. After work go and find some
commercial stores and talk to them about "business 1". Tonight go to the
night clubs and find customers. After the night clubs close, go and find night
watchers, they don't get paid well and they need a personal loan. And in the
morning at work when you don't have any customers, make phone calls and
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offer a free weight loosing program for free ehmmm..sorry, I meant a
Visa card...
Why don't you bugger off!!!
(free translation from the Employees' Union Newsletter)
5. COLUMN REGARDING THE PACKAGE
PACKAGE or Prophets: Our colleagues are reporting enormous difficulties from the
application of the program. The results: More working time, more nerves, more
stress, more frustrated customers. And then it's the workers' fault that they don't
catch up with the time schedule. It's the workers' fault that they don't achieve the
goals. PACKAGE should be giving answers to the customers and their businesses.
We are not prophets.
(free translation from the Employees' Union Newsletter)
